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Acts 1990, No. 1009: The Repeal of Provisions for
Separation From Bed and Board Increases the Federal
Income Tax Burden of Separated Spouses in Louisiana
Susan Kalinka*
In 1990 the Louisiana Legislature repealed the provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code authorizing a judgment of separation from bed
and board.' Under the current Civil Code, married couples can no longer
file for legal separation. If a husband and wife in Louisiana do not
wish to remain together, they may either separate informally or file a
petition for divorce which will be granted after 180 days.2
The repeal of the provisions authorizing separation from bed and
board was part of a major revision of Louisiana's marriage and divorce
law which simplified the procedures for obtaining a divorce, making
no-fault divorce available without requiring spouses to live apart for a
period of time.3 Before the revision, spouses could obtain a no-fault
divorce in Louisiana by living separate and apart for one year.4 A
Louisiana spouse who desired to obtain a divorce sooner was required
to prove that the other spouse either had committed adultery or had
been convicted of a felony; an expedited divorce also could be achieved
by claiming a lesser degree of fault on the part of the other spouse in
order to obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board first.
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1. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, §§ 1-2, 9.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 102.
3. For a discussion of the revision, see Stephanie B. Laborde, Note, Louisiana Divorce
Reform: For Better or For Worse? 50 La. L. Rev. 995 (1990).
4. La. R.S. 9:301 (repealed 1990).
5. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870); La. R.S. 9:302 (repealed 1990). Under the former
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, a spouse who wished to obtain a divorce without
asserting any fault on the part of the other spouse had to wait the same amount of time
to obtain the divorce, whether the spouse filed a petition for a judgment of separation
from bed and board or merely filed a petition for a judgment of divorce. A spouse could
obtain a judgment of divorce on a no-fault basis after living separate and apart fron the
other spouse for one year. La. R.S. 9:301 (repealed 1990). A spouse could obtain a judgment
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The living separate and apart statutes were considered an unneccessary
requirement which, by obliging spouses to live apart for a substantial
period of time prior to the entry of a judgment of divorce, tended "to
defeat the main purpose of the statutory waiting periods-to promote
reconciliation. ' 6 Legal separation was seen as a step on the way to
divorce that served little purpose other than creating a backlog of cases
for family courts. 7 Under the current provisions of the Civil Code,
spouses may obtain a divorce without first obtaining a judgment of
separation from bed and board,8 thereby avoiding the cumbersome proc-
ess, the long delays, and the added expenses that were required under
former law.
Easing the burden on divorcing spouses by simplifying the divorce
procedures should have no federal income tax consequences. Unfortu-
nately, however, by eliminating the possibility of obtaining a legal sep-
aration, the Louisiana Legislature has limited the federal tax savings
options of many separating spouses in Louisiana. The Internal Revenue
Code is laced with provisions whose application depends upon the marital
status of the taxpayer. For some taxpayers, the tax savings are greater
if they are considered "married" for federal income tax purposes. In
such cases, the Internal Revenue Code produces a marriage bonus. In
more cases, however, greater tax savings can be achieved if a couple is
"not married." Provisions that result in a higher tax to married taxpayers
are referred to as the marriage penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.
of separation from bed and board after living separate and apart from the other spouse
for six months. La. Civ. Code art. 138(a) (1987). Upon obtaining the judgment of separation
from bed and board, the spouse was required to wait another six months before being
eligible to obtain a judgment of divorce. La. R.S. 9:302 (repealed 1990).
Obtaining a separation from bed and board, however, could expedite the procedure
in many cases. Under the former provisions, a spouse who filed a petition for divorce could
obtain a divorce within a year only by proving either adultery on the part of the other
spouse or conviction of the other spouse of a felony and his or her sentence to death or
imprisonment at hard labor. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870). In many cases a spouse could
expedite the procedure by obtaining a separation from bed and board upon proof of one
of the fault grounds listed in former La. Civ. Code art. 138(l)-(8), which included, in
addition to adultery or conviction of a felony, the habitual intemperance of the other spouse,
public defamation by the other spouse, abandonment, attempted murder, status as a fugitive
from justice, or intentional non-support. These rules obviously required a showing of lesser
fault than the fault required to obtain an expedited judgment of divorce. In many cases a
spouse could obtain a judgment of divorce within one year by first obtaining a judgment
of separation from bed and board on one of the lesser fault grounds listed in former La.
Civ. Code art. 138 and then waiting six months.
6. Katherine Spaht, Reporter, Policy Considerations Governing the Divorce Revision,
Louisiana State Law Institute Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, Book I-of
Persons, Title V-Divorce, Chapter 1 The Divorce Action 2 (Aug. 20, 1985).
7. Statement of Cynthia Samuel, Divorce Revision: Meeting of the Joint Leg. Study
Committee 2 (Feb. 1, 1989); Laborde, supra note 3, at 1004.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 102.
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The so-called "marriage bonus" provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code generally produce tax savings for one-earner married couples. The
traditional justification for the marriage bonus provisions is that the
earning spouse incurs greater financial responsibilities than a person who
has no spouse or child to support.9 Some commentators have justified
the tax relief provided to the earning spouse, on a "benefits" theory,
arguing that to the extent the nonworking spouse benefits from the
income earned by the spouse who works, the nonworker should be taxed
on the worker's income.' 0
The "marriage penalty" provisions, which generally add to the tax
burden of a married couple when both spouses earn income," have been
justified on the grounds that a married couple has a greater capacity
to pay a higher tax than an unmarried individual earning the same
amount.'" A married couple enjoys economies of scale by sharing house-
hold expenses, and a married couple benefits from the free household
services provided by each spouse. The assumptions upon which the
marriage bonus and penalty provisions are based lose their validity when
a couple separates. 3 Congress implicitly has recognized this fact by
9. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389,
1417 (1975). The marriage bonus provisions originally were enacted to equalize the tax
burden of married couples. Before 1948 the individual was the taxable unit for purposes
of the federal income tax. A married couple could not split the family's income between
the two spouses unless the couple was domiciled in a community property state. Because
each spouse in a community property state is the owner of one-half of the community
income, each spouse is responsible for the tax on one-half of the community income. Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930). The rule allowing spouses to share community
income reduced the tax burden of spouses in community property states because each half
of the community income was taxed at the lower rates that apply under the progressive
rate structure of the federal income tax. Married taxpayers in noncommunity property states
could not achieve the same tax savings, even if they contracted to share all of their earnings.
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. III, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930). In 1948 Congress equalized the tax
treatment of married couples by authorizing every married couple, whether the spouses reside
in a community property state or noncommunity property state, to file a joint return,
aggregating the spouses' income and deductions, and paying a tax equal to twice what a
single person would pay on one-half of their consolidated taxable income. Revenue Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 2, 1948). For a discussion of the
Revenue Act of 1948, see Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue
Act of 1948, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1948). For a history of the income-splitting provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, see Bittker, supra, at 1399-1418.
10. See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simpliried Income Tax, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (1977).
1I. The income tax rate schedules and the limitations on deductions generally produce
a marriage penalty whenever one spouse earns eighty percent or less of the couple's combined
income and the other spouse earns twenty percent or more of the combined income. For
an explanation of the effect of the income tax rates on a two earner couple, see Michael
J. McIntyre, Fairness to Family Members Under Current Tax Reform Proposals, 4 Am. J.
Tax Pol'y 155, 161-74 (1985).
12. Bittker, supra note 9, at 1419-20.
13. Many commentators have argued that the assumptions upon which the marriage
1993]
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providing that, under certain circumstances, separated spouses are con-
sidered unmarried for federal income tax purposes. 14
In general, a taxpayer's marital status is determined on the last day
of the taxable year.15 If a couple is not divorced by December 31, both
spouses are considered married for most tax purposes no matter how
long they have been living apart unless they are "legally separated under
a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance' '16 or unless an exception
known as the "abandoned spouse" rule applies. 17
The phrase "legally separated under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance" is a term of art. Spouses must be legally separated
bonus and penalty provisions are based are invalid even for married couples who do not
separate. Commentators argue that unmarried taxpayers often enjoy the same economies of
scale as a married couple by sharing household expenses when they live together. Some
have criticized the marriage penalty provisions because they discourage taxpayers from
marrying and because they discourage women, who often are secondary earners, from entering
the work force. For a criticism of the marriage bonus and penalty provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, see Pamela B. Gann, The-Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981
Response to the "Marriage Penalty" Tax, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 468 (1983); Pamela B. Gann,
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
1 (1980); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 27 (1978); Philip J. Harmelink, Marital Status Tax Discrimination After
Tax Reform: Proposals to Resolve the Penalty/Bonus Issues, 26 Willamette L. Rev. 593
(1990); Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax
Factor, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 257 (1983); McIntyre, supra note 11; Michael A. Mess, For
Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 Cath. U. L. Rev. 87 (1978); Oliver
Oldman & Ralph Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12
Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1960); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent
at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 773 (1989); Harvey S.
Rosen, Is it Time to Abandon Joint Filing? 30 Nat'l Tax J. 423 (1977); Dan Subotnik,
The Marriage Tax Revisited: An Analysis of the Tax Consequences of Marriage, 90 W.
Va. L. Rev. 1127 (1988); Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall Winn, Till Death Do We
Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L.
Rev. 829 (1983); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an
Individual Filing System, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 197 (1988); Note, The Case for Mandatory
Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 Yale L.J. 363 (1981).
14. See I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2), (b) (1988) (a person who is legally separated and certain
married persons who live separately and apart from their spouses are considered unmarried
for federal income tax purposes).
15. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1) (1988).
16. Each provision of the Internal Revenue Code whose operation varies depending on
the taxpayer's marital status has its own definition of marital status. Under most of these
provisions, however, a spouse is considered unmarried if the spouse is legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (c), (d); 2(c);
21(e)(3); 22(e)(2); 32(d); 55(d); 68(b)(1); 86(c)(3)(A); 135(d)(2); 151; 318(a)(l)(A)(i); 7703(a)(2)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
17. When the abandoned spouse rule applies a spouse often, but not always, will be
considered unmarried for federal income tax purposes. For the abandoned spouse rule, see
I.R.C. § 7703(b) (1988). A number of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code incorporate
the abandoned spouse rule by referring to I.R.C. § 7703(b). See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (c),
(d); 2(c); 22(e)(2); 32(d); 55(d); 68(b)(1); 86(c)(3)(A); 135(d)(2); 151 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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to establish that they are no longer married under this standard. A court
decree that merely requires one spouse to make support payments to
another spouse does not effect a legal separation for purposes of de-
termining that a couple is not married.' 8
Even if a couple is not legally separated under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance, one or both of the spouses may be considered
not married for purposes of federal income taxation under the abandoned
spouse rule.' 9 Under this rule, an individual is considered not married
if, inter alia, the individual maintains as his or her home a household
which constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal
place of abode of a dependent child.20 Thus it is possible, where one
spouse has custody of the children, for the custodial spouse to be
considered not married while the noncustodial spouse is considered mar-
ried. Of course, if a Louisiana couple has no children and the divorce
is not final, the couple will be considered married. Thus, many Louisiana
couples who are living apart but do not wish to divorce for either
religious or personal reasons and spouses whose divorces are not final
are considered married for federal tax purposes.
This article discusses some of the federal tax provisions that most
often affect Louisiana couples who are living separate and apart. Because
the federal tax burden can be reduced significantly for many couples
who qualify as being not married, this article suggests that the Louisiana
Legislature restore some provision for legal separation to the Louisiana
18. See, e.g., Boyer v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev'g 79 T.C.
143 (1982) (court order for temporary support coupled with a temporary restraining order
did not effect a legal separation); Capodanno v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.
1979) (issuance of a court decree that merely enforces a right to a support payment does
not result in a legal separation for purposes of establishing that the spouses are unmarried
for purposes of federal income taxation); Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 361 (1978) (a
court order for temporary maintenance does not render the spouses unmarried); Boettiger
v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 477 (1958), acq. 1959-1 C.B. 3 (a court decree that only provides
for payment of support does not effect a legal separation); Palmquist v. United States, 284
F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (an interlocutory decree does not effect a legal separation);
Muracca v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 3 (1980) (decree for alimony pendente lite
does not effect a legal separation). But see Legget v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1964) (Florida decree for alimony without divorce was in effect a limited divorce, rendering
the taxpayer unmarried for federal income tax purposes).
19. I.R.C. § 7703(b) (1988). A spouse need not actually be abandoned to be considered
not married under this rule. To satisfy the "abandonment" requirement, a taxpayer must
live apart from his or her spouse during the last six months of the taxable year. 1.R.C.
§ 7703(b)(3) (1988).
20. The child must be a dependent for whom the taxpayer is entitled to deduct a
dependency exemption under I.R.C. § 151, or would be entitled to deduct the exemption
but for the fact that the taxpayer has waived the right to the deduction under I.R.C.
§ 152(e) so that the noncustodial parent can claim the deduction. 1.R.C. § 7703(b)(1) (1988).
For a discussion of the abandoned spouse rule, see infra notes 188-91 and accompanying
text.
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Civil Code. This article does not advocate reenactment of any require-
ment that a spouse obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board
as a prerequisite to obtaining an expedited, no-fault divorce. Indeed,
because some couples can achieve greater tax savings if they are con-
sidered married, this article suggests that the provisions for legal sep-
aration be optional rather than mandatory for a couple who files for
divorce.
Each spouse in a community property state like Louisiana is liable
for the tax on one-half of the community income, no matter which
spouse actually earns the income or has the beneficial enjoyment of it.2
The tax liability for one-half of the community income often imposes
a heavy burden on the spouse who has access to less of the community
income, because the spouse earns less or because the spouse has no
access to property producing community income. For convenience, this
article will refer to the spouse with reduced access to community income
as the "low income spouse" and the spouse who has greater access to
community income as the "high income spouse.""
The low income spouse most easily can escape the liability for tax
on one-half of the community income by terminating the community.
Several different events can trigger a termination of the community in
Louisiana, including a judgment of divorce, a matrimonial agreement
that terminates the community, and a judgment of separation of prop-
erty.2 A judgment of separation from bed and board under former
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code also terminated the community.14
While a separated spouse can terminate the community under the current
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, it may be difficult to do so
before the divorce is final. Spouses who separate without contemplating
a divorce could face serious obstacles to terminating the community.
Enactment of provisions authorizing a judgment of separation from bed
and board which would terminate the community would make it easier
for separated spouses in Louisiana to terminate the community.
Part I explains the rules for taxation of community income and
provides the background for understanding how various provisions of
21. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971); Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930).
See also United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184 (1931) (establishing an
affirmative obligation on the part of a nonearning spouse to report and pay tax on one-
half of the community income earned by the other spouse).
22. Admittedly, it is inaccurate to refer to either spouse living under a community
property regime as a low income or a high income spouse. Each spouse in Louisiana has
an undivided one-half ownership interest in all of the community income. La. Civ. Code
art. 2336.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 2356 (enacted 1980, amended 1990).
24. Id.
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the Internal Revenue Code affect the tax liability of separated spouses
in Louisiana. Part II of this article discusses the effect of marital status
on the amount of federal income tax that an individual must pay,
explaining first the federal rules for determining marital status and then
the effect of a taxpayer's marital status on (1) the rate of tax that the
taxpayer must pay, (2) the amount of taxable income to which the tax
rates apply, (3) the amount of tax credits a taxpayer may use to offset
any tax liability for the year, and (4) the alternative minimum tax.
I. TAxATION OF COMMUNITY INCOME
A. Allocation of Liability for Paying the Federal Income Tax on
Community Income
Louisiana is one of nine community property states.25 Spouses dom-
iciled in Louisiana are subject to the community regime unless they
contract otherwise. 26 Under community property law, spouses share equally
in the acquets and gains of either spouse during the marriage.27
The community property shared by the spouses in general consists
of all property acquired by the spouses after the marriage except property
acquired by an individual spouse by gift, devise, or descent, or by use
of the proceeds of separate property. 2 In Louisiana, community property
25. La. Civ. Code arts. 2334-2369. The leading treatise on Louisiana community property
law is Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, in 16 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1989 & Supp. 1992). The other community property states are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. For the com-
munity property laws of these states, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-211-17 (1991); Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 5102-32 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992); Idaho Code §§ 32-903 to -14 (1983); Nev.
Rev. Stat. §§ 123.130-.259 (1987); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-3-6 to 40-3-17 (Michie 1978 &
Supp. 1991); Tex. Faro. Code Ann. §§ 5.01-.27 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 26.16.010-.150 (West 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.001-.97 (Supp. 1992).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2334-provides: "The legal regime of community of acquets and
gains applies to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their domicile at the time of
marriage or the place of celebration of the marriage."
Spouses domiciled in Louisiana, however, may "opt out" of the community property
regime by entering into a matrimonial agreement. La. Civ. Code art. 2329. If the spouses
enter into an agreement that modifies or terminates the community property regime that
existed during their marriage, they must obtain court approval. Id. Court approval is not
necessary, however, if the spouses enter into an antenuptial agreement to live under a
separate property regime. Id. Nor is court approval necessary if a couple enters into a
matrimonial agreement within the first year of moving into and acquiring a domicile in
Louisiana. Id.
27. Under La. Civ. Code art. 2336, "[elach spouse owns a present undivided one-half
interest in the community property . .. ."
28. In other words, community property consists of all property acquired during the
existence of the community that is not separate property La. Civ. Code art. 2338. Separate
19931
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also includes the fruits and revenues derived from separate property
unless the owner executes and records in the public records a declaration
to reserve them as separate property.29 Thus, the community income of
a couple domiciled in Louisiana includes the earnings of the husband,
the earnings of the wife, income derived from community property, and
income derived from separate property unless the owner has made an
effective declaration.
Because each spouse is the owner of a "present undivided one-half
interest ' 30 in the community income, each is liable for payment of the
federal income tax on one-half of the community income, regardless of
which spouse actually earned the income or controlled the property to
which the income was attributable. 3I This rule, established in Poe v.
Seaborn,32 creates no problem if the spouses file a joint return. 3 How-
property is defined as:
property acquired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property
regime; property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and
community things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in
comparison with the value of the separate things used; property acquired by a
spouse by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a
spouse in an action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the
loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community
property by the other spouse; damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse
in connection with the management of his separate property; and things acquired
by a spouse as a result of a voluntary partition of the community during the
existence of a community property regime.
La. Civ. Code art. 2341.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 2339. If property became separate because one spouse donated
his or her interest in a community asset to the other spouse, however, the fruits and revenues
are the separate property of the owner even without a declaration. La. Civ. Code art. 2343.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 2336.
31. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971); Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930). Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930).
Each spouse domiciled in a community property state also may claim one-half of the
community deductions, no matter which spouse paid the expenses, if the expenses are paid
with community funds. Johnson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 340, 347 (1979); Stewart v.
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 406, 411 (1937), aff'd, 95 F.2d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1938); I.R.S.
Pub. No. 555, Federal Tax Information on Community Property 2 (1991) (hereinafter I.R.S.
Pub. No. 555].
32. 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58.
33. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1988) permits most spouses, whether living under a community
property regime or under a separate property regime, to file a joint return reporting their
aggregate income, even if one of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions. If
the spouses file a joint return, each spouse is jointly and severally liable for any deficiency
in tax for the year that the return is filed, I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1988), unless one of the
spouses qualifies as an "innocent spouse" under I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1988).
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ever, if no return is filed, or if the spouses file separately, the Seaborn
rule can impose significant burdens on the low income spouse, 4 especially
when the couple has separated.
As long as the community remains in existence, the low income
spouse must report and pay federal income tax on one-half of the entire
community income which, of course, includes the income earned by the
other, high income spouse." The Seaborn rule imposes this liability upon
the low income spouse even though the low income spouse may have
been living separate and apart from the other spouse, has no control
or enjoyment of the other spouse's income, and has no knowledge of
the amount required to be reported on the income tax return. 36
Courts have been relentless in applying the Seaborn rule. The dis-
parity in the amount of community income available to each of the
spouses is irrelevant. For example, in Brent v. Commissioner,7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mrs. Brent, a
Louisiana domiciliary, was liable for the tax on one-half of her husband's
$76,500 of income even though she had been living separately and apart
from him for the entire year and had received a total of only $4,800
in alimony pendente lite from him. In Bagur v. Commissioner,"9 it was
irrelevant that Mrs. Bagur had no access to her husband's financial
records.
In United States v. Mitchell,39 Mrs. Mitchell had renounced the
community upon her divorce from her husband. Under former provisions
34. For a discussion of the problems caused by the rule of Poe v. Seaborn, see Stuart
J. Filler, Joint and Several Federal Income Tax Liability and Community Property Income
Attribution: Continuing Problems for the Unwary Spouse, 9 Community Prop. J. 131, 140-
48 (1982); Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More
Equitable Approach, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 633; John A. Miller, Federal Income Taxation and
Community Property Law: The Case For Divorce, 44 Sw. L.J. 1087 (1990); William J.
Minick, III, The Innocent Spouse Doctrine: The Need for Reform and Planning Alternatives
in the State of Texas, 66 Taxes 56 (1988); Fred F. Murray, Problems of Taxation of the
Income of Spouses in the Context of Divorce and Separation, 14:2 Community Prop. J.
20 (1987); John Paul Parks, Income Tax Relief for the Abandoned Spouse, 12 Community
Prop. J. 119 (1985); Nancie Quick & Joseph N. DuCanto, Joint Tax Liability and the
"Innocent Spouse" Doctrine in Common Law and Community Property Jurisdictions: A
Review of Code Section 6013(e) and Its Progeny, Section 66, 17 Fain. L.Q. 65, 77-87 (1983);
Stuart Salchow, I.R.C. Section 66: Relief for Abandoned Spouses? 10 Community Prop.
J. 121 (1983); Jack M. Vaughn, P.L. 96-605: Tax Relief for the Abandoned Spouse in a
Community Property State? 8 Community Prop. J. 53 (1981).
35. The rule can create a windfall for the high income spouse who has the beneficial
enjoyment of income only one-half of which is taxable.
36. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971); Bagur v. Com-
missioner, 603 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1979), rem'g, 66 T.C. 817 (1976).
37. 630 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. 603 F.2d at 495.
39. 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971).
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of the Louisiana Civil Code, a renunciation of the community caused
a wife to lose entitlement to a distribution of community property or
a property settlement upon divorce and at the same time exonerated
the wife of any liability to pay community debts.4 The United States
Supreme Court held that Mrs. Mitchell was liable for the tax on one-
half of the community income earned during the existence of her mar-
riage notwithstanding the fact that the tax liability for community income
is a community debt, from which Mrs. Mitchell should have been
absolved upon her renunciation of the community. 4' The Supreme Court
explained:
[The renunciation might be effective] in connection with a tax
or other obligation the collection of which is controlled by state
law. But an exempt status under state law does not bind the
federal collector. Federal law governs what is exempt from fed-
eral levy.42
B. Judicial Remedy: The Theft Loss Deduction
In Bagur v. Commissioner,43 the Fifth Circuit attempted to provide
a remedy to mitigate the harsh results of the Seaborn rule by permitting
the low income spouse to claim a theft loss deduction under section
165(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code" with respect to the portion of
community income on which the spouse paid tax, without receiving any
benefit. The availability of a theft loss deduction to the low income
spouse, however, is speculative. To claim a theft loss deduction, the
40. La. Civ. Code art. 2410 (1870).
41. Mitchell, 403 U.S., at 204, 91 S. Ct. at 1771.
42. Id.
43. 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979), rem'g, 66 T.C. 817 (1976). See also, Brent v.
Commissioner, 630 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'g and rem'g 70 T.C. 775 (1978) (remanding
the case of a Louisiana taxpayer who was liable for the tax on one-half of her husband's
community income for development of facts to determine whether the taxpayer was entitled
to a theft loss deduction).
44. I.R.C. § 165 (1988) provides in part:
Sec. 165 Losses.
(a) General rule.-
There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated, for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals.-
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited
to-
(3) ... losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a
transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from ... theft.
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spouse must prove that there was a theft.45 The question of whether a
theft has occurred is determined by reference to the criminal law of the
jurisdiction where the loss occurred."
Louisiana law defines theft as:
The misappropriation or taking of anything of value which
belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to
the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent con-
duct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappro-
priation or taking is essential.
4 7
It may be difficult for the low income spouse to prove that any
disposition of community income by the spouse who earned it constitutes
a theft. Under Louisiana community property law, either spouse "acting
alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless
otherwise provided by law." '4 8 Concurrence of the other spouse is required
only with respect to the "alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community
immovables, furniture or furnishings while located in the family home,
all or substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise and
movables issued or registered as provided by law in the names of the
spouses jointly, ' 49 and with respect to a donation of community property
unless a spouse makes "a usual or customary gift of a value commen-
surate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of the
donation." 0 Thus, a Louisiana spouse has broad powers of discretion
in disposing of community income. It would be difficult to prove that
a spouse, acting within the discretion authorized by law, either mis-
appropriated any community income or intended to deprive the other
of it permanently.
In Bagur the Fifth Circuit held that an intent to deprive a spouse
of his or her share of the community income may be inferred from a
spouse's "wanton appropriation of community assets in pursuit of his
45. The Internal Revenue Service has defined "theft" to include any "felonious taking
of money or property by which a taxpayer sustains a loss, whether defined and punishable
under the penal codes of the states as larceny, robbery, burglary, embezzlement, extortion,
kidnapping for ransom, threats, or blackmail." Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60.
46. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1979). See also cases cited in
2 Borris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts
34.3 nn. 6 and 7 (2d ed. 1990 and Supp. 1992).
47. La. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1992).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 2346. Professors Spaht and Hargrave explain that the law
provides no mechanism to settle disputes between the spouses over particular transactions
or uses of community; court intervention is available primarily to protect the interests of
third parties. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 5.3.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 2349.
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own pleasure or needs." 5' A question remains as to what facts are
necessary to establish such a "wanton appropriation." In Bagur the
Fifth Circuit remanded two consolidated cases to the Tax Court for
development of facts to determine whether the husband in each case
had appropriated his earnings to his own purposes in such a way as to
be the equivalent of a theft of the wife's ownership of one-half of the
earnings.52 There is no report of either of the consolidated cases on
remand. 3 In subsequent reported cases, however, no taxpayer has been
able to prove the requisite intent to establish a theft loss for appropriation
of community income.14
In Connor v. Commissioner," the taxpayer's husband was a musician
and songwriter who performed with the Kingston Trio. Mr. Connor's
employment required him to travel away from home sometimes for
months at a time. He left Mrs. Connor at home, intermittently sending
her small amounts of money with which Mrs. Connor and her son
"eked out a meager existence." '5 6 When he was on the road, Mr. Connor
lived lavishly, entertaining frequently and expensively, and occasionally
sending money to some of his female friends. While Mrs. Connor was
unable to qualify for a theft loss deduction for other reasons,57 the Tax
Court opined that Mr. Connor's failure to divide the community income
would not constitute the "wanton appropriation" of community income
that constitutes the equivalent of theft under state law.5 8
In all of the cases, including Connor, in which a theft loss deduction
was disallowed, the taxpayer was living with her spouse during the
taxable year or years in issue.59 Proving a theft loss when the spouses
51. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 1979).
52. Id., at 503. See also Brent v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1980),
rev'g and rem'g 70 T.C. 775 (1978) (remanding a similar case to the Tax Court for the
development of facts to determine whether the wife was entitled to a theft loss deduction
for her husband's appropriation of community income).
53. Nor is there a report of Brent, 630 F.2d 356, on remand.
54. See, e.g., Lucia v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982 (1991); Connor v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (1982); Schmidt v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
793 (1981); Hall v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349 (1980).
55. 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (1982).
56. Id., at 7.
57. A theft loss is deductible only in the year in which it is discovered. I.R.C. § 165(e)
(1988). Because Mrs. Connor was unaware that her husband was earning more than twice
the amount that he sent to her, she did not discover her loss until after her divorce. Mrs.
Connor's post-divorce taxable years were not before the Tax Court. Therefore, the Tax
Court did not have jurisdiction to allow Mrs. Connor an offsetting theft loss deduction.
Connor, 44 T.C.M. (CCH), at 8 n.4.
58. Id.
59. Lucia v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982, 1983 (1991); Connor, 44 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 7; Schmidt v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 793, 794 (1981); Hall v. Com-
missioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349 (1980).
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reside together can be especially difficult because the low income spouse
cannot establish that he or she did not share in the fruits of the high
income spouse's earnings.6 In none of the reported cases did a spouse
who was living separately and apart and who received no payments
from the high income spouse claim a theft loss deduction.
One can only speculate as to the reason for the failure of such
cases to appear in the reporters. Perhaps the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service") settles these cases by allowing the deduction. On the
other hand, low income spouses may settle their cases by agreeing not
to claim the deduction because the cost of litigating is too high. Low
income spouses may not claim the deduction because they are unfamiliar
with tax law and do not know that the deduction is available. Perhaps
low income spouses do not claim a theft loss deduction because its
benefits in reducing taxable income are limited.
A theft loss is deductible only in the taxable year in which the
taxpayer discovers the loss. 61 To claim a theft loss deduction, the low
income spouse must prove the year in which the loss occurred and the
amount of the loss. 62 It is likely that a low income spouse who is living
separately and apart from the high income spouse will not know the
amount of community income of which he or she was deprived until
there is a partition of the community. The year of partition then, will
be the year of discovery. Even if the low income spouse discovers the
loss in an earlier year, no theft loss deduction is allowed if the spouse
has a claim for reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable
prospect of recovery. 63 Thus, if the high income spouse has saved any
of the community income, the low income spouse cannot claim a theft
loss deduction for amounts that later may be received upon partition
of the community." The deduction will be allowed only later if in fact
60. Lucia, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1989; Schmidt, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 797; Hall, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1351.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1964).
62. Lucia, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1989.
63. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1964); 1.165-1(d)(3) (as amended in
1977).
64. The community property regime is terminated "by the death or judgment of
declaration of death of a spouse, declaration of the nullity of the marriage, judgment of
divorce or separation of property, or matrimonial agreement that terminates the community."
La. Civ. Code art. 2356. While a partition generally will occur after termination of the
community property regime, La. Civ. Code art. 2336 permits spouses to partition community
property "in whole or in part" during the existence of the community. On partition each
spouse is entitled to a one-half share of the community assets net of community obligations.
La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991). To the extent, however, that the high income spouse has spent
community income on living and travel expenses or incurred community debts, there will
be less community property to share on partition of the community. For a discussion of
the types of expenses that are considered community obligations, see Spaht & Hargrave,
supra note 25, at § 7.12.
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the low income spouse does not recover his or her share of the com-
munity income upon which the low income spouse paid tax.
The amount that the low income spouse can deduct as a theft loss
is also reduced by statutory limitations. The theft loss suffered by the
spouse who is deprived of his or her share of community income is
not incurred in a trade or business. Section 165(h)65 of the Internal
Revenue Code reduces the deductible amount of such nonbusiness theft
65. I.R.C. § 165(h) (1988) provides:
(h) Treatment of Casualty Gains and Losses.-
(1) $100 limitation per casualty.-Any loss of an individual described in sub-
section (c)(3) shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of the loss
to such individual arising from each casualty, or from each theft, exceeds
$100.
(2) Net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of
adjusted gross income.-
(A) In general.-If the personal casualty losses for any taxable year exceed
the personal casualty gains for such taxable year, such, losses shall be
allowed for the taxable year only to the extent of the sum of-
(i) the amount of the personal casualty gains for the taxable year,
plus
(ii) so much of such excess as exceeds 10 percent of the adjusted gross
income of the individual.
(B) Special rule where personal casualty gains exceed personal casualty
losses.-If the personal casualty gains for any taxable year exceed the
personal casualty loses for such taxable year-
(i) all such gains shall be treated as gains from sales or exchanges
of capital assets, and
(ii) all such losses shall be treated as losses from sales or exchanges
of capital assets.
(3) Definitions of personal casualty gain and personal casualty loss.-For
purposes of this subsection-
(A) Personal casualty gain.-The term "personal casualty gain" means the
recognized gain from any involuntary conversion of property, which is
described in subsection (c)(3) arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft.
(B) Personal casualty loss.-The term "personal casualty loss" means any
loss described in subsection (c)(3). For purposes of paragraph (2), the
amount of any personal casualty loss shall be determined after the ap-
plication of paragraph (1).
(4) Special rules.-
(A) Personal casualty losses allowable in computing adjusted gross income
to the extent of personal casualty gains.-ln any case to which paragraph
(2)(A) applies, the deduction for personal casualty losses for any taxable
year shall be treated as a deduction allowable in computing adjusted gross
income to the extent such losses do not exceed the personal casualty gains
for the taxable year.
(B) Joint returns.-For purposes of this subsection, a husband and wife
making a joint return for the taxable year shall be treated as 1 individual.
(C) Determination of adjusted gross income in case of estates and trusts.-
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losses by requiring the spouse to subtract $100 from the amount claimed
as a loss." After subtracting $100 from this amount, the spouse must
then subtract ten percent of the spouse's adjusted gross income. 67 A
spouse's ability to take advantage of a theft loss deduction is further
limited because a nonbusiness theft loss deduction is an itemized de-
duction. 6s Spouses who might qualify for a theft loss deduction because
they have been living separately and apart probably do not claim the
deduction because a more certain remedy is available under Section 66
of the Internal Revenue Code.
C. Statutory Remedy: I.R.C. § 66
Recognizing the inequity of taxing a spouse on community income
from which the spouse has received no benefit, 69 Congress added section
66 to the Internal Revenue Code. 70 While section 66 provides a better
solution to the problems created by the Seaborn rule than an allowance
of a theft loss deduction, it offers only limited relief to low income
For purposes of paragraph (2), the adjusted gross income of an estate or
trust shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual,
except that the deductions for costs paid or incurred in connection with
the administration of the estate or trust shall be treated as allowable in
arriving at adjusted gross income.
(D) Coordination with estate tax.-No loss described in subsection (c)(3)
shall be allowed if, at the time of filing the return, such loss has been
claimed for estate tax purposes in the estate tax return.
(E) Claim required to be filed in certain cases.-Any loss of an individual
described in subsection (c)(3) to the extent covered by insurance shall be
taken into account under this section only if the individual files a timely
insurance claim with respect to such loss.
66. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (1988).
67. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). The spouse may deduct the theft loss in full if the
spouse has sufficient casualty gains for the year. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A) (1988) permits a
taxpayer to deduct casualty and theft losses from gross income to the extent of the taxpayer's
casualty gains. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii) limits the deductibility of "net" casualty and theft
losses, i.e. the amount of casualty and theft losses in excess of casualty gains. The discussion
in the text assumes that the spouse has no casualty gains for the year.
68. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (1988) (omitting a nonbusiness theft loss deduction from the list
of deductions that reduce gross income); I.R.C. § 67(b)(3) (1988) (listing the nonbusiness
theft loss deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) as an itemized deduction that is not
considered a miscellaneous itemized deduction).
69. I.R.C. § 66 was "intended to provide relief for abandoned spouses who are presently
taxed on a portion of the income earned by the other spouse but have received no benefit
from that income." 126 Cong. Rec. 24810 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski). See
also S. Rep. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980), reprinted in 6 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7293,
7299 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1036].
70. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 101, 94 Stat. 3521
(1980).
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spouses in community property states." A spouse who meets the stringent
requirements of section 66 will be exempt from liability for the income
tax on some, but not necessarily all, of the community income from
which the spouse receives no benefit.72
71. For a discussion of the shortcomings of I.R.C. § 66, see Filler, supra note 34, at
145-48; Kalinka, supra note 34, at 658-69; Miller, supra note 34, at 1115-21; Minick, supra
note 34, at 59; Parks, supra note 34; Quick & DuCanto, supra note 34, at 82-87; Salchow,
supra note 34; Vaughn, supra note 34.
72. I.R.C. § 66 (1988 & Supp. 1991) provides:
SEC. 66. TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY INCOME.
(a) Treatment of community income where spouses live apart.-If-
(1) 2 individuals are married to each other at any time during a calendar year;
(2) such individuals-
(A) live apart at all times during the calendar year, and
(B) do not file a joint return under section 6013 with each other for a
taxable year beginning or ending in the calendar year;
(3) one or both of such individuals have earned income for the calendar year
which is community income; and
(4) no portion of such earned income is transferred (directly or indirectly)
between such individuals before the close of the calendar year,
then for purposes of this title, any community income of such individuals for
the calendar year shall be treated in accordance with the rules provided by section
879(a).
(b) Secretary may disregard community property laws where spouse not notified
of community income.-The Secretary may disallow the benefits of any community
property law to any taxpayer with respect to any income if such taxpayer acted
as if solely entitled to such income and failed to notify the taxpayer's spouse
before the due date (including extensions) for filing the return for the taxable
year in which the income was derived of the nature and amount of such income.
(c) Spouse relieved of liability in certain other cases.- Under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary, if-
(1) an individual does not file a joint return for any taxable year,
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for such taxable year an
item of community income property includable therein which, in accordance
with the rules contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income of
the other spouse,
(3) the individual establishes that he or she did not know of, and had no
reason to know of, such item of community income, and
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include
such item of community income in such individual's gross income,
then, for purposes of this title, such item of community income shall be included
in the gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross income of the
individual).
(d) Definitions.-For purposes of this section-
(1) Earned income.-The term "earned income" has the meaning given to
such term by section 911(d)(2).
(2) Community income.-The term "community income" means income which,
under applicable community property laws, is treated as community income.
(3) Community property laws.-The term "community property laws" means
the community property laws of a State, a foreign country, or a possession
of the United States.
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Subsections (a) and (c) of section 66 provide relief from the Seaborn
rule under different circumstances.
A spouse will qualify for relief under Section 66(a) if: (1) the spouses
live apart from each other for an entire calendar year;"1 (2) the spouses.
do not file a joint return;74 (3) one or both of the spouses have earned
income for the calendar year which is community income; 7 and (4) no
portion of the earned income is transferred (directly or indirectly) between
the spouses before the close of the calendar year.7 6 If the requirements
of section 66 are met, the community income is taxed in accordance
with the rules set forth under section 879(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 7 Section 879(a) allocates the liability for tax as follows:
(1) Earned income . .. , other than trade or business income
and a partner's distributive share of partnership income, is treated
as income of the spouse who rendered the personal services; 78
(2) Trade or business income and deductions are treated as the
income and deductions of the spouse who exercises substantially
all of the management and control of the business;79
(3) A partner's distributive share of ordinary income or loss
from a partnership is treated as the income or loss of the spouse
who is the partner;1°
(4) Income from separate property is treated as the income of
the spouse who owns the property;"' and
(5) All other community income is treated as provided in the
applicable community property law."8
Under these rules, the benefits of section 66(a) are not available to
spouses who have lived together at any time during the taxable year.
Even if the spouses live apart, the low income spouse will not qualify,
for relief under section 66(a) if there is any transfer between the spouses
of earned community income, such as a spousal support payment or
73. I.R.C. § 66(a)(2)(A) (1988).
74. I.R.C. § 66(a)(2)(B) (1988).
75. I.R.C. § 66(a)(3) (1988). "Earned income" is defined as "wages, salaries, or pro-
fessional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered and certain income derived from a trade or business in which both personal services
and capital are material income-producing factors." I.R.C. §§ 66(d)(1), 911(d)(2) (1988 &
Supp. 1991).
76. I.R.C. § 66(a)(4) (1988). De minimis amounts that are transferred between the spouses
and amounts transferred for child support are not treated as transfers of earned community
income for purposes of this requirement. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 69, at 8-9.
77. I.R.C. § 66(a) (1988).
78. I.R.C. § 879(a)(1) (1988).
79. I.R.C. §§ 879(a)(2), 1402(a)(5) (1988).
80. Id.
81. I.R.C. § 879(a)(3) (1988).
82. I.R.C. § 879(a)(4) (1988).
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alimony pendente lite."a Furthermore, section 66(a) does not exempt the
low income spouse from liability for the tax on one-half of the com-
munity income derived from community property regardless of whether
such income inures to the sole benefit of the other spouse.8
Spouses who fail to meet the requirements of section 66(a) may
qualify for relief under section 66(c).. Section 66(c) applies, under re-
gulations yet to be promulgated, if:
(1) the spouse does not file a joint return;85
(2) the spouse does not include in gross income an item of
community income that would be includable in the gross income
of the other spouse under the rules of section 879(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code;86
(3) the spouse establishes that he or she did not know of, and
had no reason to know of, such item of community income; 87
and
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is ineq-
uitable to include the item of community income in the spouse's
gross income. 8
The utility of section 66(c) is circumscribed by the requirement that
the spouse did not know of and had no reason to know of the omitted
item of community income. In most of the reported cases, the taxpayer
seeking relief under section 66(c) has been unable to prove lack of actual
or constructive knowledge of significant amounts of community income.
Lack of knowledge of the amount of community income earned by the
other spouse is irrelevant.8 9 Only in cases where the taxpayer had no
83. It should be noted that de minimis transfers and payments for child support will
not disqualify the spouse from relief under I.R.C. § 66(a). See supra note 76.
84. Louisiana community property law confers sole management over titled moveable
property to the spouse whose name appears on the title. La. Civ. Code art. 2351. Thus,
the spouse whose name appears on the community paycheck, stock, bonds, bank account,
or patent may collect the earnings, capital gains, dividends, interest and royalties, deposit
the income in a sole bank account, and enjoy the income to the exclusion of the other
spouse.
85. I.R.C. § 66(c)(1) (1988).
86. I.R.C. § 66(c)(2) (1988).
87. I.R.C. § 66(c)(3) (1988).
88. I.R.C. § 66(c)(4) (1988).
89. See, e.g., Roberts v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1988), qaf'g 54 T.C.M.
(CCH) 94 (1987) (I.R.C. § 66 did not relieve Texas wife of the tax on illegal kickback by
husband because she knew that the husband was engaging in an income-producing activity;
however, wife had no reason to know that the kickback was invested in certificates of
deposit; therefore, I.R.C. § 66(c) applied to the wife's one-half share of the interest earned
on the certificates of deposit); Dooley v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 1858 (1992)
(Louisiana wife was aware that husband was earning commissions, therefore she was liable
for the tax on one-half of the commissions); Lytle v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1992-
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reason to know that his or her spouse was engaged in an income-
producing activity has a taxpayer qualified for relief under section 66(c).9
For example, in Roberts v. Commissioner,9 Mrs. Roberts' husband,
a real estate broker, received an illegal kickback that was community
income. While Mrs. Roberts had no actual knowledge of the existence
185 (1992) (Texas wife was aware that her husband's business was producing income; therefore
she did not meet requirement under I.R.C. § 66(c) that she have no actual or constructive
knowledge of the income); McGee v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1991) (Texas
wife was aware that her husband earned income from his dental practice, therefore no relief
was available under I.R.C. § 66(c)); McPherson v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039
(1991) (although Idaho wife had no control over her husband's business books nor access
to its funds, she knew that her husband was receiving income from the business; therefore
I.R.C. § 66(c) did not apply); Lucia v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982 (1991)
(California wife held taxable on one-half of the community income from a business that
she knew existed; however I.R.C. § 66(c) shielded her from liability for the tax on one-half
of the community income from a business of whose existence she was not aware); Butler
v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1767 (1991) (California wife knew that estranged husband
sold community property; therefore I.R.C. § 66(c) did not shield her from liability for the
tax on one-half of the gain recognized on the sale); Thatcher v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M.
(CCH) 707 (1988) (California wife was aware that husband owned a dental technical business;
therefore I.R.C. § 66(c) did not shield her from liability for tax on one-half of the community
income from the business); Warner v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 703 (1987) (Texas
husband knew that his wife was employed; therefore, I.R.C. § 66(c) did not apply with
respect to the tax on one-half of her salary); Nelson v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH)
1448 (1987) (California wife participated in the operation of husband's adult theater business
and had too much knowledge of the business to qualify for relief under I.R.C. § 66(c));
Baldwin v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 22 (1986) (Texas wife held to have actual or
constructive knowledge that her husband earned a salary; therefore, no relief was available
to her under I.R.C. § 66(c)); Bozek v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 350 (1986) (California
wife knew that her husband was earning real estate commissions; I.R.C. § 66(c) did not
apply); Sanders v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1986) (Arizona wife was unable
to obtain information from her husband with regard to the amount of his wages; nevertheless,
because she knew that he was employed I.R.C. § 66(c) relief was not available to her);
Rimple v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1985) (Texas wife participated in husband's
businesses that generated community income; she had too much knowledge of the income
to qualify for relief under I.R.C. § 66(c)).
90. See, e.g., Roberts, 860 F.2d 1235 (Texas wife held to have constructive knowledge
of illegal kickback received by her husband; however, she had no reason to know that her
husband would invest the illegal kickback in certificates of deposit; therefore, wife was not
liable for the tax on one-half of the interest earned on the certificates of deposit); Lucia,
61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982 (California wife not liable for the tax on one-half of the community
income derived from her husband's business where she had no reason to know that the
business even existed); Costa v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1178 (1990) (California
wife did not know of and had no reason to know of her husband's illegal drug trafficking
business; therefore I.R.C. § 66(c) shielded her from liability for the tax on one-half of the
income from that business); Hilton v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 217 (1990) (I.R.C.
§ 66(c) shielded Louisiana wife from liability for one-half of the tax on funds that husband
embezzled from his employer and placed in an interest-bearing checking account because
the wife did not know of and had no reason to know of the illegal activity or of the
existence of the checking account).
91. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 94 (1987), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1988).
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or the amount of the kickback, the Tax Court denied her relief from
liability for tax on one-half of the kickback under section 66(c), holding
that she had reason to know of the kickback. 92 The Tax Court imputed
constructive knowledge of the kickback to Mrs. Roberts because she
knew that her husband was involved in real estate transactions during
the year and that such activities generated income. 93
Mrs. Roberts' husband invested income from his real estate trans-
actions in four certificates of deposit. Because Mrs. Roberts had no
reason to know that the income had been invested or that the certificates
of deposit existed, section 66(c) shielded her from liability for the tax
on one-half of the interest income from the certificates of deposit. 94
Even if a spouse could qualify for relief under section 66(c), the
spouse would still be liable for the tax on half the income derived from
community property. Section 66(c) applies only to items of income that
would be includable in the income of the other spouse under the rules
of section 879(a).95 Section 879(a) provides that income from community
property is treated as the income of the spouse who owns it under
applicable community property law.9 Under Louisiana community prop-
erty law, each spouse owns a one-half share of income derived from
community property, regardless of which spouse controls the property
92. Roberts, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at 97.
93. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's opinion on this issue, explaining in addition that (1) Mrs. Roberts had noticed her
husband carrying large sums of cash, (2) her husband had deposited a portion of the
kickback in a joint checking account, (3) she enjoyed a comfortable and expensive life style,
and (4) one of her husband's business associates had warned her that he suspected her
husband of defrauding the investment group involved in the real estate transaction. Roberts,
860 F.2d, at 1239-40. Under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, a suspicions wife must report one-
half of her husband's suspected income even if she is not certain of the amount or the
existence of the income.
94. Roberts, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at 97. Actually the Tax Court should not have permitted
Mrs. Roberts to exclude her one-half share of the income derived from the certificates of
deposit under I.R.C. § 66(c). Section 66(c) shields a spouse from liability for the tax on
one-half of an item of community income that would be includible in the income of the
other spouse under I.R.C. § 879(a). The interest earned on the certificates of deposit was
income derived from community property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 5.01(b) (defining
community property as property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse
during the marriage), 501(a) (defining separate property as property owned or claimed by
a spouse before the marriage, property acquired by a spouse during the marriage by gift,
devise, or descent, and the recovery by a spouse for certain personal injuries sustained
during the marriage). Under I.R.C. § 879(a)(4), income derived from community property
is treated as provided in the applicable community property law. In Texas, such income is
owned equally by the spouses. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930);
Johnson v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 952, 954-55 (8th Cir. 1937). Thus, Mrs. Roberts should
have been liable for the tax on one-half of the interest.
95. I.R.C. § 66(c)(2) (1988).
96. I.R.C. § 879(a)(4) 1988).
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or has the beneficial enjoyment of the income from that property. 97
Section 66(b) authorizes the Service to disallow the benefits of any
community property law to any taxpayer who acted as if solely entitled
to such income and failed to notify the taxpayer's spouse of the nature
and amount of such income before the due date for filing the return.98
This provision seems to offer greater relief than sections 66(a) or 66(c)
because there is no requirement that the spouses live apart, there is no
express requirement that the nonpossessory spouse prove lack of con-
structive knowledge of the item, and section 66(b) applies to all items
of community income. Section 66(b) fails to provide adequate relief for
the low income spouse, however, because it merely authorizes, but does
not require, the Service to collect the tax from the high income spouse. 99
Moreover, the high income spouse need only notify the low income
spouse of the amount and nature of the item of income to avoid liability
for the tax on it. If such notice is given, there is no requirement that
the income be shared.
One commentator has suggested that section 66(b) imposes a heavy
burden of proof on the low income spouse.'0° If the spouses lived
together, it is difficult to prove that the high income spouse acted as
if solely entitled to the income.10' Even if the spouses are separated,
the low income spouse could be held to have constructive notice of the
other's income in cases where the high income spouse has retained the
same employment after the separation. 02
The limited availability of relief under sections 66(b) and 66(c) assures
that most spouses who do not qualify for relief under section 66(a) will
be liable for the tax on one-half of the community income under the
Seaborn rule. 03 If the spouses live together' °4 at any time during the
calendar year, if there is a transfer of earned community income between
the spouses, 0 5 or if the community income is derived from community
97. La. Civ. Code. art. 2338.
98. I.R.C. § 66(b) (1988).
99. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1992-52 (1992) (explaining that
I.R.C. § 66(b) is not a relief provision but rather permits the Service to disallow the benefits
of community property law under the prescribed conditions).
100. Miller, supra note 34, at 1117.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. If one of the spouses is a nonresident alien who does not elect to be taxed on
worldwide income, however, the spouse who is a citizen or resident of the United States
will be taxed on community income under the rules of I.R.C. § 879(a) (1988).
104. I.R.C. § 66(a)(2)(A) (1988).
105. I.R.C. § 66(a)(4) (1988). Neither de minimis amounts nor child support are considered
as transfers of earned community income for this purpose. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note
69, at 8-9.
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property,106 each spouse will be liable for the tax on one-half of the
community income.
D. Avoiding the Harsh Effects of the Seaborn Rule Through
Termination of the Community
The failure of the judicial and statutory remedies to provide adequate
protection to the low income spouse from the harsh effects of the
Seaborn rule requires the low income spouse to plan ahead. The ability
to avoid the Seaborn rule through planning, however, is limited. A low
income spouse cannot avoid liability for the tax on one-half of the other
spouse's income by moving to a noncommunity property state if the
income of the spouse domiciled in the community property state is
community property under state law.' °0 Under Louisiana law, the income
of a spouse domiciled in Louisiana is community property regardless of
the domicile of the other spouse.'10 This rule determines the character
of the income for purposes of federal taxation as well.
In rare instances a low income spouse might be able to convince
the high income spouse to agree to pay the tax on the higher income.
Such an agreement, even if it is in writing and enforceable under local
law, is not binding on the federal tax collector.' 9 If the high income
spouse becomes insolvent or unavailable for service of process and fails
to reimburse the low income spouse for payment of the tax, the low
106. I.R.C. §§ 66(a), 879(a) (1988).
107. Commissioner v. Cavanagh, 125 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1942); Owens v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 77 (1956); Hunt v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 228 (1954); Dippel v. Commissioner,
14 T.C.M. (CCH) 232 (1955).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 3523. See also Fuori v. Fuori, 334 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976) (where husband and wife had not contracted otherwise, all property acquired in
Louisiana by husband became community property even though only the husband resided
in Louisiana); Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1923) (same); Succession of
McKenna, 23 La. Ann. 369 (1871) (same).
109. Cf. Rude v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165, 175 (1967) (not-withstanding husband's
agreement to pay his share of deficiencies in tax with respect to a joint return, the Service
had an absolute right to collect the full amount entirely from the wife because she was
jointly and severally liable for the full amount). See also United States v. Mitchell, 403
U.S. 190, 205, 91 S. Ct. 1763, 1771 (1971) (wife's renunciation of the community which
under state law exonerated her of debts contracted during the marriage not binding on the
federal tax collector with respect to her obligation to pay federal income tax on her one-
half share of community income); Lawrence M. Phillips & Robert P. Stellick, Tax Reporting
in the Year a Divorce Decree Is Granted, 6 Wis. J. Fam. L. 8, 9 (No. 1, 1986) (the Service
takes the position that an agreement by divorcing spouses for each to declare and pay tax
only on the community income earned by the spouse filing the return is not valid for federal
income tax purposes, even if sanctioned by a state court with jurisdiction over the divorce
action).
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income spouse is not even entitled to claim a bad debt deduction." 0
The most certain method of avoiding the Seaborn rule is to terminate
the community. In deciding whether to terminate the community, the
low income spouse must, of course, weigh the current tax savings against
the economic advantage of keeping the community alive and sharing a
larger interest in community property on a later termination. Given the
time value of money,"' a current tax savings often will be of greater
benefit than waiting to receive a larger portion on a later termination.
If the low income spouse loses income-producing assets or is forced to
borrow money, incurring an interest liability in order to pay the tax,
the economic burden is obvious. Even if the low income spouse is able
to pay the tax on one-half of the community income, an investment of
the tax savings that would be achieved by termination of the community
could yield a higher return than the spouse would achieve by waiting
for community assets to accumulate for receipt on a later termination.
Termination of the community also can shield a spouse from tax
liabilities other than those arising under the Seaborn rule. As long as
the community exists, the Service is authorized to garnish the wages of
one spouse to pay any tax liability incurred by the other spouse either
before or during the marriage." 2 A lien for unpaid federal taxes, in-
cluding interest, additions to tax, and any applicable penalties, attaches
to "all property and rights to property ... belonging to" the person
liable for the taxes." 3 State law determines the extent to which a taxpayer
has an interest in property.'' 4 Where state law makes all of the community
property available to satisfy the debts of either spouse, courts have held
that the federal government may look to the delinquent taxpayer's entire
property to satisfy his or her tax obligations."'
110. Rude, 48 T.C. at 175; Haynes v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531 (1968).
For a discussion of Rude, see Richard C. E. Beck, The Deductibility of A Worthless Right
to Contribution for Joint Income Taxes: The Mistaken Line of Cases Under Rude v.
Commissioner, 9 Va. Tax Rev. 313 (1989).
111. The time value of money is an accounting concept that recognizes that a dollar of
savings today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. A spouse who pays less tax by
preventing application of the Seaborn rule could invest the tax savings and possibly receive
more on the investment than would be available on a later termination of the community.
For a discussion of the time value of money concept, see Gary E. Clayton & Christopher
Spivey, The Time Value of Money: Worked and Solved Problems (1978); John A. Biek,
Note, Salvaging Accrual Method Deductions: Adding a "Time Value of Money" Component
to the "All Events" Test, 40 Tax Law. 185, 188-90 (1986).
112. See, e.g., Medaris v. United States, 884 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1989).
113. I.R.C. § 6321 (Supp. 1991).
114. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722, 105 S. Ct. 2919,
2922 (1985); Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1972).
115. See, e.g., Medaris, 884 F.2d at 835; United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288,
1298-99 (9th Cir. 1983); Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Under Louisiana law, "[a) separate or community obligation may
be satisfied during the community property regime from community
property .... ,116 This rule permits the Service to seek satisfaction for
both premarital tax liabilities and community tax liabilities incurred by
one spouse from any community property, including community income
earned by the other spouse. The spouse from whom property or wages
were seized has a limited right under state law to sue for reimbursement
from the other spouse after such a seizure.
Premarital tax liabilities are separate obligations under Louisiana
law." 7 If community property is used to satisfy a separate obligation
of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half
of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used
to satisfy the obligation."' The right to reimbursement, however, can
only be exercised upon termination of the community." 9 If the spouse
who incurred a premarital tax obligation is insolvent when the community
is terminated, the spouse who paid the tax may not be able to collect
even half of the amount that he or she paid. 20
A spouse who pays the tax liability on the other spouse's one-half
share of the community income has no right to reimbursement for any
amount that he or she paid unless the spouse satisfied the tax liability
with separate property.' The obligation to pay income tax on community
income is a community obligation. 2 When community income is used
to pay a community obligation, there is no right to reimbursement,
116. La. Civ. Code art. 2345. A creditor also may seek satisfaction of the debt from
the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. Id. The creditor, however,
is not required first to seek satisfaction from-the incurring spouse's separate property. The
only recourse of the nonincurring spouse is a right of reimbursement upon termination of
the community for one-half of the amount or of the value of community property used to
satisfy the other spouse's separate obligation. La. Civ. Code art. 2364.
117. Under La. Civ. Code art. 2363, the term "separate obligation" is defined to include
an obligation incurred by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property
regime.
118. La. Civ. Code art. 2364.
119. Id.
120. The right to reimbursement is permitted against the spouse who incurred the separate
obligation, not merely against the incurring spouse's share of community property. La. Civ.
Code art. 2358. For a discussion of a spouse's right to reimbursement upon termination of
the community, see Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 7.14.
121. See, e.g, Maginnis v. Maginnis, 580 So. 2d 709, 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991)
(husband's payment of community obligation for federal income tax with separate property
entitled husband to reimbursement from his spouse for one-half of the tax liability). See
aLso La. Civ. Code art. 2365 (if separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation, the spouse is entitled, on termination of the community, to reim-
bursement for one-half of the amount or value of the property).
122. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 191, 91 S. Ct. 1763, 1765 (1971); Smith
v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. La. 1946); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495,
86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
[Vol. 53
TAX, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE
regardless of which spouse earned the community income used to satisfy
the obligation.
Termination of the community does not protect a spouse against
seizure by the Service of former community assets to satisfy the other
spouse's tax liabilities. Under Louisiana law, "[a]n obligation incurred
by a spouse before or during the community property regime may be
satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of the former
community.... "1123 Louisiana law also authorizes the Service, like any
other creditor, to seize separate property of one spouse to satisfy a tax
liability incurred by the other spouse to the extent of the value of any
former community property that the nonincurring spouse has disposed
of for purposes other than satisfaction of community obligations.1u A
spouse whose former community property or separate property is seized
to satisfy the other spouse's tax liability, however, may recover from
the other spouse one-half of the value of the property seized if the tax
liability was a community obligation and the entire value of the property
seized if the tax liability was a separate obligation. 2
If a tax liability is incurred because of an underpayment of tax with
respect to a joint return, termination of the community does not protect
either spouse from seizure of any assets, whether they are former com-
munity or separate assets. A spouse who signs a joint return is jointly
and severally liable for the tax'on the aggregate income of both spouses.'12
A spouse whose property is seized in satisfaction of the community tax
liability with respect to a joint return, however, is entitled on termination
of the community to reimbursement from the other spouse for one-half
of the value of the property that was seized.' 2 7
Thus, it could be advantageous for both spouses to terminate the
community as soon as possible upon separation. Not only does termi-
nation of the community relieve a spouse of the liability for tax on
one-half of the other spouse's post-termination earnings, but termination
also reduces a spouse's exposure to tax liabilities incurred by the other
spouse and entitles a spouse whose property is seized to reimbursement
from the spouse who incurred the tax liability.
In Louisiana, the community property regime is terminated by the
death of a spouse, the nullification of the marriage, a judgment of
123. La. Civ. Code art. 2357. A pre-termination creditor also may seek satisfaction of
the debt from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. Id. There
is no requirement, however, that the creditor first seek satisfaction from the incurring
spouse's separate property.
124. Id.
125. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 7.10.
126. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1988). A limited exception to the joint and several liability
incurred with respect to a joint return applies to a spouse who can satisfy the innocent
spouse requirements of I.R.C. § 6013(e).
127. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 7.10.
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divorce or separation of property, a matrimonial agreement that ter-
minates the community, or the absence of a spouse. 2 ' As long as both
spouses are alive and can be located, the low income spouse for whom
divorce or nullification is not an option must either enter into a court-
approved marital agreement with the high income spouse to partition
the community'29 or obtain a judgment of separation of property'3 ° in
order to terminate the community.
In cases where application of the Seaborn rule inflicts a hardship,
the low income spouse should enter into a marital agreement to terminate
and partition the community.' Such an agreement, however, requires
the concurrence of both spouses and a finding by the court that the
agreement serves the spouses' best interests and that the spouses un-
derstand the governing principles and rules.3 2
If the high income spouse is unwilling to sign a marital agreement,
the low income spouse might sue for a judgment of separation of
property. To obtain such a judgment, the low income spouse must show
that the spouse's interest in community property is threatened to be
diminished by the fraud, fault, neglect, or incompetence of the other
spouse, or by the disordered affairs of the other spouse."' There are
no reported cases in which a spouse sought a judgment of separation
128. La. Civ. Code art. 2356.
129. In Louisiana a couple can sign a prenuptial agreement to live under a separate
property regime. La. Civ. Code art. 2329. If the couple wishes to opt out of a community
property regime during the marriage, however, the spouses must obtain court approval of
the agreement. Id. Court approval is not required if the spouses have recently moved to
Louisiana from another state and enter into a matrimonial agreement within one year of
moving into and acquiring a domicile in Louisiana. Id. When a community is partitioned
under a marital agreement, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service generally will respect
the agreement for federal income tax purposes. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 161 F.2d
607 (5th Cir. 1947); I.R.S. Pub. No. 555, supra note 31. Community income that has been
earned but not collected before the date of the agreement, however, is considered community
income for purposes of federal taxation. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125
(9th Cir. 1943); Hubner v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1150 (1957).
130. La. Civ. Code art. 2374 authorizes a judgment of separation of property when the
interest of a spouse in a community property regime is threatened by the fraud, fault,
neglect, incompetence, disorder of the affairs of, or absence of the other spouse.
131. Professors Spaht and Hargrave warn that the marital agreement should state expressly
that it terminates the community property regime; otherwise it could bd interpreted as a
modification of the legal regime. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 7.8.
132. La. Civ. Code art. 2329. If the spouses have moved into Louisiana within one
year of signing their agreement, court approval is not necessary. Id.
133. La. Civ. Code art. 2374. The low income spouse also can obtain a judgment of
separation of property if the other spouse is an absent person. Id. An "absent person" is
"one who has no representative in this state and whose whereabouts are not known and
cannot be ascertained by diligent effort." La. Civ. Code art. 74. Unless the absent spouse
has moved to a community property state, the low income spouse will not suffer under the
Seaborn rule.
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of property to avoid the application of the Seaborn rule. A spouse
seeking a judgment of separation of property should have no difficulty
in establishing that the other spouse's refusal to partition the community
threatens to diminish the petitioning spouse's interest in community
property. Not only does the low income spouse incur a greater tax
liability under the Seaborn rule on income that the high income spouse
is likely to consume, but the time value of money often makes the
value of a current tax savings to the low income spouse worth more
than any increase in assets that may be available on a later termination
of the community.'3 4
It is not certain, however, whether a spouse seeking to avoid ap-
plication of the Seaborn rule by obtaining a judgment of separation of
property can prove the requisite fraud, fault, neglect, incompetence, or
disorder of the affairs of the other spouse merely by showing an increased
current tax burden. A court could require a showing of the other spouse's
extreme mismanagement of community assets to obtain a judgment of
separation of property.'35 A low income spouse seeking a judgment of
separation of property, however, may be able to establish that the other
spouse's refusal to partition the community imposes such a burden on
the low income spouse that the refusal constitutes fault or neglect. Under
Louisiana law, the term "fault" includes "very slight fault," a term
that is defined as fault "which is excusable, and for which no respon-
sibility is incurred."' ' 36
A spouse need not prove one of the specified acts of fault or
mismanagement to obtain a judgment of separation of property if a
petition for divorce is filed. When such a petition is filed, either spouse
may obtain a judgment of separation of property upon a showing that
the spouses have lived separately and apart for thirty days from the
date of the filing of the petition for divorce. 37 This provision makes
it easier for separated spouses to terminate the community. Separated
spouses who do not seek a divorce, however, cannot obtain a judgment
134. For a discussion of the time value of money concept, see supra note Ill and
accompanying text.
135. The reported cases in which a judgment of separation of property was issued have
involved extreme mismanagement. For example, in Cooper v. Cooper, 509 So. 2d 616 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1987), the court held that a separation of property was appropriate where
the wife's mismanagement involved her signing her husband's name on checks drawn from
his personal checking account and on various notes and loans totaling $24,500 without his
authorization or knowledge, writing 101 overdraft checks, and failing to file federal income
tax returns for the community business, resulting in a tax deficiency of approximately
$30,000.
In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 231 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), the court held that
a wife was entitled to a judgment of separation of property where the numerous debts of
her husband who was unable to obtain or hold a steady job threatened to deprive her of
her meager earnings.
136. La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13).
137. La. Civ. Code art. 2374(C).
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of separation of property without proving one of the statutory acts of
fault or mismanagement.
Under former provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, a judgment
of separation from bed and board terminated the community. 3 A spouse
did not have to prove any wrongdoing, incompetence, or disorder in
the affairs of the other spouse to obtain a judgment of separation from
bed and board. While specified acts of wrongdoing could constitute
grounds for a judgment of separation from bed and board,13 9 a spouse
also could obtain such a judgment by showing that the spouses vol-
untarily had lived separately and apart for six months without recon-
ciliation.140 A revival of these provisions could make it easier for separated
spouses in Louisiana to terminate the community without having to file
for divorce. 41
In many cases it is advantageous for the low income spouse to
terminate the community as quickly as possible to avoid taxation under
the Seaborn rule and to avoid liability for payment of the other spouse's
income tax. Thus, the date of termination is crucial. Federal law often
relies on state law for a determination of when the community is
terminated.
For purposes of federal income taxation, the community terminates
on the date prescribed by state law when termination results from a
138. La. Civ. Code art. 2356.
139. A spouse could obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board upon a
showing (1) of adultery by the other spouse, (2) of a conviction "of a felony and sentence
to death or imprisonment at hard labor in a state or federal penitentiary," (3) of the
"habitual intemperance . . ., excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages" of the other spouse
that rendered the couple's living together insupportable, (4) of public defamation of the
petitioning spouse by the other spouse, (5) of abandonment, (6) of an attempt of one of
the spouses against the life of the other, (7) that the other spouse was a fugitive from
justice, or (8) intentional non-support. La. Civ. Code art. 138(l)-(8) (1987). For a discussion
of the former provisions of the Civil Code concerning grounds for a judgment of separation
from bed and board, see Robert Anthony Pascal & Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana Family
Law Course 133-69 (3d ed. 1982).
140. La. Civ. Code art. 138(9) (1987). Spouses who lived separately and apart for only
six months could obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board only if both spouses
executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that they voluntarily had lived separately and
apart for six months and that there existed irreconcilable differences between them such
that their living together was insupportable and impossible. La. Civ. Code art. 138(10)
(1987).
141. Of course, the Louisiana legislature could make it easier for separating spouses to
terminate the community by permitting unilateral termination of the community upon a
showing that the spouses had lived separately and apart for a period of time even if neither
of the spouses files a petition for divorce. Perhaps the legislature has not enacted such a
provision because it would prefer to see proof that the spouses intend to dissolve the marital
bond before permitting a spouse unilaterally to terminate the community possibly to the
detriment of the other spouse.
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matrimonial agreement 42 or a null marriage.143 The date of termination
of the community under state law, however, will not always be respected
for federal income tax purposes. In Brent v. Commissioner, '4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana wife
was liable under the Seaborn rule for the tax on one-half of her hus-
band's income earned during the entire 1970 calendar year despite the
fact that under state law termination of the community was retroactive
to March 26, 1970, the date the petition for divorce was filed. Louisiana
law provides that a judgment of divorce terminates a community property
regime retroactively to the date that the petition was filed. 45 Thus, if
a divorce is granted, the income of each spouse earned during the
pendency of the suit is the separate property of each spouse. However,
if the divorce action fails for any reason, the income earned by each
142. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 161 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1947) (prenuptial agreement
of Louisiana couple effective to characterize all future earnings of each spouse as separate
property for federal income tax purposes); Van Dyke v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1941) (earnings of each spouse after entering into separation of property agreement
were separate property for federal income tax purposes); Helvering v. Hickman, 70 F.2d
985 (9th Cir. 1934) (same); Shoenhair v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 576 (1941) (same); I.R.S.
Pub. No. 555, supra note 34, at 2-3 (state law determines when a matrimonial agreement
terminates the community for federal income tax purposes). In Louisiana termination of
the community by matrimonial agreement is effective "as to immovable property, when
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the property is situated
and as to movables when filed for registry in the parish or parishes in which the spouses
are domiciled." La. Civ. Code art. 2332.
143. I.R.S. Pub. No. 555, supra note 31, at 2 (state law determines whether a community
exists and/or when it terminates with respect to a null marriage). The effective date of
termination of a community upon declaration of a nullity in Louisiana generally, but not
always, is the date that the marriage is declared null. Louisiana recognizes two types of
nullity: absolute nullity and relative nullity. A marriage is absolutely null if it is contracted
without a marriage ceremony, with a party absent and represented by another person, or
in violation of an impediment. La. Civ. Code arts. 94, 92. Such a marriage generally
produces civil effects in favor of the party who is in good faith and only as long as the
good faith lasts. La. Civ. Code art. 96; Evans v. Eureka Grand Lodge, 149 So. 2d 305
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). When the cause of an absolute nullity is one party's prior undissolved
marriage, however, the civil effects of the absolutely null marriage "continue in favor of
the other party regardless of whether the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage
is pronounced null or the latter party contracts a valid marriage." La. Civ. Code art. 96.
A marriage is relatively null in Louisiana if the consent of one of the parties was not freely
given. La. Civ. Code art. 95. Such a marriage may be declared null upon application of
the party whose consent was not free unless "that party confirmed the marriage after
recovering his liberty or regaining his discernment." Id. The civil effects of a relatively null
marriage continue until a declaration of the nullity. See, e.g., State v. Loyacano, 135 La.
945, 66 So. 307 (1914); Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
144. 630 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1980).
145. La. Civ. Code art. 159. During the year in issue in Brent, former La. Civ. Code
art. 155 (1870) also provided for retroactive termination of the community upon the rendering
of a divorce decree.
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spouse during the pendency of the suit is community property.'" Ac-
cordingly, Mrs. Brent had a right to one-half of her husband's income
until her right to that income was extinguished retroactively when the
divorce became final on December 9, 1971.
The retroactivity of the termination of the community cannot be
recognized for federal income tax purposes because the federal income
tax system operates on an annual accounting basis. 47 The annual ac-
counting principle requires that an amount received under a claim of
right must be reported as income in the year received even though it
is determined in a later year that the taxpayer had no right to the
amount and is required to repay it.'48 The annual accounting principle
is an integral part of our taxing system so that the amount of a taxpayer's
income is "ascertainable and payable to the government, at regular
intervals.' 1 49 The Fifth Circuit explained that Mrs. Brent had to report
one-half of her husband's income even though she was not entitled to
it because
[tihere is no practical way for the tax collector to know that a
married person who files a tax return is party to a separation
or divorce proceeding. Even if that fact were known, the levy
of an assessment against the husband would be improper if the
suit were dismissed or terminated without a decree favorable to
the plaintiff. 50
The Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta, however, that a remedy might
be available to Mrs. Brent under section 1341 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' If a taxpayer, like Mrs. Brent, is required to repay an amount
that was previously included in income under a claim of right, the
taxpayer is entitled to deduct the amount in the year it is repaid.5 2 The
allowance of a deduction in a later year, however, will not offset the
tax liability incurred in the earlier year if the taxpayer, as is likely, was
146. If an action for divorce fails, the community remains in effect because termination
is only retroactive once a judgment of divorce is rendered. La. Civ. Code art. 159. If one
of the spouses has obtained a judgment of separation of property upon proof that the
spouses have lived separately and apart for thirty days from the filing of the petition for
divorce, termination of the community will remain in effect even if the divorce action fails
unless the spouses reconcile and do not execute a matrimonial agreement terminating the
community. La. Civ. Code art. 2375(B).
147. Brent, 630 F.2d at 359.
148. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 73 S. Ct. 671 (1953); United States v. Lewis
340 U.S. 590, 71 S. Ct. 522 (1951); North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 52
S. Ct. 613 (1932); Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 150 (1931).
149. Burnet, 282 U.S. at 365, 51 S. Ct. at 152.
150. Brent, 630 F.2d at 360.
151. Brent, 630 F.2d at 360-61 & n. 8.
152. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 71 S. Ct. 522.
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in a higher income bracket in the year of inclusion than in the year of
the deduction.' To alleviate this problem,'5 4 Congress enacted section
1341'1 of the Internal Revenue Code.
153. The federal income tax is a progressive tax, imposed at higher rates as taxable
income increases. Under the current rules, increments of an individual's income are taxed
at rates of fifteen percent, twenty-eight percent and thirty-one percent. I.R.C. § 1 (1988).
The additional amounts included in a taxpayer's income are likely to cause the income to
be placed in a higher tax bracket in the year of the inclusion. The deduction in the later
year will reduce taxable income, causing the taxpayer's income to fall into a lower bracket
in the year of the deduction.
154. See S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922,
1003-05 (1958); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 451-52 (1954).
155. I.R.C. § 1341 (1988) provides:
SEC. 1341. COMPUTATION OF TAX WHERE TAXPAYER RESTORES SUB-
STANTIAL AMOUNT HELD UNDER CLAIM OF RIGHTS.
(a) General rule.-If-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years)
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not
have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000,
then the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of
the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to--;
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction, minus;
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding provisions
of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which would
result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from
gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
For purposes of paragraph (5)(B), the corresponding provisions of the Internal Revenue
code of 1939 shall be chapter 1 of such code (other than subchapter E, relating to self-
employment income) and subchapter E of chapter 2 of such code.
(b) Special rules.-
(1) If the decrease in tax ascertained under subsection (a)(5)(B) exceeds the
tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year (computed without the
deduction) such excess shall be considered to be a payment of tax on the last
day prescribed by law for the payment of tax for the taxable year, and shall
be refunded or credited in the same manner as if it were an overpayment for
such taxable year.
(2) Subsection (a) does not apply to any deduction allowable with respect to
an item which was included in gross income by reason of the sale or other
disposition of stock in trade of the taxpayer (or other property of a kind
which would properly have been included in the inventory of the taxpayer if
on hand at the close of the prior taxable year) or property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
This paragraph shall not apply if the deduction arises out of refunds or
repayments with respect to rates made by a regulated public utility (as defined
in section 7701(a)(33) without regard to the limitation contained in the last
19931
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In cases where the amount repaid in the later year exceeds $3,000,
a taxpayer who satisfies the requirements of section 1341 is permitted
to deduct the amount of the repayment or claim a tax credit for tax
paid on the amount included in the earlier year. 5 6 The taxpayer must
use the method of computing tax (deduction or credit) that results in
the lesser tax liability."' If the credit claimed in the year of repayment
exceeds the tax liability for that year, the taxpayer is entitled to a
refund.""
While section 1341 does much to alleviate the burden of the claim
of right doctrine, it does not compensate the taxpayer who is required
to liquidate important assets in order to pay the tax liability for the
year of inclusion. Nor does the provision take into account the time
two sentences thereof) if such refunds or repayments are required to be made
by the Government, political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality referred
to in such section, or by an order of a court, or are made in settlement of
litigation or under threat or imminence of litigation.
(3) If the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year is the amount
determined under subsection (a)(5), then the deduction referred to in subsection
(a)(2) shall not be taken into account for any purpose of this subtitle other
than this section.
(4) For purposes of determining whether paragraph (4) or paragraph (5) of
subsection (a) applies-
(A) in any case where the deduction referred to in paragraph (4) of
subsection (a) results in a net operating loss, such loss shall, for purposes
of computing the tax for the taxable year under such paragraph (4), be
carried back to the same extent and in the same manner as is provided
under section 172; and
(B) in any case where the exclusion referred to in paragraph (5)(B) of
subsection (a) results in a net operating loss or capital loss for the prior
taxable year (or years), such loss shall, for purposes of computing the
decrease in tax for the prior taxable year (or years) under such paragraph
(5)(B), be carried back and carried over to the same extent and in the
same manner as is provided under section 172 or section 1212, except that
no carryover beyond the taxable year shall be taken into account.
(5) For purposes of this chapter, the net operating loss described in paragraph
(4)(A) of this subsection, or the net operating loss or capital loss described
in paragraph (4)(B) of this subsection, as the case may be, shall (after the
application of paragraph (4) or (5)(B) of subsection (a) for the taxable year)
be taken into account under section 172 or 1212 for taxable years after the
taxable years after the taxable year to the same extent and in the same manner
as-
(A) a net operating loss sustained for the taxable year, if paragraph (4)
of subsection (a) applied, or
(B) a net operating loss or capital loss sustained for the prior taxable year
(or years), if paragraph (5)(B) of subsection (a) applied.
156. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4), (5) (1988). For an explanation of the I.R.C. § 1341 computations,
see I Bittker & Lokken, -supra note 46, at 1 6.3.4.
157. I.R.C. § 1341(a) (1988).
158. I.R.C. § 1341(b) (1988).
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value of money: section 1341 does not permit the taxpayer to collect
interest with respect to the credit for taxes paid in the earlier year.
Moreover, section 1:41 relief will not be available to the unsophisticated
taxpayer who does not know that the provision exists and does not
claim its benefits for the year of repayment. Furthermore, it is not
certain that a taxpayer who is required to pay tax on one-half of the
community income during the pendency of a divorce can actually claim
relief under section 1341 for the year in which the divorce is final.
The Service seems to take the position that section 1341 relief is
not available to divorcing spouses in Louisiana. In Revenue Ruling 74-
393,'19 the Service ruled that the community does not terminate in
Louisiana until the decree of divorce is rendered, notwithstanding ret-
roactivity under state law.lw0 Louisiana law provides that "[tlhe retro-
active termination of the community shall be without prejudice to the
rights of third parties . .. "161 In Revenue Ruling 74-393, the Service
interpreted this provision to mean that the community does not retro-
actively terminate with respect to the federal tax liability incurred during
the pendency of the divorce.1 62 If each spouse is considered the actual
owner of one-half of the community income earned during the pendency
of the divorce, in accordance with the Service's position, the inclusion
of income in the earlier year was proper, and there is no reason for
the allowance of a deduction or a credit in a later year.
Disallowing a spouse any relief under section 1341 would establish
a rule of administrative convenience. If one spouse is entitled to claim
a deduction or credit for putative community income improperly included
in the spouse's income, the other spouse should be required to include
the same amount in income in the later year, either under a tax benefit
theory 63 or because the spouse's right to more than one-half of the
159. 1974-2 C.B. 28.
160. See Rev. Rul. 74-393, 1974-2 C.B. 28, 29 ("[sltate court judgments cannot for
Federal income tax purposes retroactively change the facts as they existed at the time of
the original transactions"); I.R.S. Pub. No. 555, supra note 31, at 2 (an absolute decree
of divorce ends the marital community).
161. La. Civ. Code art. 159.
162. Rev. Rul. 74-393, 1974-2 C.B. at 30.
163. The tax benefit rule requires a taxpayer to include in income an item recovered
during that taxable year that would not be includable in income except for the fact that
the item produced a tax benefit in an earlier year. For example, taxpayers often deduct
bad debts when they become worthless. I.R.C. § 166 (1988). If a debtor becomes solvent
and repays a debt that the creditor deducted as worthless in a prior year, the creditor must
include the amount of the repayment in income in the year that the debt is recovered. See,
e.g., National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940).
The statutory provision concerning the tax benefit rule does not literally apply to items,
like community income, that were omitted from income in earlier years. I.R.C. § 111 (1988)
requires a taxpayer to include in income recovered amounts that were previously deducted
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income vested in the later year.' 64 Adjustment would also be necessary
for any alimony pendente lite payments. Alimony pendente lite generally
is deductible by the payor 65 and income to the payee.' 6 If alimony
pendente lite is paid during the existence of the community, however,
the payor may deduct and the payee must include in income only the
amount by which the alimony pendente lite payments exceed one-half
of the community income for the year. 67 A later determination that the
community retroactively terminated for tax purposes should allow the
payor to deduct in the year that the divorce becomes final alimony
pendente lite payments previously disallowed and require the payee to
include in income such payments that previously were excluded. A rule
establishing that the community terminates for tax purposes only when
the divorce is final eliminates all of the adjustments that must be made
under section 1341 and the tax benefit rule.
The different positions taken by the Fifth Circuit and the Service
raise questions as to the reporting of community income and alimony
pendente lite not only when a divorce becomes final in a later year but
also when a divorce becomes final in the same year that the petition
for the divorce was filed. In Louisiana, a spouse may obtain a decree
of divorce after 180 days of filing the petition.168 Thus, in Louisiana,
many divorces will be final within the same year in which the petition
is filed. The Fifth Circuit's rationale in Brent seems to require that for
federal tax purposes, the termination date of the community relates back
to the date the petition was filed when the year of the filing and the
year of the entry of the final decree of divorce coincide. While the
claim of right doctrine requires a spouse to report putative community
income earned during the time the suit for divorce is pending, a de-
termination in the same year that neither spouse had a right to one-
or credited to the extent that deduction or credit reduced the amount of tax that the taxpayer
was required to pay in the earlier year. Courts, however, have applied tax benefit principles
to require the inclusion in income of recovered amounts that were previously excluded from
income. See, e.g., Keystone Nat'l Bank in Pittsburgh v. United States, 52 AFTR 1511 (W.D.
Pa. 1957) (embezzled funds that had been omitted from income in the year of the embez-
zlement must be included in income in the year of the recovery under the tax benefit rule).
164. See, eg., Alsop v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961) (cash method rules
required cash basis taxpayer to include in income embezzled amounts that were excluded
from income in the year of the embezzlement).
165. I.R.C. § 215(a) (1988).
166. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1988).
167. Rev. Rul. 62-115, 1962-2 C.B. 23. Professor Miller raises a question with respect
to the application of this rule when a spouse with both community income and separate
income claims to make alimony pendente lite payments with separate funds. In such a case,
the payor could argue that the payments are deductible by the payor and income to the
payee, Miller, supra note 34, at 1102 n.96. Of course, tracing the funds used for the
payments could be problematic.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 102.
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half of the other's income should be effective for the year of the divorce.
Excluding each spouse's share of the other's income when the year of
the filing of the petition and the entry of the decree of divorce coincide
does no violence to the annual accounting principle.
The Service's position, however, that the community does not ter-
minate until the decree of divorce is entered, 6 9 contradicts this inter-
pretation. While the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Brent is binding with
respect to Louisiana taxpayers, 70 the suggestion of a remedy under
section 1341 is only dictum.' 7' It is not certain whether the Fifth Circuit
actually would allow relief under section 1341. Because the Service's
position would disallow application of section 1341, a taxpayer who
cannot afford litigation probably will not be able to claim such relief. 72
Because of the uncertainty, it would be better for a low income spouse
to terminate the community by entering into a matrimonial agreement
or obtaining a judgment of separation of property before the divorce
is final, rather than to rely on any possible relief under section 1341.
While Louisiana law permits the low income spouse to claim reim-
bursement from the other spouse for the tax paid on the income that
belonged to the other spouse, terminating the community in a way that
is effective for federal income tax purposes, could save the low income
spouse the effort and expense required in seeking reimbursement after
the divorce is final.
The retroactivity problem is not limited to termination of the com-
munity by divorce. In Louisiana, a judgment of separation of property
169. Rev. Rul. 74-393, 1974-2 C.B. 28.
170. The Tax Court decides cases on the basis of the law in the Circuit to which the
appeal will lie. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940, 92 S. Ct. 284 (1971).
171. The litigation in Brent concerned only Mrs. Brent's income for 1970, the year in
which the petition for divorce was final. Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not have jurisdiction
over the issue of whether Mrs. Brent was entitled to a deduction or a credit in 1971, the
year in which the divorce became final.
172. No reported cases could be found in which a Louisiana divorcee claimed relief
under I.R.C. § 1341. The Service's official position is that the community terminates when
a final decree of divorce is issued, notwithstanding retroactivity under state law. Rev. Rul.
74-393, 1974-2 C.B. 28. In Brent, however, the final decree of divorce was not entered
until December 9, 1971. There was no issue in Brent concerning any community income
earned from January 1 until December 9, 1971. Under Rev. Rul. 74-393, half of that income
should have been taxable to Mrs. Brent. One can only speculate as to the lack of an issue
concerning Mrs. Brent's 1971 tax liability. Perhaps the Service overlooked the 1971 tax year
until the statute of limitations had run. Perhaps the Brents had partitioned the community
by January 1, 1971. It is possible, however, that the Service simply did not pursue the
issue because the divorce decree entered before the end of the taxable year retroactively
rendered all income earned by the spouses during 1971 as separate income. The lack of an
issue concerning Mrs. Brent's 1971 income tax liability might be an indication that the
Service in fact has accepted the Fifth Circuit's suggestion that relief is available under I.R.C.
§ 1341.
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also terminates the community retroactively to the date that the petition
for separation of property was filed . 73 In cases where a petition is filed
in one year and the judgment of separation of property is rendered in
a later year, each spouse must report and pay tax on one-half of the
community income until the judgment is final. Whether a spouse is
entitled to claim relief under section 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code
remains uncertain. Even when a judgment of separation of property is
rendered in the same year that the petition is filed, the status of the
community between the date of filing the petition and the date the
judgment is entered also is uncertain.
A recently enacted provision of the Louisiana Civil Code permits
either spouse to obtain a judgment of separation of property when a
petition for divorce has been filed, upon a showing that the spouses
have lived separate and apart for 30 days from the date of the filing
of the petition for divorce.174 If such a judgment effectively terminates
the community for federal income tax purposes, the expedited procedure
for unilateral termination of the community could reduce the adverse
impact of the retroactivity problem.
It is not certain, however, whether a 30-day judgment of separation
of property will be effective in terminating the community for federal
income tax purposes. Under Louisiana law a reconciliation of the spouses
retroactively reestablishes the community if it has been terminated by
a 30-day judgment of separation of property.' 71 On the date that such
a judgment is final, it cannot be certain that the community is in fact
terminated. Only when the divorce is final is the termination established.
The Service may adopt a rule of administrative convenience, providing
that a judgment of separation of property rendered upon a showing of
a 30-day separation is ineffective in terminating the community for
federal income tax purposes.
On the other hand, reestablishment of the community upon rec-
onciliation after a 30-day judgment of separation of property is not
effective as to third parties unless a notice of the reestablishment is
filed in the public records. 176 The Service and the federal courts may
follow state law and find that the date that a 30-day judgment of
separation of property is rendered is the date upon which the community
terminates for federal tax purposes. Until the Service or a court rules
on the issue, the answer remains uncertain.
173. La. Civ. Code art. 2375(A).
174. La. Civ. Code art. 2374(C).
175. La. Civ. Code art. 2375(B).
176. Id.
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E. Amending State Law to Mitigate the Harsh Effects of the
Seaborn Rule
The Seaborn rule imposes an onerous burden on low income spouses
in community property states. Commentators have called upon Congress
to override the rule. 77 Unless and until Congress acts, however, the
Louisiana Legislature should try to help protect its domiciliaries against
the adverse impact of the Seaborn rule.
Low income spouses in Louisiana can protect themselves by entering
into a matrimonial agreement to partition the community or by peti-
tioning for a judgment of separation of property. Either remedy, how-
ever, may be difficult to obtain. A matrimonial agreement requires the
concurrence of both spouses and judicial approval. 178 Separating spouses
may not be able to cooperate well enough to concur in a matrimonial
agreement. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a spouse could obtain
a judgment of separation of property if the only grounds for the petition
were the obligation to pay federal income tax on one-half of the com-
munity income.' 79 Moreover, spouses who either do not understand their
rights under the community property system or are unaware of the
federal rules for taxation of community income often do not appreciate
the need to terminate the community to avoid application of the Seaborn
rule.
Spouses who divorce escape the burdens of the Seaborn rule because
the community necessarily terminates for tax purposes, at least by the
time the divorce decree is entered. No such automatic termination is
available, of course, for spouses who wish to live separate and apart
without obtaining a divorce. Such spouses will continue to be liable for
one-half of the community income unless they enter into a matrimonial
agreement, obtain a judgment of separation of property, or qualify for
relief under the stringent requirements of section 66 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Louisiana could help some of these taxpayers by enacting a provision
authorizing a suit for separation from bed and board which would
terminate the community. 80 Such a provision would make it easier for
separated spouses to terminate the community. Spouses who do not
177. See. e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, Joint Return Liability and Poe v. Seaborn Should
Both Be Repealed, Tax Notes 457, 464-67 (Oct. 22, 1990); Gann, supra note 13; Kalinka,
supra note 34; Miller, supra note 34.
178. La. Civ. Code art. 2329. If the spouses have moved into Louisiana within one
year before signing their agreement, court approval is not necessary. Id.
179. For a discussion of the problem in seeking a judgment of separation of property
to avoid application of the Seaborn rule, see supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
180. See La. Civ. Code arts. 138 (1987) (authorizing suits for separation from bed and
board); 2356 (1980) (providing that a judgment of separation from bed and board terminates
the community).
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desire to divofce and do not understand that it would be beneficial for
them to partition the community to avoid application of the Seaborn
rule might nevertheless seek a legal separation, thereby terminating the
community.
Under former law, a judgment of separation from bed and board,
like a divorce or suit for separation of property, terminated the com-
munity retroactively to the date of filing the petition.' s The retroactive
termination of the community in the context of a separation from bed
and board creates the same problem for the low income spouse as it
does in the context of a divorce or a suit for separation of property.
To eliminate the retroactivity problem, the Louisiana Legislature
could enact legislation providing that the community terminates upon
the filing of a petition for separation from bed and board, divorce, or
separation of property. Such a rule would protect the low income spouse
from the adverse effects of the Seaborn rule. Such a rule, however,
would create inequities because a spouse could terminate the community
unilaterally, merely by filing a petition, thereby depriving the other
spouse of the benefits of community property law.
Another solution to the federal tax problem would be to enact a
provision that the community terminates upon the entry of a decree of
separation from bed and board, a decree of divorce, or a judgment of
separation of property. This rule would coincide with the rule for federal
taxation, thereby at least giving the low income spouse an interest in
and possible chance of recovering the income on which the spouse paid
tax. This rule, however, creates too much potential for abuse. As long
as the community remains in existence, each spouse can contract debts,
diminishing the amount of community property that will be available
to the other spouse upon later termination.' s2
181. La. Civ. Code art. 155 (1870).
182. La. Civ. Code art. 2345 provides: "A separate or community obligation may be
satisfied during the community property regime from community property and from the
separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
After termination of the community, pre-termination creditors can seize former com-
munity assets from either spouse in satisfaction of such debts. La. Civ. Code art. 2357.
The creditor, of course, must be able to identify the property as former community property
or risk an action for wrongful seizure. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 25, at § 7.10. In
cases where the creditor seizes former community property from the non-debtor spouse, the
non-debtor may be able to recover reimbursement from the debtor spouse. For a discussion
of the rights of the non-debtor spouse against the debtor spouse in such a case, see id.
Nevertheless, a community obligation could consume the entire community. A non-
contracting spouse has no right to reimbursement when community obligations are satisfied
with community property. For a discussion of the rights of the spouses to reimbursement
upon termination of the community, see id, at §§ 7.13-7.18.
A community obligation is one "incurred by a spouse during the existence of a
community property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of
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While there may be no solution to the retroactivity problem, per-
mitting a spouse to obtain a separation from bed and board could
protect some Louisiana taxpayers who are unable to enter into a mat-
rimonial agreement terminating the community, who are unable to obtain
a judgment of separation of property, or who are unaware that they
are liable for the tax on one-half of the community income earned
during the existence of the community. The case for enacting a provision
authorizing legal separation, however, is much stronger upon consid-
eration of the effect of a legal separation on the operation of the
marriage penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
II. MAITAL STATUS AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: THE CASE
FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
A taxpayer's marital status has a major impact on the amount of
federal income tax that is due. Not only do the tax rates on the same
amount of taxable income differ depending on a taxpayer's marital
status, but marital status also affects a taxpayer's ability to take ad-
vantage of many deductions and credits. Attribution rules that apply to
married taxpayers can affect tax liability as well. While it is sometimes
advantageous for a taxpayer to be married for purposes of federal income
taxation, in many cases a married taxpayer incurs a substantially higher
tax burden than one who is not married. In repealing the provisions
authorizing a judgment of separation from bed and board, Louisiana
has made it more difficult for: separated spouses to qualify as unmarried
for federal income tax purposes. Thus, a significant class of Louisiana
domiciliaries incurs a higher federal income tax burden than would be
necessary if the state authorized legal separation. The burden often falls
upon spouses at a time when they are straining under the economic
hardship of establishing separate households. In some cases, the absence
of a provision authorizing legal separation in Louisiana adds uncertainty
as to the federal tax status of Louisiana taxpayers.
A. Determination of a Taxpayer's Marital Status for Purposes of
Federal Income Taxation
Because the application of so many provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code depends on a taxpayer's marital status, it is essential to know
the other spouse ... " La. Civ. Code art. 2360. Upon careful analysis of the jurisprudence,
Professors Spaht and Hargrave have compiled a list of community obligations that includes,
inter alia, obligations relating to a business conducted by one or both of the spouses and
obligations incurred for family goods and household or living expenses. Spaht & Hargrave,
supra note 25, at § 7.12. Under these rules a spouse could easily incur debts that would
diminish the other spouse's share of community property upon termination.
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whether a taxpayer is married or not.' 3 Section 7703 of the Internal
Revenue Code provides the general rules for determining marital status.1 4
For federal income tax purposes, the determination of whether an in-
dividual is married generally is made as of the close of the taxable
year. ' 5 Tax law generally looks to state law for a determination as to
marital status.'" There are two statutory exceptions to this rule. First,
183. For a discussion of the rules concerning the determination of marital status for
purposes of federal income taxation, see 4 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 1111.3.6;
Jerome M. Hesch, 95-5th Tax Mgmt., Divorce and Separation A-24 to A-26 (1991); Jerome
M. Hesch, Separated Couples and the Marriage Penalty, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 116, 117-22 (1980);
Robinson & Wenig, supra note 13; Mark Ulven, Note, The Separation Penalty: Problems
in Establishing Legal Separation for Filing Status, 45 Tax Law. 903 (1992).
184. Each provision of the Internal Revenue Code whose operation varies depending on
the taxpayer's marital status has its own definition of marital status. Many such provisions,
however, define marital status by referring to I.R.C. § 7703. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c),
(d); 2(c); 22(e)(2); 32(d); 55(d); 63(g); 68(b)(1); 86(c)(3)(A); 135(d)(3); 151(d) (1988 & Supp.
1991). In general, then, the rules of I.R.C. § 7703 apply in determining a taxpayer's marital
status.
185. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1) (1988). If a taxpayer's spouse dies before the end of the taxable
year, however, the taxpayer's marital status will be determined at the time of the death.
Id. In other words, a surviving spouse is considered married for federal income tax purposes.
186. See, e.g., Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Commissioner
v. Eccles, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'g 19 T.C. 1049 (1953); Dunn v. Commissioner,
70 T.C. 361 (1978); Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 64
(3d Cir. 1979); Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir.
1977); Untermann v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 93 (1962). See also Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940) ("State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal
revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed"). But see Estate
of Steffke v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1976) ("It]he meaning of the words
or the legal status of circumstances for federal tax purposes need not be identical to their
meaning or their legal effect under state law").
A person who was never married generally is not married for federal income tax
purposes. The federal tax rules, however, recognize common law marriages if such a marriage
is valid under the law of the state of the domiciliary. Von Tersch v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 415 (1967); Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. An individual who receives a decree of
annulment was never married for state law purposes. The Service takes the position that
such a person must file amended returns claiming unmarried status for all taxable years
affected by the annulment that are not closed by the statute of limitations. Rev. Rul. 76-
255, 1976-2 C.B. 40; I.R.S. Pub. No. 504, Tax Information for Divorced or Separated
Individuals 1 (1991). If, however, there is no decree of annulment, the putative marriage,
whether absolutely null or relatively null, will be recognized for federal income tax purposes.
See, e.g., Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974); Reisman v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 570 (1968).
An individual who obtains a decree of divorce is considered not married as of the
date of the decree. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2) (1988). If, however, a couple obtains a divorce for
tax avoidance purposes and contemplates remarriage, the Service treats the divorce as a
sham. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40; I.R.S. Pub. No. 504, supra, at 1. Courts have
also disregarded such divorces. See, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980), aff'd,
668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). If taxpayers divorce and continue to live together without
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an individual who is "legally separated from his spouse under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance" is considered not married for
federal income tax purposes." 7 The second exception is the so-called
"abandoned spouse"' 88 rule. Under the abandoned spouse rule, a tax-
payer is not considered married if: (1) the taxpayer maintains as his or
her home a household that constitutes for more than one-half of the
taxable year the principal place of abode of the taxpayer's dependent
remarrying, however, the Service and the courts generally treat the divorce as valid. See,
e.g., Boykin v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 267 (1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-350-76
(June 1, 1978).
The courts are split with respect to the effect of a foreign divorce that is later declared
invalid by the domiciliary state. The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that such
a divorce decree is also invalid for purposes of determining a taxpayer's filing status. See,
e.g., Lee, 64 T.C. 552; Estate of Buckley v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 664 (1962), acq., 1964-
2 C.B. 4. The Second Circuit, however, applies a "rule of validation" which validates a
current marriage for income tax purposes by giving conclusive effect to a foreign divorce
decree even after it is adjudicated a nullity by a state court with jurisdiction over the parties.
See, e.g., Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965); Wondsel v. United
States, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935, 86 S. Ct. 1064 (1966),
rev'g in part 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1278 (1964). The Second Circuit has also applied the rule
of validation in cases involving the determination of whether an individual is a surviving
spouse for purposes of the federal estate tax unless a court of the state where the decedent's
estate was administered has ruled the prior divorce invalid. Compare Estate of Spalding v.
Commissioner, 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1976) (New York Supreme Court declared ex parte
Nevada divorce invalid, but decedent's estate was administered in California; held, second
marriage was valid for purposes of the federal estate tax) with Estate of Goldwater v.
Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976) (New York court administering the decedent's
estate declared er parte Mexican divorce invalid; held, decedent's first wife, rather than his
second wife, was the surviving spouse for purposes of the federal estate tax). See also Estate
of Steffke, 538 F.2d at 735 (the decision of the state court that has primary jurisdiction
over the administration of the decedent's estate determines whether an individual is a surviving
spouse for federal estate tax purposes). For purposes of determining whether a spouse is
entitled to claim an alimony deduction, the Third Circuit and Tax Court have validated
marriages despite an adjudication that they were null. See, e.g., Feinberg v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952); Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974). For a
discussion of the application of state law to determine marital status for purposes of federal
taxation, see Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative
Tax Factor, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 257 (1983); Case Comment, State Domestic Relations
Law and Federal Tax Policy, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 150, 151 (1966); Note, The Haitian
Vacation: The Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 Mich. L. Rev.
1332, 1339-44 (1979). For a defense of the rule of validation, see Noreen A. Shugrue, Note,
Divorce, Conflict of Laws, and the IRS-The "Rule of Validation" As a Solution to
Matrimonial Tax Difficulties: Estate of Spalding v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1976), 9 Conn. L. Rev. 282 (1977).
187. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2) (1988).
188. A spouse need not actually be deserted to qualify; I.R.C. § 7703(b)(3) requires only
that the taxpayer live apart from his or her spouse during the last six months of the taxable
year to qualify as an abandoned spouse.
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
child; s9 (2) the taxpayer furnishes over one-half of the cost of main-
taining the household during the taxable year;'90 and (3) during the last
six months of the taxable year, the taxpayer's spouse is not a member
of the taxpayer's household.19'
In repealing the provisions for legal separation, the Louisiana Leg-
islature has made it more difficult for its domiciliaries to be considered
not married for federal income tax purposes. In cases where there is
no decree requiring spousal support, Louisiana taxpayers who separate
from their spouses but do not wish to obtain a divorce and individuals
whose divorce decrees are still pending as of December 31 are considered
married unless they qualify under the abandoned spouse rule. Childless
couples and noncustodial parents who fail to meet the requirement that
a taxpayer have a dependent child under the abandoned spouse rule,
are considered married. If the community has not terminated, it is
impossible even for a custodial parent to qualify as not married because
the abandoned spouse rule requires the parent to furnish over one-half
the cost of maintaining the household. To the extent that the parent
uses community funds to pay the household expenses, the parent fur-
nishes only one-half of the cost. 192
Before the repeal of the provisions for separation from bed and
board, Louisiana taxpayers could easily qualify as not married for federal
income tax purposes.. Spouses who were separated under the former
provisions authorizing judgments of separation from bed and board 93
were considered legally separated under a decree of divorce, and therefore
not married for federal income tax purposes.194
The status of separated spouses in Louisiana is less certain when a
court decree requires one of the spouses to make support payments to
189. I.R.C. § 7703(b)(1) (1988). The child will qualify if the taxpayer would have been
entitled to claim the dependency exemption but for the fact that the taxpayer permitted the
other spouse to claim the deduction pursuant to the rules of I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) or (4). Id.
190. I.R.C. § 7703(b)(2) (1988).
191. I.R.C. § 7703(b)(3) (1988).
192. Cf. Abrams v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433, 1436 (1989) (during the
existence of the community the total support of the household and the children is allocable
evenly to both parents for purposes of determining whether one of the parents has satisfied
the requirement for qualifying as a head of household that the taxpayer furnish over one-
half of cost of maintaining a household); Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-40-006 (June 26, 1977)
(married taxpayer living under a community property regime did not qualify for head-of-
household status; absent proof that the taxpayer used separate funds, taxpayer could establish
only that he furnished one-half, rather than over one-half of the cost of maintaining his
household).
193. La. Civ. Code arts. 140, 143, 152-153 (1825); 141-142, 144-151, 154-158 (1870).
194. Garsaud v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1086 (1957).
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the other spouse. A taxpayer is considered not married for federal tax
purposes if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or her spouse
under a decree of separate maintenance.191 If a decree orders spousal
support, the parties must be legally separated to be considered unmarried
for federal tax purposes.'96 Spouses who are separated under a written
separation agreement, even one requiring support payments, are consid-
ered married because there has been no court decree,'97 unless one or
both qualifies as unmarried under the abandoned spouse rule. A judg-
ment of separation of property will not satisfy the legal separation
requirement. 98 Nor will a decree requiring a spouse to pay alimony
pendente lite satisfy the requirement.' 99 To constitute a legal separation,
the court order must alter the marital status of the parties .2° Neither
a judgment for separation of property nor an interlocutory decree or-
dering payment of alimony pendente lite will accomplish this result.
Thus, in Louisiana where a spouse cannot obtain a judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board, a spouse who is separated, but not divorced,
in most cases is married for federal tax purposes, regardless of whether
one of the spouses is making support payments, unless the abandoned
spouse rule applies.
In cases where one of the spouses is making support payments under
a decree entered pursuant to section 9:291 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, however, the marital status of Louisiana spouses is uncertain. 0'
Courts do not seem to agree as to whether a decree ordering a spouse
195. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2) (1988).
196. See, e.g., Frazier v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'g T.C.M. (P-
H) 1979-515 (1979); Capodanno v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1979); Hulick v.
Commissioner, 357 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1966); Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 361 (1978);
Palmquist v. Commissioner, 284 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Rafal v. United States,
267 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1967).
197. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1948); Donigan v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 632 (1977).
198. Cash v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1978).
199. See, e.g., Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 361 (1978); Muracca v. Commissioner,
40 T.C.M. (CCH) 3 (1980); Rosenbaum v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 889 (1979);
Criscuolo v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1449 (1978); Forrest v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1033 (1978); Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 687 (1978); Rev.
Rul. 59-248, 1959-2 C.B. 31.
200. Boyer v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Capodanno v. Com-
missioner, 602 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1979); Seaman v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 336, 338
(9th Cir. 1973); Legget v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'g 39 T.C. 1022
(1963); Boettiger v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 477, 483 (1958), acq. 1959-1 C.B. 3.
201. La. R.S. 9:291 (1991) provides:
Spouses may not sue each other except for causes of action pertaining to
contracts or arising out of the provisions of Book 111, Title VI of the Civil Code;
for restitution of separate property; for divorce or declaration of nullity of the
marriage; and for causes of action pertaining to spousal support or the support
or custody of a child while the spouses are living separate and apart.
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to make support payments and to live separately and apart causes the
couple to be "legally separated" within the meaning of section 7703 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
In Legget v. Commissioner,22 the taxpayer's wife had obtained a
decree under former section 65.09 of the Florida Statutes ordering him
to pay alimony unconnected with divorce. The couple had been living
separately and apart. Florida, like Louisiana, has no statute authorizing
a legal separation or separation from bed and board. Section 65.09 of
the Florida Statutes authorized a wife to obtain alimony without seeking
divorce if she had grounds for divorcing her husband and lived separate
and apart from him. 20 3 Such a decree had the effect of releasing the
wife from the control of her husband.2°4
The issue in Legget concerned the deductibility of the alimony pay-
ments. At the time of the decision, alimony was not deductible by the
husband unless the couple was "legally separated." 2 5 The Second Circuit
distinguished a line of cases denying the deduction to taxpayers making
separate maintenance payments in jurisdictions whose laws also make
specific provision for legal separation and held that the payments at
issue were deductible because former section 65.09 of the Florida Statutes
202. 329 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'g 39 T.C. 1022 (1963).
203. Fla. Rev. Stat. § 65.09 (repealed 1967) provided:
65.09. Alimony unconnected with divorce. If any of the causes of divorce
set forth in § 65.04 shall exist in favor of the wife, and she be living apart from
her husband, she may obtain alimony without seeking a divorce upon a bill filed
and suit prosecuted as in other chancery causes; and the court shall have power
to grant such temporary and permanent alimony and suit money as the circum-
stances of the parties may render just; but no alimony shall be granted to an
adulterous wife.
The current provision under Florida law that authorizes spousal support unconnected
with divorce is Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.09 (West Supp. 1992), which provides:
If a person having the ability to contribute to the maintenance of his spouse
and support of his minor child fails to do so, the spouse who is not receiving
support or who has custody of the child or with whom the child has his primary
residence may apply to the court for alimony and for support for the child without
seeking dissolution of marriage, and the court shall enter an order as it deems
just and proper.
204. Fla. Rev. Stat. § 65.11 (repealed 1967; substantially reenacted as § 61.11).
205. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(l), 215(a) (1954). The current provisions do not require the couple
to be legally separated for the payment to qualify as alimony. Under the current rules
alimony is deductible if, inter alia, the payment is received under a "divorce or separation
instrument," defined as:
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument incident
to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement, or
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to make
payments for the support or maintenance of the other spouse.
I.R.C. § 71 (b)(1)(A), (2) (1988).
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was in substance "a legal separation although not baptized as such." 2°0
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit relied on opinions of the
Florida Supreme Court explaining that the right to relief authorized by
former section 65.09 was "in the nature of a limited divorce,"20 7 like
a divorce a mensa et thoro. 08
It is not certain whether a federal tax court would hold that section
9:291 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes constitutes "a legal separation,
although not baptized as such." Section 9:291 enforces the obligation
of married persons to support each other under article 98 of the Louis-
iana Civil Code. 209 The obligation of spousal support arises from the
marital relation 21 0 and ceases upon divorce.2 1 1 Thus, it appears that a
decree pursuant to section 9:241 requiring spousal support does not alter
the marital status of the parties in order to effect a legal separation
for federal income tax purposes. Case law, however, indicates that the
fact that spousal support ceases upon divorce is irrelevant in determining
whether a couple is married for federal income tax purposes. Under
prior Louisiana law a judgment of separation from bed and board did
not extinguish a spouse's duty of support authorized by the predecessor
of article 98.212 The Tax Court has held, however, that a judgment of
separation from bed and board under prior Louisiana law altered the
marital status of the parties to such an extent that they were considered
unmarried for federal income tax purposes. 213 To qualify for spousal
support under section 9:291, the spouses must be living separately and
apart. The duty to make support payments ceases upon reconciliation
of the parties. 21 4 Because a spouse must be living separate and apart in
order to obtain support payments, a court could follow Legget and hold
that a decree under section 9:291 constitutes a separation from bed and
board.
The precedential value of Legget is uncertain, however. In subsequent
cases, courts have held that a decree for spousal support entered in
jurisdictions other than Florida did not constitute legal separation for
federal tax purposes.2" Indeed, it is not even certain that the Fifth
206. Legget, 329 F.2d at 511.
207. Id., at 512, quoting Preston v. Preston, 116 Fla. 246, 157 So.197 (1933).
208. Legget, 329 F.2d at 511, citing Hartzog v. Hartzog, 65 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1953).
209. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (d).
210. Player v. Player, 162 La. 229, 110 So. 332 (1926).
211. Nethken v. Nethken, 292 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), aff'd, 307 So. 2d
563 (1975).
212. Adams v. Adams, 243 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 258 La.
212, 245 So. 2d 410 (1971).
213. Garsaud v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1086 (1957).
214. Player, 162 La. at 231, 110 So. at 333.
215. See, e.g., Capodanno v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1979), tff'g 69
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Circuit would agree with Legget that a decree under former section
65.09 of the Florida Statutes constituted a legal separation. Both the
Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court have held that a decree under the
same Florida statute did not effect a legal separation.21 6
The determination of whether an order for spousal support issued
pursuant to section 9:291 constitutes a legal separation depends on state
court interpretation of the statute. In Boyer v. Commissioner, 17 the
issue was whether a decree issued by a Massachusetts Probate Court,
holding that the taxpayer's wife was living apart for justifiable cause,
ordering the taxpayer to pay spousal support, and restraining him from
approaching his wife or the marital residence, constituted a legal sep-
aration for federal income tax purposes. The Tax Court reviewed de-
cisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and determined that the
decree in question modified the parties' marital status in such a way
that the taxpayer was legally separated from his wife. 21s
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the Tax Court's decision, explaining,
In determining whether a party is legally separated for purposes
of [federal income taxation] the proper inquiry is not whether
a state order of separate maintenance affects marriage status
under applicable state law; rather the proper inquiry is whether
an order of separate maintenance affects marriage status in such
a way that it is deemed a legal separation under applicable state
law. 219
The order in Boyer was expressly denominated "Temporary Order."
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts had held that such an order did
not "create a judicial separation, nor establish a permanent status for
T.C. 638 (1978) (separate maintenance agreement under New Jersey law does not sanction
or authorize a separation, but only recognizes its de facto existence); Palmquist v. United
States, 284 F. Supp. 577, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (New Jersey decree of separate maintenance
did not result in a legal separation); Rafal v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.
Del. 1967) (Delaware decree ordering spousal support and maintenance did not constitute
a legal separation; unlike Florida, Delaware law authorizes a divorce a mensa et thoro which
was not sought in this case); Haase v. United States, 91-1 USTC 50,116 (N.D. Ohio 1991)
(under Ohio law temporary restraining order to pay support pendente lite did not constitute
a legal separation); Keibler v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1244 (1980) (Penn-
sylvania law, where legal separation has been declared unconstitutional, does not justify a
holding, as in Legget, that a decree for separate maintenance constitutes a limited divorce
in the form of a divorce from bed and board).
216. See, e.g., Tressler v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 356, 360 (9th cir. 1955), qff'g 12
T.C.M. (CCH) 358 (1953); Legget v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1022 (1963), rev'd, 329 F.2d
509 (2d Cir. 1964).
217. 79 T.C. 143 (1982), rev'd, 732 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
218. Boyer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 143, 147-52 (1982).
219. Boyer v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev'g 79 T.C. 143
(1982).
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the future."220 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the order did not constitute a legal separation
for purposes of federal income taxation. 22' If the Louisiana Supreme
Court were to hold that a decree pursuant to section 9:291 effects a
legal separation under state law, separated spouses in Louisiana paying
or receiving spousal support would be considered unmarried for federal
income tax purposes. Unless and until the Louisiana Supreme Court
decides the issue, however, it is uncertain whether Louisiana taxpayers
who are making support payments pursuant to such a decree are con-
sidered married for federal income tax purposes. Nevertheless, the weight
of authority seems to indicate that such taxpayers are considered married.M
Thus, in repealing the provisions for separation from bed and board,
the Louisiana legislature practically has assured that spouses who are
separated but not divorced will 'be considered married for federal tax
purposes unless the abandoned spouse rule applies. "Married" status
may be inconsequential for some taxpayers and in fact, may offer tax
savings to others. In the majority of cases, however, that status will
increase the tax burden of separated spouses in Louisiana as compared
with separated spouses in jurisdictions that authorize judgments of legal
separation. The following sections of this article illustrate the problem.
220. Gould v. Gould, 267 N.E. 2d 652, 655 (1971), cited in Boyer, 732 F.2d, at 194-
95.
221. Boyer, 732 F.2d at 195.
222. One commentator finds evidence in two cases that spouses may be considered
unmarried without obtaining a legal separation. Ulven, supra note 183, at 908. Neither of
these cases, however, is helpful in establishing a rule of law giving separated spouses unmarried
status unless the spouses have obtained a legal separation. In Hilliard v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1985), the Tax Court held that a Louisiana taxpayer was unmarried
for federal tax purposes even though he could not provide court records to show that he
had obtained a judgment of separation from bed and board under former provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code. While no court records were introduced into evidence, the Tax
Court concluded, based on the testimony of the witnesses, that the taxpayer was legally
separated. Id. at 506. At best, Hilliard only relaxed the taxpayer's burden of proving legal
separation by permitting a taxpayer to submit oral proof rather that court records.
In Abrams v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433 (1989), nonacq., action on decision,
1990-017 (July 2, 1990), the Tax Court assumed in dicta and without any analysis that two
Texas spouses were legally separated. While legal separation is not available under Texas
law, there was no issue in Abrams as to whether the taxpayer was considered unmarried
under the "legally separated" requirement of I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2). The issue in Abrams
concerned the taxpayer's eligibility to claim head-of-household filing status. The Tax Court
held that the taxpayer was not eligible for such status because she did not furnish over
one-half of the cost of maintaining her household. Not only do Hilliard and Abrams fail
to provide substantive law regarding the definition of legal separation for purposes of
determining filing status, but they have no precedential value. Hilliard and Abrams are both
memorandum opinions. Tax Court memorandum opinions do not constitute binding prec-
edent. Nico v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 647, 654, aff'd in part and rev'd in part on unrelated
issues, 565 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1977).
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B. Filing Status and the Income Tax Rates: The Marriage Penalty
and the Marriage Bonus
The federal income tax is a progressive tax; an individual's taxable
income is taxed on a graduated schedule as income increases. The first
dollars of taxable income are taxed at fifteen percent; the next bracket
of taxable income is taxed at twenty-eight percent; and a third bracket
is taxed at thirty-one percent. The amount of tax that an individual
must pay with regard to taxable income depends on the individual's
filing status. Sections l(a) through (d) of the Internal Revenue Code
prescribe different tax rates for four classes of individual filers: (1)
married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses, (2) heads
of households, (3) unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses
and heads of households), and (4) married individuals filing separate
returns.m
223. I.R.C. § l(a)-I(d) (Supp. 1991) set forth the 1991 income tax rates for natural
persons as follows:
§ 1. Tax imposed
(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses.-There is
hereby imposed on the taxable income of-
.(I) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a
single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and
(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined
in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $32,450 ............................. 1501o of taxable income.
Over $32,450 but not over $78,400 .... $4,867.50, plus 2801o of the excess over
$32,450.
Over $78,400 ................................... $17,733.50, plus 31% of the excess over
$78,400.
(b) Heads of households. -There is hereby imposed on the taxable income
of every head of a household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined
in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $26,050 ............................. 15% of taxable income.
Over $26,050 but not over $67,200 .... $3,907.50, plus 28% of the excess over
$26,500.
Over $67,200 ................................... $15,429.50, plus 31% of the excess over
$67,200.
(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of house-
holds).-There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual
(other than a surviving spouse as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a
household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a married individual (as
defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $19,450 .............................. 1501o f taxable income.
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The amount of taxable income that is taxed at the lower rates varies
depending on the taxpayer's filing status. These variations create for
some a marriage penalty and for others a marriage bonus.22 A marriage
penalty results when two married persons with the same income would
pay a lower tax in the aggregate if they were not married. A marriage
bonus results when the fact of marriage reduces the aggregate amount
of tax that the two must pay.
This article will use the 1992 rate schedules to illustrate the marriage
penalty and the marriage bonus. The 1991 schedules are found in sections
l(a) through (d) of the Internal Revenue Code. For taxable years after
1991, these schedules are adjusted annually for inflation.22
The 1992 rate schedules that apply to individuals in each of the
four classes are as follows:
Section l(a)-Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns and Surviving
Spouses
If Taxable Income Is: The Tax Is:
Not Over $35,800 15% of the taxable income
Over $35,800, but $5,370 plus 2806 of the
not over $86,500 excess over $35,800
Over $86,500 $19,566 plus 31% of the
excess over $86,500
Over $19,450 but not over $47,050 ..... $2,917.50, plus 28016 of the excess over
$19,450.
Over $47,050 .................................... $10,645.50, plus 31% of the excess over
$47,050.
(d) Married individuals filing separate returns.-There is hereby imposed on
the taxable income of every married individual (as defined in section 7703)
who does not make a single return jointly with his spouse under section
6013, a tax determined in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $16,225 .............................. 15% of taxable income.
Over $16,225 but not over $39,200 ..... $2,433.75, plus 28% of the excess over
$16,225.
Over $39,200 .................................... $8,866.75, plus 31% of the excess over
$39,200.
These rate schedules are adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 1(f) (1988).
224. For a discussion of the marriage penalty and the marriage bonus, see 4 Bittker &
Lokken, supra note 46, at 111.3.5; Bittker, supra note 9; Gann, supra note 13; Gerzog,
supra note 13; Harmelink, supra note 13; Hesch, supra note 183; Herbert L. Jensen, The
Historical Discrimination of the Federal Income Tax Rates, 54 Taxes 445 (July 1976);
McIntyre, supra note 11; Michael J. McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income
Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. Rev. 469 (1980); McIntyre & Oldman,
supra note 10; Mess, supra note 13; Oldman & Temple, supra note 13; Harvey S. Rosen,
The Marriage Tax Is Down But Not Out, 40 Nat'l. Tax J. 567 (1987); Rosen, supra note
13; Subotnik, supra note 13; Davis, supra note 13; Note, supra note 13.
225. I.R.C. § l(f) (1988).
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Section l(b)-Heads of Households
If Taxable Income Is:
Not Over $28,750
Over $28,750 but
not over $74,150
Over $74,150
The Tax Is:
15%0 of the taxable income
$4,312.50 plus 28% of the
excess over $28,750
$17,024.50 plus 31%0 of
the excess over $74,150
Section l(c)-Unmarried Individuals (Other Than Surviving Spouses and
Heads of Households)
If Taxable Income Is:
Not Over $21,450
Over $21,450 but
not over $51,900
Over $51,900
Section l(d)-Married Individuals
If Taxable Income Is:
Not Over $17,900
Over $17,900 but
not over $43,i50
Over $43,250
The Tax Is:
15%0 of the taxable income
$3,217.50 plus 28% of the
excess over $21,450
$11,743.50 plus 31% of the
excess over $51,900
Filing Separate Returns
The Tax Is:
157o of the taxable income
$2,685 plus 28% of the
excess over $17,900
$9,783 plus 31% of the
excess over $43,250216
A glance at the rate schedule shows that separated spouses, each
with taxable income of $21,450 in 1992, pay a higher tax if they are
considered married than if they are considered unmarried. Unmarried
taxpayers with income of $21,450 or less pay income tax at a rate of
fifteen percent. Thus, the total combined tax liability on the $42,900
of combined income is $6,435. If the two are considered married,
however, the fifteen percent rate applies only to the first $35,800 of
taxable income. The remaining $7,100 of their combined income is taxed
at twenty-eight percent. The tax liability for a married couple with
$42,900 of taxable income is $7,358, resulting in a marriage penalty of
$923 .227
A marriage bonus would result, however, if only one of the spouses
has taxable income. A separated spouse with taxable income of $42,900
who is considered unmarried incurs a tax liability of $9,223.50. If the
taxpayer is considered married and his or her spouse has no taxable
226. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 2, 1991-2 C.B. 867.
227. If each spouse had taxable income of $21,450 in 1992, the couple's aggregate tax
liability would be $7,358, whether the spouses filed a joint return or separate returns. The
rate schedule for a married taxpayer filing a separate return is exactly one-half of the
schedule that applies to a joint return. I.R.C. § 1(a), (d); Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 2, 1991-2 C.B.
867, 868.
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income, the tax liability on the joint return is $7 ,358,2's resulting in a
marriage bonus of $1,865.50.
The amount of the marriage penalty and marriage bonus increases
as taxable income increases. For example, two unmarried taxpayers with
taxable income of $60,000 each in 1992 incur a tax liability of $28,509
in the aggregate. If they were considered married, the tax liability on
their $120,000 of combined taxable income would be $29,951, resulting
in a marriage penalty of $1,442. The marriage bonus for a taxpayer
with $120,000 of taxable income who is considered married to a spouse
with no taxable income in 1992 is $2,903.50. 229
In both examples the marriage bonus is greater than the marriage
penalty. The computations seem to indicate that taxpayers would prefer
to be considered married for federal income tax purposes. The marriage
penalty, however, falls most heavily upon two-earner couples. Separated
spouses often will feel the bite of the marriage penalty because the
economic burden of establishing separate households generally requires
that separated spouses both work2 30 Such taxpayers, of course, would
prefer to be considered unmarried to avoid the marriage penalty.
Separated spouses may prefer to be considered unmarried even if
a marriage bonus might be available because the marriage bonus generally
results only if the couple files a joint return. 2 3  If a couple is living
under a separate property regime and one spouse has $120,000 of taxable
income and the spouse with no income refuses to sign a joint return,
the spouse with the income must use the rate schedule that applies to
married individuals filing separate returns. Such an individual would
228. For the sake of simplicity, the example in the text does not take into account the
fact that married taxpayers filing a joint return are entitled to two personal exemptions and
to a higher standard deduction than the standard deduction for unmarried taxpayers. The
additional personal exemption and the higher standard deduction could reduce the taxpayer's
taxable income, increasing the amount of the marriage bonus. For a discussion of the
standard deduction and the personal exemption, see infra notes 249-59, 294-303 and ac-
companying text.
229. An unmarried taxpayer with taxable income of $120,000 in 1992 incurs a tax liability
of $32,854.50. If the taxpayer marries an individual with no taxable income, the tax liability
on a joint return is $29,951. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 2, 1991-92 C.B. 867, 868.
230. A study of divorcing couples in California in 1977 revealed that in most cases the
spouses had few community assets to divide, that only seventeen percent of divorcing spouses
received spousal support upon divorce, that in the few cases where spousal support was
awarded, the spouse received a median of $210 per month, and that the mean child support
order was $126 per child even though it cost more than $4,000 per year to raise a child
at a moderate standard of living in 1980. Lenore J. Wiltzman, The Economics of Divorce:
Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1181 (1981). No doubt these meager awards provide strong incentive for
the supported spouse to find a job.
231. I.R.C. § l(a) (1988). For the rules concerning the filing of a joint return, see I.R.C.
§ 6013 (1988).
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incur a 1992 tax liability .of $33,575 or $721 more than the spouse
would pay if the spouse could qualify as unmarried for federal tax
purposes. 23 2 The spouse earning the income might be able to convince
the other spouse to sign a joint return, especially if there is an offer
to increase support payments in exchange for such an agreement. The
agreement to sign a joint return, however, requires not only the co-
operation but also the trust of the nonearning spouse. A spouse who
signs a joint return incurs joint and several liability for any deficiency
in tax, as well as penalties and interest with respect to the return.
2 a
Such cooperation and trust may not be present when the spouses are
separating.
Of course, a high income spouse's tax burden is reduced significantly,
to the detriment of the other spouse, if the community is not terminated
and section 66 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply.2 4 In that
case, the Seaborn rule requires each spouse to pay tax on $60,000 of
taxable income, resulting in a tax liability of $14,475.50 to each if they
file separate returns. If, however, the low income spouse is aware of
the Seaborn rule and has obtained a partition or judgment of separation
of property, the high income spouse will not be able to take advantage
of the Seaborn rule. Moreover, if the spouses live apart for the entire
calendar year and no earned community income is transferred between
232. For simplicity, the example in the text disregards the fact that I.R.C. § 151(b) (1988)
permits a married taxpayer filing a separate return to reduce taxable income by claiming
an additional exemption deduction for the taxpayer's spouse if the spouse has no gross
income and is not the dependent of another taxpayer. In many cases the separate filer will
not be entitled to claim the additional exemption deduction either because the spouse who
has no gross income is supported by another individual who claims the spouse as a dependent
or because the taxpayer is paying spousal support, includable in the spouse's gross income
under I.R.C. § 71(a) (1988).
233. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1988). A spouse who signs a joint return may be relieved of
liability for the tax if the spouse qualifies as an "innocent spouse" under I.R.C. § 6013(e)
(1988). The stringent requirements of § 6013(e), however, limit the availability of such relief.
The technical requirements and the requirement of I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C), that the spouse
"did not know, and had no reason to know" that there was a substantial understatement
of tax on the return, precludes many taxpayers from qualifying for innocent spouse relief.
For a criticism of the innocent spouse rules, see Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse
Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 Vand. L.
Rev. 317 (1990); Beck, supra note 177; Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief: A Call for Legislative
and Judicial Liberalization, 40 Tax Law. 819 (1987); Filler, supra note 34; Minick, supra
note 34; J. Timothy Phillips & L. Bradford Bradford, Even a Tax Collector Should Have
Some Heart: Equitable Relief for the Innocent spouse Under I.R.C. § 6013(e), 8 N. Ill. U.
L. Rev. 33 (1987); Note, The Innocent spouse Rule: Recent Developments and Proposed
Changes, 14 Sw. U. L. Rev. 129 (1983).
234. For a discussion of the rules concerning the taxation of community income and
I.R.C. § 66 see supra notes 25-106 and accompanying text.
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them, section 66 will prevent application of the rule with respect to all
community income except income derived from community property. 235
Thus, in many cases the high income spouse is able to take advantage
of the Seaborn rule only during the first year of separation. 236
The marriage penalty is more pronounced if one or both of the
spouses qualifies for the rate schedule that applies to heads of house-
holds.2 37 An individual is considered a head of a household238 if the
individual is not married at the close of the taxable year and either (1)
furnishes over half of the cost of maintaining a household that is the
home of the taxpayer and that constitutes for more than one-half of
the taxable year the principal place of abode of the taxpayer's unmarried
child 239 or grandchild240 or any other person, including a married child
or stepchild, if the taxpayer is entitled to claim the person as a de-
pendent, 24' or (2) furnishes over half of the cost of maintaining a
household which is the principal place of abode of the taxpayer's de-
235. See I.R.C. § 66(a) (requiring community income to be taxed in accordance with
the rules of I.R.C. § 879(a) if (1) the spouses live apart at all times during the calendar
year, (2) the spouses do not file a joint return, (3) one of both of the spouses has earned
income which is community income, and (4) no portion of such earned income is transferred
between the spouses during the calendar year). The Seaborn rule is also inapplicable if the
low income spouse satisfies the requirements of I.R.C. § 66(c) (which permits a taxpayer
to exclude from income items of community income attributable to the other spouse under
I.R.C. § 879(a) if (1) the taxpayer files a separate return, (2) the taxpayer establishes lack
of actual or constructive knowledge of the item of community income, and (3) taking into
account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include the item in the taxpayer's
income).
236. Even during the first year of separation, the high income spouse may not be able
to take advantage of the Seaborn rule if the high income spouse acted as if solely entitled
to the community income and failed to notify the other spouse of the nature and amount
of the income. I.R.C. § 66(b) (1988).
237. I.R.C. § 1(b) (1988).
238. For definition of the term "head of a household," see I.R.C. § 2(b) (1988).
239. For this purpose the term "child" includes the taxpayer's son, stepson, daughter,
or stepdaughter. I.R.C. § 2(b)(l)(A)(i) (1988).
240. For this purpose, the term "grandchild" includes only descendents of the taxpayer's
son or daughter I.R.C. § 2(b)(l)(A)(i) (1988). If the member of the household is a descendent
of the taxpayer's stepson or stepdaughter, the taxpayer apparently must be entitled to claim
a dependency exemption for the ward to qualify as a head of a household. I.R.C. § 2(b)(l)(A)(ii)
(1988).
241. I.R.C. § 2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (1988). If the taxpayer would be entitled to claim a child as
a dependent but cannot because the taxpayer entered into an agreement permitting the
taxpayer's spouse or ex-spouse to claim the child as a dependent, the taxpayer may still be
eligible to claim head-of-household status. I.R.C. § 2(b)(l)(A)(i) (1988). A member of the
taxpayer's household whom the taxpayer is entitled to claim as a dependent will not cause
the taxpayer to be eligible to file as a head of a household, however, if the dependent is
not related to the taxpayer within the rules of I.R.C. § 152(a)(l)-(8) or if the only reason
the taxpayer may claim the dependent is because of a multiple support agreement. I.R.C.
§ 2(b)(3)(B) (1988).
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pendent father or mother. 242 Where each spouse with $60,000 of taxable
income in 1992 qualifies for the head-of-household rate schedule, the
aggregate tax liability is $26,125, a tax savings of $3,826 when compared
with the amount of tax they would have to pay if they filed a joint
return or separate returns as married individuals.
A threshold requirement for qualifying as a head of a household,
however, is that the taxpayer be unmarried. 243 A taxpayer is considered
unmarried for purposes of head-of-household status if (1) the taxpayer
is legally separated from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance,2" (2) the taxpayer's spouse is a nonresident
alien,241 or (3) the taxpayer is considered unmarried under the abandoned
spouse rule.m Under these rules, a separated spouse in 'Louisiana will
not qualify as a head of a household even though the spouse furnishes
over one-half of the cost of maintaining a household for a dependent
unless the other spouse was not a member of the household during the
last six months of the taxable year. 47 As long as the community is in
existence, a separated spouse in Louisiana will not qualify as a head
of a household for failure to provide over one-half of the cost of
maintaining a household.' In this respect, the Seaborn rule imposes a
double burden on a low income spouse who files a separate return. Not
only must the low income spouse pay tax on one-half of the community
income, but the low income spouse must pay tax at the high rates that
apply to a married taxpayer filing separately rather than at the lower
rate that applies to a head of a household. If a decree of legal separation
were available in Louisiana, it would be easier for separated spouses to
qualify for the more favorable tax rates that apply to heads of house-
holds.
The enactment of provisions authorizing legal separation, of course,
would not offer tax savings to separated spouses in Louisiana who
qualify for a marriage bonus under the income tax rate structure. En-
actment of such provisions, however, would not necessarily increase the
federal tax burden of separated spouses. Spouses could continue to take
advantage of the marriage bonus provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code by failing to file a petition for a judgment of separation from
bed and board.
242. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(B) (1988).
243. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (1988).
244. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (1988).
245. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(C) (1988).
246. 1.R.C. §§ 2(c), 7703(b) (1988).
247. I.R.C. § 7703(b)(3) (1988).
248. Abrams v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433, 1436 (1989); Tech. Adv. Mem.
77-40-006 (June 20, 1977).
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If the Louisiana Legislature were to enact a provision authorizing
legal separation, separating spouses would have to compare the cost of
filing for a legal separation, including attorney fees, against the tax
savings that could be achieved by qualifying as unmarried for federal
income tax purposes. For taxpayers who plan to live separately and
apart from their spouses for a long period of time because they do not
plan to be divorced, a savings of approximately $1,000 to $3,000 per
year because of reduced tax rates could quickly offset the cost of
obtaining a legal separation.
Even taxpayers who plan to divorce their spouses shortly after the
end of the taxable year in which the separation occurs and taxpayers
who will qualify as unmarried under the abandoned spouse rule in the
year after the separation, could achieve substantial tax savings by qual-
ifying as unmarried during the first year of separation. The foregoing
comparison of tax burdens considered only the results of the application
of the tax rates. The marriage penalty actually is greater for a two-
earner couple because the higher rates that apply to such married tax-
payers generally are imposed on a broader tax base than the lower rates
that apply to unmarried individuals or heads of households. In computing
taxable income, married taxpayers generally are allowed more limited
deductions and must include greater amounts in income than their un-
married counterparts.
C. Further Consideration of the Marriage Penalty: Broadening the
Income Tax Base of Two Earner Married Couples
A two-earner married couple generally must report a larger amount
of taxable income than two unmarried taxpayers with the same aggregate
amount of gross income and expenditures. The Internal Revenue Code
achieves this result by reducing the amount of deductions available to
married taxpayers, as compared to unmarried taxpayers, requiring mar-
ried taxpayers to include more in income than their unmarried coun-
terparts, and by attributing the interests in an entity from one spouse
to another. Thus, when separated spouses both have income, tax savings
can be achieved if the spouses are considered unmarried for federal tax
purposes.
1. The Standard Deduction
Individual taxpayers must choose between itemizing their personal
deductions or deducting a flat allowance, known as the standard de-
duction, in lieu of their itemized deductions. 249 Taxpayers who have
249. I.R.C. § 63(b) (1988). For a discussion of the standard deduction, see 2 Bittker &
Lokken, supra note 46, at 30.5.
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attained the age of sixty-five or are blind may claim an additional
standard deduction for each qualifying attribute. 20 The amount of the
basic standard deduction25" ' and/or the additional standard deduction2 5 2
an individual may claim depends on the taxpayer's marital status. The
rules for computing the standard deduction create a marriage penalty
and a marriage bonus similar to the penalty and bonus that result from
application of the rate schedules. In 1992, the basic standard deduction
is $6,000 for a joint return, $5,250 for a head of household, $3,600
for an unmarried individual, and $3,000 for a married individual filing
a separate return.253 The structure of the deductible amounts shows that
a one-earner married couple achieves a $2,400 deduction bonus under
the 1992 amounts that would not be available if the earning spouse
were considered not married.25 4 A two-earner couple, however, loses
$1,200 of the standard deduction the taxpayers could have claimed if
they were considered not married.255 A spouse who, but for the fact of
marriage, would be eligible to claim head-of-household status loses $2,250
of the standard deduction.
. The allowances for the additional standard deduction have a similar
effect. In 1992, the additional standard deduction'is $700 for a married
individual and $900 for an unmarried individual. 25 6 A taxpayer who is
married to an elderly or blind individual with no taxable income in
1992 could claim an additional $700 standard deduction that would not
be allowable if the taxpayer were considered unmarried. If the taxpayer's
spouse is both elderly and blind, a bonus deduction of $1400 results.
When the earner is the elderly or blind person, however, there is a
marriage penalty of $200 for each qualifying attribute.257
250. I.R.C. § 63(c)(3), (f) (1988).
251. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (1988). If an individual is claimed as a dependent of another
taxpayer, however, the individual's standard deduction may not exceed the greater of $600
or the individual's earned income plus any additional standard deduction that is allowed if
the dependent taxpayer has attained the 'age of 65 or is blind. I.R.C. § 63(c)(5), ( ) (1988);
Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 3.02, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
252. I.R.C. § 63(0(3) (1988).
253. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 3.01, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 868.
254. An unmarried taxpayer's standard deduction in 1992 is $3,600. By marrying an
individual with no taxable income and filing a joint return, the individual could claim a
$6,000 standard deduction.
255. Each unmarried taxpayer may claim a $3,600 standard deduction or a total of
$7,200. By marrying and filing a joint return the couple could claim only a $6,000 deduction.
If the spouses file separate returns, each could claim a standard deduction of $3,000 or a
total of $6,000.
256. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 3.03, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869; I.R.C. § 63(f) (1988). These amounts
are adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 63(c)(4) (1988).
257. The $900 additional standard deduction that applies to unmarried individuals is
reduced to $700 when an individual marries. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 3.03, 1991-2 C.B. 867,
869.
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The burden of the marriage penalty can fall heavily upon a married
taxpayer filing a separate return. If the taxpayer's spouse itemizes de-
ductions on a separate return, the taxpayer may claim neither the $3,000
standard deduction that generally applies for separate returns nor any
additional standard deduction regardless of whether the taxpayer is eld-
erly or blind. "5 8
A taxpayer is considered unmarried for purposes of claiming the
standard deduction if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or her
spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or if the
taxpayer qualifies as an abandoned spouse.25 9 Thus, when a two-earner
couple in Louisiana separates, the spouses often suffer a marriage penalty
with respect to the standard deduction unless one or both of them
qualifies as an abandoned spouse.
2. Itemized Deductions
a. The Overall Limitation on Itemized Deductions
If the spouses choose to itemize their deductions, rather than to use
the standard deduction, they may suffer a marriage penalty with respect
to the amount of itemized deductions they may claim. Section 68 of
the Internal Revenue Code generally reduces the amount of a taxpayer's
otherwise allowable itemized deductions by three percent of the amount
by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $105,250 ($52,625
in the case of a married taxpayer filing a separate return).2w° The re-
duction under section 68, however, may not exceed eighty percent of
the taxpayer's otherwise allowable deductions.2 6' Section 68 applies to
all itemized deductions except four deductions that are subject to lim-
itations under other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The item-
ized deductions excepted from reduction under section 68 are the deduction
for medical expenses, the deduction for investment interest, the deduction
for personal casualty and theft losses, and the deduction for wagering
losses. 262
An example illustrates the application of section 68. An unmarried
taxpayer with adjusted gross income of $505,250 in 1992 loses the ability
to deduct $12,000 of the taxpayer's otherwise allowable itemized de-
258. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(a) (1988).
259. I.R.C." §§ 63(g), 7703 (1988).
260. I.R.C. § 68(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. 1991). The Internal Revenue Code provides that the
threshold amounts are $100,000 and $50,000 of adjusted gross income. These amounts are
adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 68(b)(2) (1988). The 1992 amounts are $105,250
and $52,625. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 8.02, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
261. I.R.C. § 68(a)(2) (Supp. 1991).
262. I.R.C. § 68(c) (Supp. 1991).
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ductions to which section 68 applies.263 If the taxpayer only had $14,000
of such itemized deductions, however, the reduction under section 68
would be limited to eighty percent of the itemized deductions, or $11,200.24
Under section 68, there is no marriage bonus. A taxpayer's itemized
deductions are reduced if the taxpayer has adjusted gross income in
excess of $105,250 whether the taxpayer is unmarried or is married and
files a joint return with a spouse who has no taxable income. Section
68 imposes a significant marriage penalty. Separated spouses who are
considered unmarried may deduct their itemized deductions in full if
each spouse had adjusted gross income of $105,000 or less. If they are
considered married and each has $105,250 of adjusted gross income,
they must reduce their itemized deductions by three percent of $105,250,
or $3,157.50. Filing separate returns will not alleviate the tax burden.
A married taxpayer who files a separate return will suffer a reduction
in itemized deductions by three percent of the amount by which the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $52,625.26
The ability to itemize deductions, however, can result in a marriage
bonus. A married taxpayer may deduct the itemized deductions of the
taxpayer's spouse by filing a joint return, even if the spouse has no
taxable income. When both spouses have adjusted gross income, how-
ever, the benefits of combining the spouses' itemized deductions on a
joint return may be reduced or eliminated if the combined adjusted
gross income on the joint return exceeds $105,250.
For purposes of section 68, marital status is determined under the
rules of section 7703 of the internal Revenue Code. 266 Thus, separated
spouses in Louisiana are considered married unless the abandoned spouse
rule applies. 267 By enacting a provision authorizing legal separation, the
Louisiana Legislature could enable more separated spouses to avoid any
marriage penalty resulting under section 68. 26 s
b. The Deduction For Home Mortgage Interest
The reductions required by section 68 apply after the application
of any other limitation on the allowance of the itemized deduction in
question. The fact of marriage may limit the amount of the taxpayer's
itemized deductions under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other
263. The taxpayer's $505,250 of adjusted gross income exceeds the $105,250 threshold
amount by $400,000. Three percent of $400,000 is $12,000.
264. Such a taxpayer, of course, should claim.the standard deduction of $3,600 in lieu
of itemizing.
265. I.R.C. § 68(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
266. I.R.C. § 68(b)(1) (Supp. 1991).
267. I.R.C. § 7703(b) (Supp. 1991).
268. A taxpayer who is legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance is considered unmarried for purposes of I.R.C. § 68. I.R.C. §§ 68(d), 7703(a)(2)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
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than section 68. For example, section 163(h)(3) authorizes a deduction
for home mortgage interest.269 In general, the maximum amount of
269. I.R.C. § 163(h) (1988) provides in part:
(h) Disallowance of deduction for personal interest.-
(1) In general.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for personal interest paid or
accrued during the taxable year.
(2) Personal interest.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "personal
interest" means any interest allowable as a deduction under this chapter
other than-
(D) any qualified residence interest (within the meaning of paragraph (3))
(3) Qualified residence interest.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) In general.-The term "qualified residence interest" means any interest
which is paid or accrued during the taxable year on-
(i) acquisition indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the
taxpayer, or
(ii) home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the
taxpayer.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the determination of whether any
property is a qualified residence of the taxpayer shall be made as of the time
the interest is accrued.
(B) Acquisition indebtedness.-
(i) In general.-The term "acquisition indebtedness" means any indebt-
edness which-
(I) is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving
any qualified residence of the taxpayer, and
(II) is secured by such residence. Such term also includes any indebt-
edness secured by such residence resulting from the refinancing of in-
debtedness meeting the requirements of the preceding sentence (or this
sentence); but only to the extent the amount of the indebtedness resulting
from such refinancing does not exceed the amount of the refinanced
indebtedness.
(ii) $1,000,000 Limitation.-The aggregate amount treated as acquisition
indebtedness for any period shall not exceed $1,000,000 ($500,000 in the
case of a married individual filing a separate return).
(C) Home equity indebtedness.-
(i) In general.-The term "home equity indebtedness" means any indebt-
edness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified residence
to the extent the aggregate amount of such indebtedness does not exceed-
(I) the fair market value of such qualified residence, reduced by
(II) the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such resi-
dence.
(ii) Limitation.-The aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness
for any period shall not exceed $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of a separate
return by a married individual).
(D) Treatment of indebtedness incurred on or before October 13, 1987.-
(i) In general.-In the case of any pre-October 13, 1987, indebtedness-
(I) such indebtedness shall be treated as acquisition indebtedness, and
(II) the limitation of subparagraph (B)(ii) shall not apply.
(ii) Reduction in $1,000,000 Limitation.-The limitation of subparagraph
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principal debt that will qualify for the interest deduction is $1,100,000270
($550,000 in the case of a separate return by a married individual). 271
(B)(ii) shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the aggregate amount of
outstanding pre-October 13, 1987, indebtedness.
(iii) Pre-October 13, 1987, indebtedness.-The term "pre-October 13, 1987,
indebtedness" means-
(I) any indebtedness which was incurred on or before October 13, 1987,
and which was secured by a qualified residence on October 13, 1987,
and at all times thereafter before the interest is paid or accrued, or
(II) any indebtedness which is secured by the qualified residence and
was incurred after October 13, 1987, to refinance indebtedness described
in subclause (I) (or refinanced indebtedness meeting the requirements
of this subclause) to the extent (immediately after the refinancing) the
principal amount of the indebtedness resulting from the refinancing does
not exceed the principal amount of the refinanced indebtedness (im-
mediately before the refinancing).
(iv) Limitation on period of refinancing. -Subclause (II) of clause (iii) shall
not apply to any indebtedness after-
(I) the expiration of the term of the indebtedness described in clause
(iii)(I), or
(II) if the principal of the indebtedness described in clause (iii)(1) is not
amortized over its term, the expiration of the term of the 1st refinancing
of such indebtedness (or if earlier, the date which is 30 years after the
date of such 1st refinancing).
(4) Other definitions and special rules.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Qualified residence.-
(i) In general.-The term "qualified residence" means-
(I) the principal residence (within the meaning of section 1034) of
the taxpayer, and
(II) 1 other residence of the taxpayer which is selected by the taxpayer
for purposes of this subsection for the taxable year and which is
used by the taxpayer as a residence (within the meaning of section
280A(d)(1)).
(ii) Married individuals filing separate returns.-If a married couple does
not file a joint return for the taxable year-
(I) such couple shall be treated as I taxpayer for purposes of clause
(i), and
(II) each individual shall be entitled to take into account I residence
unless both individuals consent in writing to I individual taking into
account the principal residence and I other residence.
(iii) Residence not rented.-For purposes of clause (i)(11), notwithstanding
section 280A(d)(l), if the taxpayer does not rent a dwelling unit at any
time during a taxable year, such unit may be treated as a residence for
such taxable year.
270. A taxpayer may deduct the interest on $1,000,000 or less of "acquisition indebt-
edness," defined as indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially im-
proving any qualified residence of the taxpayer which is secured by the residence. I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(3)(B) (1988). A taxpayer may also deduct the interest on $100,000 or less of "home
equity indebtedness," defined as indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured
by a qualified residence to the extent that it does not exceed the fair market value of the
residence reduced by the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to the residence.
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C) (1988). Indebtedness that was incurred on or before October 13, 1987,
however may exceed the $1,100,000 and $550,000 limitations. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(D) (1988).
271. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B), (C) (1988).
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A taxpayer may claim the deduction with respect to a maximum of two
"qualified residences," defined as the taxpayer's principal residence and
one other residence that the taxpayer selects.2 72 If the taxpayer is married
and files a separate return, however, the taxpayer may deduct home
mortgage interest with respect to only one residence unless the taxpayer's
spouse consents in writing to forego the home mortgage interest de-
duction. 273
These rules impose a marriage penalty on very wealthy taxpayers.
Separated spouses who are considered unmarried may deduct the interest
on an aggregate of $2,200,000 of home mortgage principal with respect
to four residences. If they are considered married, the deduction is
limited to the interest on $1,100,000 of debt with respect to two resid-
ences. A spouse who is considered married and files a separate return,
however, feels the greatest impact of the marriage penalty because the
separate filer may only deduct the interest on a maximum of $550,000
of indebtedness even if the taxpayer's spouse agrees to permit the tax-
payer to claim the deduction with respect to two residences. The ability
to obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board in Louisiana
could help some separated spouses to avoid a marriage penalty under
section 163(h)(3). 274
c. Estimated Losses on Deposits in Insolvent and Bankrupt
Financial Institutions
A similar marriage penalty can result under section 165(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code which allows a taxpayer to elect to deduct as
an itemized deduction reasonably estimated losses with respect to deposits
in certain bankrupt or insolvent financial institutions. 27 The election
272. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A) (1988). The second residence will qualify if the taxpayer does
not rent it out. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(iii) (1988). If the taxpayer rents the second residence
to third parties, the residence will qualify only if the taxpayer uses it for personal purposes
for the greater of 14 days or ten percent of the number of days during the year for which
the residence is rented at fair rental. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II), 280A(d)(1) (1988).
273. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(ii) (1988).
274. I.R.C. § 163(h) provides no definition of marital status. This article assumes that
the references in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (h)(3)(C)(ii) to a married individual filing a
separate return and the reference in I.R.C. § 163 (h)(4)(A)(ii) to a married couple that does
not file a joint return incorporate the rules for filing status. For purposes of determining
an individual's filing status, the individual is considered unmarried if the individual is legally
separated from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance or
if the abandoned spouse rule applies. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (c), (d); 2(b)(2)(B), (c); 7703 (1988).
275. I.R.C. § 165(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991) provides:
(1) Treatment of certain losses in insolvent financial institutions.-
(1) In generaL-If-
(A) as of, the close of the taxable year, it can reasonably be estimated that
there is a loss on a qualified individual's deposit in a qualified financial
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under section 165() is authorized only with respect to losses on deposits
institution, and;
(B) such loss is on account of the bankruptcy or insolvency of such
institution,
then the taxpayer may elect to treat the amount so estimated as a loss described
in subsection (c)(3) incurred during the taxable year.
(2) Qualified individual defined.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified individual" means any individual, except an individual-
(A) who owns at least 1 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the
qualified financial institution,
(B) who is an officer of the qualified financial institution,
(C) who is a sibling (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, aunt,
uncle, nephew, niece, ancestor, or lineal descendant of an individual de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) or (B), or
(D) who otherwise is a related person (as defined in section 267(b)) with
respect to an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(3) Qualified financial institution.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified financial institution" means-
(A) any bank (as defined in section 581),
(B) any institution described in section 591,
(C) any credit union the deposits or accounts in which are insured under
Federal or State law or are protected or guaranteed under State law, or
(D) any similar institution chartered and supervised under Federal or State
law.
(4) Deposit.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "deposit" means any
deposit, withdrawable account, or withdrawable or repurchasable share.
(5) Election to treat as ordinary loss.-
(A) In general.-In lieu of any election under paragraph (1), the taxpayer
may elect to treat the amount referred to in paragraph (1) for the taxable
year as an ordinary loss described in subsection (c)(2) incurred during the
taxable year.
(B) Limitations.-
(i) Deposit may not be federally insured.-No election may be made
under subparagraph (A) with respect to any loss on a deposit in a
qualified financial institution if part or all of such deposit is insured
under Federal law.
(ii) Dollar limitation.-With respect to each financial institution, the
aggregate amount of losses attributable to deposits in such financial
institution to which an election under subparagraph (A) may be made
by the taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed $20,000 ($10,000
in the case of a separate return by a married individual). The limitation
of the preceding sentence shall be reduced by the amount of any
insurance proceeds under any State law which can reasonably be ex-
pected to be received with respect to losses on deposits in such insti-
tution.
(6) Election.-Any election by the taxpayer under this subsection for any taxable
year-
(A) shall apply to all losses for such taxable year of the taxpayer on
deposits in the institution with respect to which such election was made,
and
(B) may be revoked only with the consent of the Secretary.
(7) Coordination with section 166.-Section 166 shall not apply to any loss to
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in financial institutions such as banks, mutual savings banks, savings
and loan associations, and credit unions whose deposits are insured,
protected, or guaranteed under state or federal law.1 76 If any part of
the deposit is federally insured, the taxpayer may elect to treat the loss
as a personal casualty loss, deductible only to the extent that it exceeds
$100 and to the extent that when combined with the taxpayer's other
casualty losses for the year, it exceeds ten percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income.277 If no part of the deposit is federally insured,
the taxpayer may deduct the full amount of the loss. 278 The maximum
of non-federally insured losses that a taxpayer may deduct in full,
however, is $20,000.279 A married taxpayer who files a separate return,
however, may deduct only a maximum of $10,000 of such losses. 20
Thus, separated spouses who are considered unmarried taxpayers may
deduct an aggregate of $40,000 of non-federally insured losses under
section 165(1). If they are considered married, they may only deduct an
aggregate of $20,000 of such losses.
The fact of marriage can eliminate the deduction under section 165(1)
entirely. The deduction is available only to a taxpayer who is a "qualified
individual." ' 2 ' For this purpose, a taxpayer is not a qualified individual
if the taxpayer owns one percent or more of the outstanding stock of
which an election under this subsection applies.
A taxpayer who does not elect to deduct the losses under I.R.C. § 165(l) may be able
to deduct the losses as a nonbusiness bad debt under I.R.C. § 166(d) (1988). While a
nonbusiness bad debt deduction can be more advantageous because a taxpayer may deduct
the nonbusiness bad debt from gross income and also claim the standard deduction, I.R.C.
§§ 166(d)(l)(B), 62(a)(3) (1988), the itemized deduction authorized by I.R.C. § 1650) may
be more advantageous. To deduct a nonbusiness bad debt under I.R.C. § 166(d), the taxpayer
must prove that the debt has become worthless. An election under I.R.C. § 165(1), on the
other hand, permits the taxpayer to deduct the reasonably estimated loss before it becomes
worthless. A nonbusiness bad debt is also deductible only as a short term capital loss.
I.R.C. § 166(d)(l)(B) (1988). Capital losses are deductible by an individual taxpayer only to
the extent of the taxpayer's capital gains for the year plus $3,000. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988).
Amounts that are disallowed are carried forward indefinitely, subject to the same limitations
in future years. I.R.C. § 1212(b) (1988). A taxpayer may obtain a larger current deduction
of losses by electing under I.R.C. § 165(1) because the losses authorized by I.R.C. § 165(1)
are considered ordinary losses. The time value of money may cause the current deduction
of losses under I.R.C. § 165(l) to be worth more than a suspended deduction under I.R.C.
§ 166(d). For a discussion of the advantages of making an election under I.R.C. § 165(l),
see 2 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 33.3.2.
276. I.R.C. § 165(l)(3) (1988).
277. I.R.C. § 165(l)(1), (h) (1988). The example in the text assumes that the taxpayer
has no personal casualty gains for the year. A taxpayer may deduct personal casualty losses
in excess of $100 to the extent of the taxpayer's personal casualty gains for the year. I.R.C.
§ 165(h)(2) (1988).
278. I.R.C. § 165(l)(5)(A), (B)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
279. I.R.C. § 165(l)(5)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
280. Id.
281. I.R.C. § 165(1)(1)(A) (1988).
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the financial institution or is an officer of the financial institution.28 2
If the taxpayer's spouse owns a prohibited interest in or is an officer
of the financial institution, the taxpayer also fails to be a qualified
individual. 283 Thus, ability to obtain a legal separation could allow some
separated spouses in Louisiana larger deductions under section 165(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code. A taxpayer may be able to avoid disqual-
ification resulting from a spouse's interest in the institution by obtaining
a legal separation. 284
d. Floors Limiting the Deductibility of Certain Itemized
Expenses
The Internal Revenue Code limits the deductibility of some itemized
expenses by imposing a floor on the deductions, measured with respect
to a percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. For example,
in computing the amount of allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions,
such as unreimbursed employee business expenses and certain investment
expenses, a taxpayer must subtract two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income. 2 5 A taxpayer must subtract ten percent of his or her
adjusted gross income from net personal casualty and theft losses before
any amount of the losses is deductible. 2 6 Medical expenses are deductible
only to the extent that they exceed seven and one-half percent of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 217
When a married taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds the ad-
justed gross income of an unmarried taxpayer with the same amount
of gross income and deductions, these floors create a marriage penalty.
282. I.R.C. § 165(l)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
283. I.R.C. § 165(l)(2)(C) (1988). A taxpayer's sibling, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, an-
cestor, or lineal descendant who owns a prohibited interest or is an officer of the financial
institution also disqualifies the taxpayer from claiming the deduction. Id. Nor can the
taxpayer claim the deduction if a related entity owns a prohibited interest in or is an officer
of the financial institution. I.R.C. § 165()(2)(D) (1988). Spousal attribution can cause an
entity to be related if the taxpayer's spouse owns a sufficient interest in the entity. For a
discussion of marriage penalties resulting from spousal attribution, see infra notes 455-498
and accompanying text.
284. I.R.C. § 165(1) provides no definition of marital status. This article assumes that
the reference in I.R.C. § 165(l) (5)(B)(ii) to "a separate return by a married individual"
incorporates the rules concerning marital status with respect to filing status. Under those
rules, a taxpayer is considered unmarried if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or
her spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance or if the abandoned spouse
rule applies. I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c), (d); 2(b)(2)(B), (c); 7703 (1988).
285. I.R.C. § 67 (1988).
286. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) (1988). A taxpayer must also subtract $100 per casualty from
the amount of such losses. I.R.C. § 165(h)(l) (1988). A taxpayer, however, is allowed to
deduct personal casualty and theft losses, after subtracting $100 per casualty, to the extent
of the taxpayer's casualty gains for the year. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A) (1988).
287. I.R.C. § 213(a) (1988).
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A married taxpayer will have more adjusted gross income than his or
her unmarried counterpart if certain provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code apply that either increase the gross income of married taxpayers
or reduce the deductions allowable in computing adjusted gross income
of married taxpayers in comparison to unmarried taxpayers. 288 A mar-
riage bonus can result, of course, when only one spouse has adjusted
gross income and the other spouse has itemized expenses. Certain pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code reduce the adjusted gross income
of a married couple as compared to the adjusted gross income of two
similarly situated unmarried taxpayers. 2 9 When both spouses have in-
come, however, the benefits of pooling deductions and the benefit of
any reductions in adjusted gross income can lose their value because
spouses who file a joint return must also combine their income, thereby
increasing adjusted gross income and the amount of the floor limiting
the deductions.
e. The Charitable Deduction
With respect to some itemized deductions, the pooling of income
on a joint return can result in a marriage bonus. For example, section
170 of the Internal Revenue Code places a ceiling on the amount of
charitable contributions a taxpayer can deduct for the taxable year. 29°
The maximum amount that an individual taxpayer can deduct in any
year under section 170 is generally fifty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income.29' Thus, the increase in adjusted gross income achieved
by filing a joint return could increase the amount of currently deductible
charitable contributions. The beneficial effects of pooling income on a
joint return, however, could be illusory. Once the adjusted gross income
on the joint return exceeds $105,250, section 68 reduces the amount of
the charitable contribution that can be deducted.2 92 A married taxpayer
may not be able to escape the section 68 limitation on the charitable
288. For a discussion of the different rules for computing the adjusted gross income of
married and unmarried taxpayers, see infra notes 304-454, and accompanying text.
289. For a discussion of the marriage bonus provisions that affect the computation of
adjusted gross income, see infra notes 304-454 and accompanying text.
290. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1988).
291. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1988) provides that the maximum amount of charitable con-
tributions that a taxpayer can deduct for the year is 50 percent of the taxpayer's "contribution
base." The term "contribution base" is defined as "adjusted gross income (computed without
regard to any net operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section 172)." I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(F) (1988). A taxpayer may carry forward for five years charitable contributions
that are not deductible because of the limitations that apply in the current year. I.R.C.
§ 170(d) (1988). Amounts carried forward are subject to the same limitations in future years.
Id.
292. For a discussion of the limitations on itemized deductions under I.R.C. § 68 see
supra notes 260-268, and accompanying text.
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deduction by filing a separate return because the amount of the deduction
is reduced once adjusted gross income reported on the separate return
exceeds $52,625.293
Whether a spouse elects to use the standard deduction or to itemize
personal expenses, a marriage penalty usually results when both spouses
have income. When both separated spouses have income, they can reduce
their taxable income and the consequential tax burden by qualifying as
unmarried for federal income tax purposes. The Louisiana Legislature
could help such taxpayers by authorizing suits for legal separation,
thereby making it easier for them to claim unmarried status on their
income tax returns.
3. The Deduction for Personal Exemptions
In addition to any other allowable deductions, a taxpayer generally
may deduct an amount for a personal exemption. Section 151 of the
Internal Revenue Code allows an individual taxpayer to deduct an ex-
emption for the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and the taxpayer's
dependents unless some other taxpayer is entitled to the deduction.2 9
The amount of the exemption deduction in 1992 is $2,300 per person
claimed3 91
Taxpayers with a large amount of adjusted gross income may not
be able to deduct exemptions to which they would otherwise be entitled.
A taxpayer must reduce the otherwise allowable deduction for exemptions
by two percentage points for each $2,500 (or fraction thereof) by which
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount.2 9 A
married taxpayer filing a separate return must reduce the otherwise
allowable deduction by two percentage points for each $1,250 of adjusted
gross income in excess of the threshold amount. 29 The applicable thresh-
old amount depends on a taxpayer's filing status: $157,900 in the case
of a joint return; $131,550 for a head of a household; $105,250 for an
unmarried taxpayer; and $78,950 for a married taxpayer filing a separate
return. 298
The rules for reducing the deduction for exemptions have a similar
marriage penalty/bonus effect as previously discussed provisions of the
293. I.R.C. § 68(b)(1) (1988).
294. I.R.C, § 151(a), (b), (c), (d)(2) (1988).
295. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 4.01, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
296. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
297. Id.
298. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(C) (Supp. 1991) provides that the threshold amounts are:
(1) $150,000 in the case of a joint return,
(2) $125,000 for a head of a household,
(3) $100,000 for an unmarried taxpayer, and
(4) $75,000 for a married taxpayer who files a separate return.
The threshold amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 151(d)(4) (Supp. 1991).
For the 1992 threshold amounts, see Rev Proc 91-65 § 4.02, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
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Internal Revenue Code. For example, separated spouses who are con-
sidered unmarried may take advantage of an aggregate of $4,600 in
exemption deductions, assuming that neither taxpayer has a dependent
when each has adjusted gross income of $105,250 or less. If they are
considered unmarried, the total exemption deduction allowable is $2,576,1
resulting in a marriage penalty of $2,024 in reduced deductions. If the
taxpayers have dependents, the $2,300 exemption deduction for each of
the dependents also is reduced proportionately.3°°
A marriage bonus may result in the case of a one-earner couple.
A separated spouse with adjusted gross income of $157,900 who is
considered unmarried may deduct an exemption amount of $1,288. If
the same taxpayer is considered married and his or her spouse has no
adjusted gross income, there will be two fully deductible exemptions,
totaling $4,600 on a joint return. If a "married" taxpayer files a separate
return, however, whether or not the taxpayer is entitled to claim an
exemption deduction for the spouse or for any dependents, 0' the lim-
itations on the exemption deduction prevent the taxpayer from claiming
any deduction for an exemption 0 2 unless spouses are living under a
community property regime. If a community is in existence, each spouse
must report $78,950 of adjusted gross income on his or her separate
return, and each spouse is entitled to a $2,300 exemption deduction.
When one or both of the separated spouses has adjusted gross
income in excess of $78,950 and the spouses file separate returns, tax
299. Following the rules of I.R.C. § 151(d)(3), the result in the text was reached first
by determining that the taxpayers' $210,500 of adjusted gross income exceeded the threshold
amount of $157,900 that applies to a joint return, by $52,600. The excess $52,600 is then
divided by $2,500 to determine the number of $2,500 "(or fraction thereof)" amounts of
adjusted gross income that exceed the threshold amount. The result is twenty-two, which
then must be multiplied by two percent to determine the reduction in the exemption deduction.
Under these facts, the exemption deduction must be reduced by forty-four percent. Because
there are two taxpayers, the exemption deduction allowable before reduction is $4,600. This
otherwise allowable amount must be reduced by forty-four percent, or $2,024, leaving an
allowable deduction of $2,576. The aggregate deduction is the same if the taxpayers file
separate returns.
300. The reduction under I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) applies to the total amount of exemptions
that the taxpayer is otherwise entitled to deduct.
301. A married taxpayer who files a separate return may claim an additional exemption
amount for the spouse if the spouse has no gross income and is not the dependent of
another taxpayer. I.R.C. § 151(b) (1988).
302. This results because of the additional reductions that apply to separate filers under
I.R.C. § 151(d)(3). In the example in the text, the taxpayer's $157,900 exceeds the $78,950
threshold amount by $78,950. The $1,250 increment that applies to a married taxpayer filing
a separate return occurs 63.16 times. The rounded number sixty-four is then multiplied by
two percent, resulting in a reduction of 128 percent of the otherwise allowable exemption
amount. Section 151 gives the taxpayer a reprieve in such a situation by reciting that, "In
no event shall the applicable percentage [of reduction) exceed one hundred percent." I.R.C.
§ 151(d)(3)(B) (Supp. 1991).
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savings can be achieved if the spouses qualify as unmarried. The rules
for determining marital status for purposes of the reduction in the
exemption deduction are the same as the rules that apply with respect
to filing status.303 Thus, for some taxpayers, the availability of a decree
of legal separation in Louisiana would increase the amount of the
deduction for personal exemptions.
4. Adjusted Gross Income and Marriage Penalty/Bonus Issues
To the extent that the fact of marriage increases or decreases a
taxpayer's adjusted gross income, a corresponding marriage penalty or
bonus results. Any increase in adjusted gross income has a direct impact
on taxable income.3° As explained earlier, an increase in adjusted gross
income also can cause an indirect increase in taxable income because
adjusted gross income serves as a measuring rod that reduces the overall
amount of itemized deductions, 0 miscellaneous itemized deductions,
306
personal casualty and theft losses, 3°7 medical expenses,3°s and the ex-
emption amount3°9 that a taxpayer may claim.310 Adjusted gross income
also serves as a measuring device for other purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, generally limiting tax savings otherwise available as ad-
justed gross income increases."'
303. Compare I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (Supp. 1991) with I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c), (d); 2(b)(2)(B),
(c) (1988).
304. "Taxable income" is defined as gross income minus the taxpayer's deductions
including either itemized deductions or the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(a) (1988). In
other words, taxable income is adjusted gross income minus: (1) either the taxpayer's itemized
deductions or the standard deduction, and (2) the deduction for exemptions. Thus, as
adjusted gross income increases, so does taxable income.
305. I.R.C. § 68(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
306. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1988).
307. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) (1988).
308. I.R.C. § 213(a) (1988).
309. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (Supp. 1991).
310. An increase in adjusted gross income sometimes can be advantageous because
adjusted gross income determines the maximum amount of charitable contributions that a
taxpayer may deduct for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1988). The benefits of the larger
deduction for charitable contributions, however, can be reduced if adjusted gross income
exceeds the applicable amounts in I.R.C. § 68. For a discussion of the impact of adjusted
gross income on the charitable deduction, see supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21(a) (limiting the amount a taxpayer can claim as a credit for
dependent care services); 22(d) (reducing the amount of credit for elderly and permanently
and totally disabled taxpayers); 32(b) (limiting the amount of the earned income credit);
86(b) (increasing the amount of social security and tier one railroad retirement benefits that
a taxpayer must include in gross income); 135(b)(2) (limiting the excludable amount of
interest derived from government savings bonds used to fund qualified higher education
expenses); 219(g)(2) (reducing the deductible amount of contributions to an individual re-
tirement account where an individual or the individual's spouse is an active participant in
certain pension plans); 469(i)(3) (limiting the deductible amount under the active rental real
estate exception to the passive activity loss rules).
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The term "adjusted gross income" is defined as gross income minus
the deductions listed in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
fact of marriage often increases a married taxpayer's adjusted gross
income as compared with the adjusted gross income of an unmarried
taxpayer because the Internal Revenue Code generally requires a married
taxpayer to include more in gross income and allows a married taxpayer
to take smaller deductions than his or her unmarried counterpart.
a. Gross Income
i. Social Security Benefits
Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code require a married
taxpayer to include more in gross income than an unmarried taxpayer.
For example, a taxpayer who receives social security benefits may be
required to include a portion of the benefits in income." 2 Under section
86 of the Internal Revenue Code, a recipient of social security benefits"'
usually must include one-half of the benefits in income. The taxpayer
may exclude the entire amount of the benefits from income, however,
if the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is sufficiently low.31 4
Section 86 permits a taxpayer to exclude social security benefits from,
income if the sum of one-half of the social security benefits and the
taxpayer's "modified adjusted gross income" does not exceed a "base
amount." The term "modified adjusted gross income" is defined as
adjusted gross income, excluding social security benefits, increased by
tax-exempt interest and certain amounts that otherwise would be ex-
cludable because the taxpayer resides outside the United States., 5 The
"base amount" generally is $25,000 except that in the case of a joint
return, the base amount is $32,000.16 In the case of a married taxpayer
312. I.R.C. § 86 (1988).
313. For this purpose, the term "social security benefit" also includes certain amounts
received under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. I.R.C. § 86(d) (1988).
314. I.R.C. § 86 requires a taxpayer to include in income the lesser of one-half of the
social security benefits received during the year or one-half of the excess of the amount by
which the sum of one-half of the social security benefits plus the taxpayer's modified adjusted
gross income exceeds a base amount. The term "modified adjusted gross income" means
adjusted gross income (excluding social security benefits) increased by tax-exempt interest,
earned income from foreign sources that is excluded under I.R.C. § 911, and income of a
resident of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Northern Mariana Islands that is
excluded under I.R.C. § 931 or § 933. I.R.C. § 86(b)(2) (1988). The base amount is $25,000
unless the taxpayers file a joint return, in which case the base amount is $32,000. I.R.C.
§ 86(c)(1), (2) (1988). In the case of a spouse who does not live apart from the other spouse
for the entire taxable year and who files a separate return, the base amount is zero. I.R.C.
§ 86(c)(3) (1988).
315. I.R.C. § 86(b)(2) (1988).
316. I.R.C. § 86(c)(1), (2) (1988).
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who files a separate return, however, the base amount is zero unless
the taxpayer has lived apart from his or her spouse for the entire taxable
year.
317
The disparity in the base amounts effects a marriage bonus for
some and a marriage penalty for others. When only one spouse receives
benefits and has modified adjusted gross income, the fact of marriage
permits the taxpayer to use a higher base amount in determining the
excludable amount of the social security benefits. If both spouses have
income, however, not only is the income combined in determining whether
modified adjusted gross income plus one-half of the benefits exceed the
base amount, but the base amount is $32,000 instead of the two $25,000
amounts that each taxpayer could use if the two were unmarried.
The greatest impact of the section 86 computation falls upon a
married spouse who files a separate return during the first year of
separation. Such a person must pay tax on one-half of the social security
payments even if the spouse has no income from other sources. The
spouse might escape taxation on the benefits by filing a joint return,
but the income of the other spouse that must be reported on the joint
return could, when added to one-half of the social security benefits,
exceed the $32,000 base amount that applies to joint returns. A joint
return might not even be a possibility if the other spouse refuses to
sign it. For purposes of section 86, marital status is determined under
the rules that apply with respect to filing status s. 3 1 Thus, in Louisiana
a separated spouse may suffer a marriage penalty under section 86 unless
the abandoned spouse rule applies. If the recipient of the benefits could
obtain a legal separation before the end of the taxable year, the taxpayer
could enjoy the benefit of a $25,000 base amount.
ii. Employer-Provided Day Care
Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code can make employer-
provided day care more expensive for married taxpayers than for their
unmarried counterparts. Section 129 permits a taxpayer to exclude up
to $5,000 of employer-provided day care assistance.319 A married taxpayer
who files a separate return, however, may not exclude more than $2,500
of such assistance. 20 A marriage penalty results in cases where two
317. 1.R.C. § 86(c)(3) (1988).
318. Compare I.R.C. § 86(c)(3)(A) (1988) with I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c), (d); 2(b)(2)(B), (c)
(1988).
319. I.R.C. § 129(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). The taxpayer may exclude the fair market value
of employer-operated day care facilities, employer-provided reimbursements for dependent
care expenses, or amounts withheld from the taxpayer's salary to pay for dependent care.
I.R.C. §§ 129(a)(1), (d)(8)(B), 125 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Amounts that are excluded under
I.R.C. § 129 cannot also be claimed as a credit under I.R.C. § 21. I.R.C. §129(e)(7) (1988).
320. I.R.C. § 129(a)(2) (1988).
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taxpayers, each with employer-provided day care, marry, reducing the
$10,000 aggregate exclusion for two unmarried taxpayers to $5,000. The
separate filer loses one-half of the $5,000 maximum exclusion, regardless
of whether the separate filer's spouse is also entitled to claim an exclusion
under section 129. If the taxpayer qualifies as unmarried because the
taxpayer is legally separated or divorced3 2' or is considered unmarried
under the abandoned spouse rule, 22 the taxpayer may exclude up to
$5,000 of such assistance on a separate return. Under these rules, a
Louisiana spouse who is separated from his or her spouse generally
must include additional amounts in income during the first year of
separation unless the spouse files a joint return.3 23
Section 129 further reduces the excludable amount for a married
taxpayer whose spouse has little or no earned income. Section 129(b)
limits the amount of the exclusion for married taxpayers to the lesser
of the earned income of either spouse. 24 Thus, in cases where one
spouse has only investment income and the other receives employer-
provided dependent care assistance, the entire amount of the assistance
must be included in income, whether a joint or separate return is filed.
A taxpayer who separates from his or her unemployed spouse also must
include in income the full amount of employer-provided dependent care
assistance unless the taxpayer is considered unmarried. If the community
321. I.R.C. §§ 129(a)(2)(C), 21(e)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
322. I.R.C. §§ 129(a)(2)(C), 21(e)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
323. Under the abandoned spouse rule for purposes of I.R.C. § 129, an otherwise
"married" taxpayer is considered unmarried if: (1) the taxpayer files a separate return, (2)
the taxpayer furnishes over one-half of the cost of maintaining as his home a household
which constitutes for more than one-half of the year the principal place of abode of a
dependent of the taxpayer, and (3) during the last six months of the taxable year, the
taxpayer's spouse is not a member of the household. I.R.C. §§ 129(a)(2)(C), 21(e)(4) (1988).
Under these rules, a taxpayer who separates from his or her spouse after June 30, will be
considered married unless there is a decree of divorce or legal separation by December 31.
If the community is still in existence and I.R.C. § 66 does not apply, a taxpayer will fail
to qualify as unmarried even if the taxpayer's spouse was not a member of the taxpayer's
household for the entire taxable year because of the requirement that the taxpayer furnish
over one-half of the cost of maintaining the household. While the community is in existence,
the spouse only furnishes exactly one-half of the cost. Cf. Abrams v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 1433, 1436 (1989) (for purposes of determining whether a taxpayer has
furnished over one-half of the cost of maintaining a household for purposes of filing as
head of a household, the total support of the household is allocable evenly to parents
during the period the marital community exists); Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-40-006 (June 20,
1977) (same).
324. I.R.C. § 129(b)(1) (1988). If the nonearning spouse is a student or incapable of
caring for himself, the nonearning spouse will be deemed to earn $200 a month if the
family includes only one dependent under the age of thirteen or one dependent or spouse
who is physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself. I.R,.C. §§ 129(b)(2), 21(b)(l),
(d)(2) (1988). If the family includes two or more such individuals, the nonearning spouse
is deemed to earn $400 per month. I.R.C. §§ 129(b)(2), 21(d)(2) (1988).
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is in existence, the taxpayer will fail to qualify as unmarried3 25 and
therefore, will be required to' include all of such assistance in income
during the subsequent years as well. Of course, the existence of the
community in such a case places an additional burden on the unemployed
spouse. Under the Seaborn rule, the unemployed spouse is liable for
the tax on one-half of the community income which includes the full
amount of the employer-provided dependent care assistance. If legal
separation were available, separated spouses in Louisiana could achieve
greater tax savings under section 129.
iii. Interest From Government Bonds Used to Pay Higher
Education Expenses
Section 135 of the Internal Revenue Code has a marriage bonus
penalty effect on the computation of adjusted gross income. Under
section 135 a taxpayer may exclude from income interest earned on
Series EE bonds redeemed to pay the taxpayer's "qualified higher ed-
ucation expenses.''326 Qualified higher education expenses generally are
tuition and fees incurred by the taxpayer for enrollment or attendance
of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or the taxpayer's dependent at
a college, university, or vocational school.3 27 The amount of the exclusion
is phased out for taxpayers who have high income.312 The income lim-
325. If the community is in existence, the taxpayer will not be able to meet the requirement
of furnishing over one-half the cost of maintaining a household to qualify as an abandoned,
and therefore, unmarried spouse. See supra note 192. Any support payments made to the
unemployed spouse in post-separation years could preclude application of I.R.C. § 66(a),
thereby assuring the continuance of the community unless the spouses cause it to terminate
by partitioning, obtaining a judgement of separation of property, or obtaining a divorce.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
326. I.R.C. § 135(a), (b)(l) (Supp. 1991). To qualify, the bonds must be issued after
December 31, 1989, and the taxpayer must have attained the age of twenty-four before the
date of issuance. I.R.C. § 135(c)(1) (1988). This rule assures that the benefits of I.R.C.
§ 135 are not available to wealthy taxpayers. The income limitations under I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)
prevent taxpayers with high incomes from excluding the interest. The twenty-four-year age
limit prevents a wealthy taxpayer from purchasing bonds in his child's name and permitting
the child to redeem them later when the child is in a low income bracket.
327. I.R.C. § 135(c)(2) (Supp. 1991).
328. The phase-out begins when the taxpayer's 1992 "modified adjusted gross income"
exceeds $44,150 ($66,200 in the case of a joint return). I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991);
Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 7, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869. For purposes of I.R.C. § 135, modified adjusted
gross income is the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the year increased by certain
amounts that would otherwise be excludable because the taxpayer resided outside the United
States after taking into account includable social security benefits, deductible passive losses,
and the deduction for contributions to an investment retirement account. I.R.C. § 135(c)(4)
(Supp. 1991). A taxpayer who has modified adjusted gross income in excess of the applicable
amount must reduce the otherwise excludable amount under a formula that requires the
taxpayer to multiply the otherwise excludable amount by a fraction, using the excess of
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itations vary depending on whether the taxpayer is unmarried or files
a joint return, a29 generally creating a marriage bonus for a one-earner
couple and a marriage penalty for a two-earner couple. No exclusion
is allowed if a married individual files a separate return.3 0 For purposes
of section 135, a taxpayer is considered unmarried if the taxpayer is
legally separated from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance or if the abandoned, spouse rule applies. 3 ' Under
these rules, a separated spouse in Louisiana who does not meet the
requirements of the abandoned spouse rule must include in income the
full amount of interest earned on bonds used to finance the cost of
advanced education for the spouse or for a child unless a joint return
is filed. Even if a joint return is filed, the combined income on the
return may prevent an exclusion. If the spouses could obtain a legal
separation, the interest on the bonds could be tax-free.
iv. Exclusion of Gain From the Sale of a Personal
Residence for Taxpayers Who Have Attained the Age
of Fifty-Five
Section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code produces a marriage
penalty that can affect a separated spouse for a lifetime. Section 121
allows a taxpayer who has reached the age of fifty-five to elect to
exclude up to $125,000 of the gain on the sale or exchange of property
that the taxpayer has owned and used as a principal personal residence
for three of the five years preceding the sale or exchange 3 2 A taxpayer
may make an election under section 121 only once in a lifetime.333 A
married taxpayer is not permitted to make the election unless the tax-
modified adjusted gross income over the applicable amount as the numerator, and $15,000
($30,000 in the case of a joint return) as the denominator. I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(A) (Supp.
1991). In no event will the excludable amount be less than zero. Id. The $44,150 and $66,200
amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(B) (1988); Rev. Proc. 91-65
§ 7, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
329. I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991).
330. I.R.C. § 135(d)(2) (Supp. 1991).
331. I.R.C. §§ 135(d)(2), 7703 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
332. I.R.C. § 121(a) (1988). To qualify as a principal personal residence, the property
must have been owned and used by the taxpayer as a principal personal residence for periods
aggregating at least three out of the five years preceding the sale or at least one year during
the five-year period if the taxpayer becomes physically or mentally incapable of self care.
I.R.C. § 121(a)(2), (d)(9) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The holding period and use of a prior
personal residence that was involuntarily converted is treated as the holding period and use
of the taxpayer's current residence if I.R.C. § 1033 applied to exclude the gain on the
involuntary conversion of the former residence because the taxpayer used the proceeds of
the involuntary conversion to purchase the residence for which the I.R.C. § 121 election is
made. I.R.C. § 121(d)(8) (1988).
333. I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (1988). A taxpayer who made an election under I.R.C. § 121 on
or before July 26, 1978, however, is permitted to make one other such election. I.R.C.
§ 121(b)(3) (1988).
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payer's spouse joins in the election.33 4 The spouse who joins in the
election then will be precluded from ever making another election under
section 121, even if the couplelater divorces and the spouse remarries.33 s
In fact, if a spouse who has joined in a section 121 election divorces
and later marries a taxpayer who has never made such an election, the
new spouse will not be entitled to claim an exclusion under section
121.336
The marriage penalty that results from the limitations of section
121 is obvious. If two unmarried taxpayers each over age fifty-five sell
a qualifying residence they can each exclude up to $125,000 of gain on
the sale, or an aggregate of $250,000. If they marry and then sell both
residences, the maximum exclusion is $125,000, and only one residence
will qualify. 337 The maximum exclusion for a married taxpayer filing a
separate return is $62,500.338
Unmarried taxpayers over age fifty-five who own a qualifying res-
idence as joint tenants or tenants in common each can take advantage
of a $125,000 exclusion with respect to the respective share of the gain.3 19
Thus, the aggregate exclusion with respect to the jointly owned residence
is $250,000. If they marry, any gain in excess of $125,000 cannot be
excluded under section 121. 340
A marriage bonus may result in cases where one of the spouses
does not satisfy the age, holding, and uie requirements. If a husband
and wife own property as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, or
community property, and one spouse satisfies the age, holding, and use
requirements, the couple can exclude $125,000 of the gain by filing a
joint return. 34 1 The holding and use requirements satisfied by a deceased
334. I.R.C. § 121(c) (1988). If the residence is held by the husband and wife as joint
tenants, tenants by the entirety, or community property, and they file a joint return, they
will qualify for the election even though only one of the spouses meets the age, holding,
and use requirements of I.R.C. § 121(a) (1988).
335. I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (1988).
336. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-2(b)(2) Example (1) (as amended in 1979).
337. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-2(b)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1979).
338. I.R.C. § 121(b)(l) (1988).
339. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-235, 1967-2 C.B. 79 (brother and sister who were joint
owners of their principal residence may each exclude their own gain under I.R.C. § 121 if
each meets the age, holding-period, and use requirements); Rev. Rul. 67-234, 1967-2 C.B.
78 (unmarried taxpayer owning a residence as joint tenant or tenant in common may elect
to exclude his share of the gain under I.R.C. § 121).
340. If the couple purchases a new residence, the gain may be shielded from recognition
if I.R.C. § 1034 applies. Each spouse can take advantage of I.R.C. § 1034 to avoid recognition
of his or her individual share of the gain if each purchases a new residence. Rev. Rul. 74-
250, 1974-1 C.B. 202. If a spouse does not wish to purchase a new residence or cannot
afford one, however, relief will not be available under I.R.C. § 1034.
341. I.R.C. § 121(d)(1) (1988).
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spouse who has never made a section 121 election can be attributed to
the spouse who survives. 342
For purposes of section 121, an individual who is legally separated
from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance
at the time of the sale or exchange of the residence is considered not
married.143 In most cases, Louisiana taxpayers over age fifty-five who
have filed for divorce should wait until the divorce is final before selling
the marital home and making a section 121 election unless one of the
spouses does not qualify for the election and a joint return is contem-
plated. Because there is no abandoned spouse rule for purposes of section
121, spouses who separate in Louisiana and do not plan to divorce
cannot avoid the marriage penalties that result under section 121. If
legal separation were authorized in Louisiana, many of these taxpayers
could use the section 121 election more advantageously.
v. Fringe Benefits
A marriage bonus results under several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code that exclude from income fringe benefits received by an
employee or the employee's spouse. A taxpayer whose employer furnishes
to the taxpayer's spouse medical care, 3" a qualified tuition reduction, 4
group legal services, 346 excess capacity services such as stand-by airline
tickets, 347 employee discounts,3 " or athletic facilities 349 could lose the
ability to exclude these items from income if the taxpayer's marital
status is altered. Separated spouses to whom such benefits are offered
might not wish to obtain a legal separation.5 0 The enactment of pro-
visions authorizing a judgment of separation from bed and board in
Louisiana would not affect separated spouses who wish to take advantage
of the exclusions. Spouses could continue to exclude fringe benefits by
failing to file a petition for a judgment of separation from bed and
board.
342. I.R.C. § 121(d)(2) (1988)
343. I.R.C. § 121(d)(6) (1988)
344. I.R.C. § 105(b) (1988).
345. I.R.C. § 117(d) (1988).
346. I.R.C. § 120(a) (1988).
347. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (b), (f)(2)(A) (1988).
348. I.R.C. § 132(a)(2), (C), (f)(2)(A) (1988).
349. I.R.C. § 132(h)(5) (1988).
350. There is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code or in the Regulations defining
the term "spouse" for purposes of the exclusion from income of the fringe benefits discussed
in the text. Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit have held that a person who was
legally separated from her spouse was a "surviving spouse" for purposes of the federal
estate tax provisions. See, e.g., Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 540 (1975),
aff'd, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976). The application of this precedent to an income tax
case, however, is uncertain. For a discussion of the uncertainty, see infra note 454.
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b. Above-the-Line Deductions
The foregoing discussion of the effect of a taxpayer's marital status
on the amount of items that a taxpayer must include in gross income
concerned only a portion of the impact of marital status on a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. Marital status also affects the amount and avail-
ability of some of the deductions that a taxpayer may deduct from gross
income in computing adjusted gross income.
A taxpayer computes his or her adjusted gross income by subtracting
from gross income the so-called "above-the-line" deductions listed in
section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 62 does not authorize
the deduction of any particular expense; it merely lists the deductions
authorized by other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that can
be taken from gross income. The deductions that do not appear in the
section 62 list, the so-called "below-the-line" deductions, are itemized
deductions which a taxpayer may deduct only if the taxpayer elects to
forego the standard deduction.3 ' The availability and the amount of
some of the above-the-line deductions vary depending on marital status,
causing for some a marriage penalty and for others a marriage bonus.
i. Trade or Business Expenses
(a) Bonus Depreciation Under Section 179
An important category of above-the-line deductions includes expenses
incurred in a trade or business.3 12 Among the trade or business expenses
that a taxpayer may deduct above the line, is an allowance for depre-
ciation with respect to certain assets used in the taxpayer's trade or
business.3 5 3 A taxpayer who purchases tangible personal property for use
in a trade or business that satisfies the requirements of section 179 of
the Internal Revenue Code ("section 179 property' ")314 may be able to
deduct the entire cost of the property in the year of the purchase rather
than taking smaller depreciation deductions over the years that constitute
the property's recovery period. The time value of money makes the.
351. I.R.C. § 63(b) (1988). The "line" is adjusted gross income. The deductions listed
in I.R.C. § 62 are subtracted from gross income, so that the taxpayer can determine his
or her adjusted gross income. Itemized deductions are subtracted from adjusted gross income.
352. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (1988). If the trade or business consists of the performance of
services by the taxpayer as an employee, however, most unreimbursed expenses are not
deductible above the line. Id.; § 62(a)(2) (1988).
353. I.R.C. §§ 167(a), 168 (1988).
354. Section 179 property generally consists of tangible, depreciable personal property
that the taxpayer has purchased for use in the active conduct of a trade or business. I.R.C.
§ 179(d)(1) (1988).
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accelerated deduction under section 179 advantageous to taxpayers.3"
The rules for the application of section 179 can effect a marriage penalty
or a marriage bonus, depending on the circumstances.
Under section 179, a taxpayer may elect to deduct, rather than
capitalize and depreciate, up to $10,000 of the cost of a section 179
property. 3 6 The deduction is allowed for the taxable year in which the
property is placed in service.357 A taxpayer may make an election with
respect to all or a portion of the cost of one asset or several assets, 58
but the total deduction for all section 179 property placed in service
during the taxable year cannot exceed $10,000. 319
A taxpayer who places more than $210,000 of section 179 property
in service during the year cannot expense any of it under section 179.
The $10,000 limit is reduced by the amount by which the cost of section
179 property placed in service during the year exceeds $200,000.160 Thus,
for example, a taxpayer who places $203,000 of section 179 property
in service during the year may only expense $7,000 of it under section
179.
After the reduction, if any, attributable to the amount of section
179 property placed in service during the year, the $10,000 limitation
is further limited to the aggregate amount of taxable income derived
from the active conduct by the taxpayer of any trade or business during
the taxable year.36 1 In determining the amount of active trade or business
income, the taxpayer may aggregate all such income, including income
derived from the trade or business of being an employee.36 2
For purposes of applying the $10,000 limitation and for determining
the cost of section 179 property placed in service during the year, a
355. A taxpayer who elects to expense an asset under I.R.C. § 179 must reduce the
depreciable basis of the asset by the amount of the § 179 deduction. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.179-1(0, 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991). The reduced basis will in turn result in smaller
depreciation deductions with respect to the expensed asset in later years. Because of the
time value of money, the taxpayer benefits from the larger deductions in the first year that
the asset is placed in service. The taxpayer could invest the tax savings achieved in the first
year, earning income that would not be produced if the taxpayer waited to take the deduction
in later years. For a discussion of the time value of money, see supra note Ill and
accompanying text.
356. I.R.C. § 179(b)(1) (1988).
357. I.R.C. § 179(a) (1988)
358. I.R.C. § 179(c)(1) (1988).
359. I.R.C. § 179(b)(1) (1988).
360. I.R.C. § 179(b)(2) (1988).
361. I.R.C. § 179(b)(3) (1988). For this purpose, taxable income is computed without
regard to the deduction allowable under I.R.C. § 179. I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(C) (1988). Amounts
that are disallowed because of the taxable income limitation are carried forward, to be used
as a deduction in future years, subject to the dollar limitations and active trade or business
income limitations discussed in the text. I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(B) (1988).
362. I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(A) (1988); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(4), (5)(iv), 56 Fed. Reg.
12868 (1991).
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husband and a wife are treated as one taxpayer, whether they file a
joint return3 63 or each files a separate return.364 Thus, the maximum
amount of the so-called "bonus depreciation" that both spouses may
deduct under section 179 is $10,000, and the cost of section 179 property
that each spouse has purchased is aggregated to determine whether the
cost of such property purchased during the taxable year exceeds $200,000.
The marriage penalty is obvious: if the taxpayers were not married,
each could claim up to $10,000 of bonus depreciation, resulting in an
aggregate deduction of $20,000, and neither taxpayer would have to
take into account the other's purchases of section 179 property during
the year. Separated spouses who qualify as unmarried can avoid the
marriage penalty resulting from the $10,000 limitation on the amount
of bonus depreciation allowable under section 179.
An additional limitation applies to married taxpayers who file sep-
arate returns. Once the spouses aggregate the cost of section 179 property
that each has placed in service during the year, the maximum amount
of bonus depreciation that either spouse can deduct is one-half of the
otherwise allowable amount, unless both spouses make an election to
share the allowable bonus depreciation unequally.3 6 Thus, in a case
where a husband places $195,000 of section 179 property in service
during the year, and his wife places $9,000 of such property in service
during the same taxable year, the total amount of bonus depreciation
that the spouses may deduct is $6,000.166 If they file separate returns,
each may claim up to $3,000 of bonus depreciation unless they agree
to share the $6,000 amount differently and each makes an election on
his or her separate return.3 67 If one spouse claims $3,000 of bonus
depreciation, the other cannot claim more than 3,000.168 These rules
often require separated spouses to cooperate in order to obtain the
greatest aggregate tax savings under section 179. Such cooperation may
be unattainable.
For purposes of applying these rules, a taxpayer is considered un-
married if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or her spouse under
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or if the abandoned spouse
rule applies. 69 A provision authorizing a decree of legal separation in
Louisiana could help some separated spouses to use section 179 to achieve
greater tax savings.
363. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(b)(5), 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
364. I.R.C. § 179(b)(4)(A) (1988).
365. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(b)(6), 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
366. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(b)(6)(ii) Example, 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
367. Id.
368. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(b)(6)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
369. Id.
[Vol. 53
TAX, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE
Section 179 has one marriage bonus feature. Spouses who file a
joint return may aggregate their income for purposes of determining
the amount of the taxpayer's active trade or business income. 70 Thus,
the active trade or business income of one spouse may increase the
amount of bonus depreciation allowable with respect to property placed
in service by the other spouse. Of course, spouses who file separate
returns are not permitted to aggregate their income for purposes of the
taxable income limitation . 71 The ability to obtain a judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board would not prevent separated spouses from
taking advantage of the marriage bonus feature of section 179. Separated
spouses who cooperate well enough to file a joint return could take
advantage of any bonus that would result by foregoing a separation
from bed and board.
(b) Reforestation Expenses
When both spouses are in the timber business, a marriage penalty
can result with respect to their reforestation expenses.3 72 Reforestation
costs are the direct costs incurred in connection with forestation or
reforestation by planting or artificial or natural seeding, including costs
(1) for the preparation of the site, (2) of seeds or seedlings, and (3)
for labor and tools, including depreciation of equipment used in planting
or seeding.3 73 Such expenses are capital expenditures, which generally
must be added to the adjusted basis of the timber and recovered later
through a depletion allowance as the timber is cut or as adjusted basis
of the timber when it is sold.3 74 Section 194 of the Internal Revenue
Code allows a taxpayer to amortize, over an eighty-four-month period,
up to $10,000 of qualifying reforestation expenses. 37 The maximum
amount of such expenses that can be amortized by a married taxpayer
who files a separate return is $5,000.76 Reforestation expenses that
qualify for amortization under section 194 also qualify for an investment
tax credit under section 46 of the Internal Revenue Code.3 77 A taxpayer
may claim the credit whether or not the taxpayer elects to amortize the
reforestation costs. 3 7 The maximum amount of reforestation expenses
370. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(6)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
371. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(7), 56 Fed. Reg. 12868 (1991).
372. For a discussion of the tax treatment of reforestation expenses, see F. Gerald
Burnett, 457 Tax Mgmt., Timber Transactions A-43-A-46 (1990).
373. I.R.C. § 194(c)(3) (1988).
374. Rev. Rul. 75-467, 1975-2 C.B. 93, superseding Rev. Rul. 55-252, 1955-1 C.B. 319.
375. I.R.C. § 194(b)(1) (1988).
376. Id.
377. I.R.C. § 48(b) (Supp. 1991).
378. H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 1320, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4228, 4233.
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that a taxpayer can claim as a credit is $10,000 ($5,000 in the case of
a taxpayer who is married and files a separate return).3 7 9
Under these rules separated spouses who are considered unmarried
can amortize a maximum of $20,000 of reforestation expenses and can
claim a maximum credit of $20,000 in the aggregate. If they are con-
sidered married, the maximum amount that qualifies for amortization
and/or credit is $10,000. For purposes of applying these rules, a taxpayer
is not considered married if the taxpayer is legally separated from his
or her spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or if
the abandoned spouse rule applies.38 0 A provision in the Louisiana Civil
Code authorizing legal separation could result in federal income tax
savings to some separated spouses with respect to reforestation expenses.
(c) Passive Activity Losses
While a taxpayer may deduct most business expenses above the
line381 there may be a limit on the amount of expenses that the taxpayer
may deduct if the business is a passive activity. The passive activity loss
rules contain both marriage bonus and marriage penalty provisions.
In general, an individual taxpayer may deduct expenses attributable
to a passive activity only to the extent that the taxpayer has income
from passive activities. 38 2 The term "passive activity" is defined generally
as: (1) any activity involving the conduct of a trade or business in which
the taxpayer does not materially participate, or (2) any rental activity. 33
Congress enacted the passive activity loss rule to curtail the use of tax
shelters. 3 4 In general, the passive activity loss rules prevent a taxpayer
from using net losses from passive activities such as limited partnerships
and real estate rental activities to "shelter," or reduce, either income
379. I.R.C. §§ 48(b)(1), 194(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
380. I.R.C. §§ 48(b)(1), 194(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
381. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (1988).
382. For the rules limiting the deductibility of expenses attributable to passive activities,
see I.R.C. § 469 (1988). The rules apply to individuals, estates, trusts, certain closely held
C corporations, and personal service corporations. I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) (1988). I.R.C. § 469(a)(1)
disallows a taxpayer's "passive activity loss" and "passive activity credit" for the year. A
taxpayer's "passive activity loss" is a net loss, defined as the amount by which the aggregate
losses from all passive activities exceed the aggregate income from all passive activities for
the taxable year. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (1988). The term "passive activity credit" means the
amount by which credits other than the foreign tax credit that are attributable to passive
activities exceed the regular tax liability of the taxpayer attributable to passive activities for
the year. I.R.C. § 469(d)(2) (1988).
383. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1), (2) (1988). A working interest in any oil and gas property which
the taxpayer holds directly or through an entity that does not limit the taxpayer's liability,
however, is not a passive activity, regardless of any lack of material participation by the
taxpayer. I.R.C. § 469(c)(3)(A), (4) (1988).
384. S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713-14 (1986).
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from active businesses, such as salaries and fees, or portfolio income,
such as interest and dividends.3"5
Net losses from a trade or business, other than a rental business,
in which a taxpayer materially participates, on the other hand, generally
can be used to offset income from any other activity, whether the
activity is active or passive or generates portfolio income, unless some
other provision of the Internal Revenue Code restricts the deduction.38 6
Thus, it often is advantageous for a taxpayer to establish that the
taxpayer materially participated in a business that generates net losses.3 7
A taxpayer is treated as materially participating in an activity if the
taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity' on a regular,
continuous, and substantial basis. 8 The Regulations interpreting the
passive activity loss rules provide safe harbor tests for establishing ma-
terial participation, generally based on the number of hours that the
taxpayer has devoted to the activity during the taxable year.389 In de-
termining whether a taxpayer has materially participated in an activity,
any participation by the taxpayer's spouse is attributed to the taxpayer. 90
It is not necessary for the spouse to own an interest in the activity,
nor is it necessary for the spouses to file a joint return for the spouse's
participation to be considered for purposes of establishing material par-
ticipation.3 9' A spouse's participation is not attributed to a taxpayer,
however, if the taxpayer is legally separated from the spouse under a
decree of divorce or separate maintenance or if the abandoned spouse
rule applies. 92 Thus, separated spouses who wish to aggregate their
participation in a business activity in order to avoid application of the
passive activity loss rules will not want to obtain a legal separation.
The authorization of legal separation in Louisiana will not prevent
spouses from aggregating their participation for purposes of the passive
385. For a discussion of the passive activity loss rules, see 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra
note 46, at 28.
386. For other limitations on the deduction of net losses see, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(d)
(limiting the amount of partnership losses a partner may deduct to the partner's basis in
his or her partnership interest); 465 (1988) (permitting a taxpayer to use net losses incurred
in one activity to offset income derived from another activity only to the extent that the
taxpayer has placed capital or personal credit at risk in the activity generating the losses);
1366(d) (limiting the amount of S corporation losses than a shareholder may deduct to the
shareholder's basis in stock or debt of the corporation).
387. If a business generates a net profit, it could be advantageous for the taxpayer to
establish a lack of material participation in order to characterize the income from the business
as passive income. The taxpayer then could use net loses from passive activities to offset
the income from the business.
388. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) (1988).
389. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T (as amended in 1989).
390. I.R.C. § 469(h)(5) (1988).
391. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(3) (as amended in 1989).
392. Id.
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activity loss rules. Separated spouses who wish to take advantage of
the spousal attribution provisions may continue to do so if neither spouse
files a petition for a judgment of separation from bed and board.
Congress carved out an exception to the passive activity loss rules
for a taxpayer who actively participates in a rental real estate activity.
A natural person may offset active or portfolio income with up to
$25,000 of net losses attributable to all rental real estate activities in
which the taxpayer actively participated during the year.3 93 A taxpayer
is considered to be an active participant if the taxpayer owns at least
a ten percent interest in the rental real estate activity394 and participates
in a significant and bona fide sense in the activity. 95 To be an active
participant, a taxpayer need not satisfy the rules of the material par-
ticipation test. Active participation can be established if the taxpayer
makes management decisions, such as approving capital or repair ex-
penditures, or arranges "for others to provide services (such as re-
pairs)."19
For purposes of determining whether a taxpayer has actively par-
ticipated in a rental real estate activity, both the interest owned and
any participation by the taxpayer's spouse are attributed to the tax-
payer. 319 In this respect, the so-called "active rental real estate exception"
to the passive activity loss rules provides a marriage bonus. Separated
spouses wishing to aggregate their ownership interests and participation
in a rental real estate activity may not wish to obtain a judgment of
separation from bed and board.3 98 The availability of a judgment of
separation from bed and board in Louisiana will not prevent separated
spouses who do not file for the judgment from taking advantage of
spousal attribution under the active rental real estate exception to the
passive activity loss rules.
The marriage penalty provisions of the active rental real estate
exception, however, may make a legal separation an important option.
393. I.R.C. § 469(i)(1) (1988). The allowance also applies to up to $25,000 of the deduction
equivalent of the passive activity credit for any taxable year which is attributable to all
rental real estate activities in which the taxpayer actively participated. Id.
394. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(A) (1988). If the interest is a limited partnership interest in the
real estate activity, however, the taxpayer will not be considered an active participant no
matter how great an interest the taxpayer owns in the activity. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6XC) (1988).
395. S. Rep. No. 313, supra note 384, at 737.
396. Id.
397. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(A), (D) (1988).
398. Marital status is not defined for all purposes of the passive activity loss rules. In
determining whether a spouse's participation is attributable to the taxpayer, however, the
taxpayer is considered unmarried if there is a legal separation or if the abandoned spouse
rule applies. Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(3) (as amended in 1989). This article assumes
that the same rules apply in determining whether the interests of the spouses should be
aggregated.
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The amount of active rental real estate losses that a taxpayer may deduct
is phased out for taxpayers who have adjusted gross income in excess
of $100,000.1" The $25,000 ceiling for active rental real estate losses is
reduced by fifty percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income exceeds $100,000." Thus, a taxpayer with adjusted gross
income in excess of $150,000 cannot take advantage of the active rental
real estate exception to the passive activity loss rules.4'
The active rental real estate exception is even more limited for a
married individual who files a separate return. Such a separate filer is
denied the $25,000 allowance unless the taxpayer lives apart from his
or her spouse for the entire taxable year, regardless of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income 02 A separate filer who lives apart from his or
her spouse for the entire taxable year loses at least one-half of the
allowance. The maximum amount of active rental real estate losses that
a married separate filer can use to offset active or portfolio income is
$12,500.40 The $12,500 ceiling is reduced by fifty percent of the amount
by which the separate filer's adjusted gross income exceeds $50,000.4
Under these rules separated spouses in Louisiana who do not meet the
requirements of the abandoned spouse rule must file a joint return for
the first year of their separation to take advantage of the active rental
real estate exception to the passive activity loss rules. Even after the
first year of separation, a joint return may be necessary to take the
fullest advantage of the exception. As has been explained, filing a joint
return requires a degree of trust and cooperation that may not be present
in the context of a separation. 405 If the spouses could obtain a judgment
of separation from bed and board, each spouse could use up to $25,000
of active rental real estate losses to offset active or portfolio income,
399. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3) (1988). For this purpose adjusted gross income is determined
without regard to : (1) social security benefits that are includable in gross income under
I.R.C. § 86, (2) interest earned from government bonds used to pay qualified higher education
expenses, excluded under I.R.C. § 135, (3) contributions to an individual retirement account
that are deductible under I.R.C. § 219, and (4) any passive activity loss. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(E)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
400. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(A) (1988). With respect to a passive activity loss credit attributable
to a rehabilitation credit, there will be no phase out until the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income exceeds $200,000. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (1988). There is no phase out under this rule
for a passive activity credit attributable to a low-income housing credit. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(C)
(1988).
401. The $25,000 allowance is reduced by $25,000, or fifty percent of the $50,000, the
amount of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000.
402. I.R.C. § 469(i)(5)(B) (1988).
403. I.R.C. § 469(i)(5)(A)(i) (1988).
404. I.R.C. § 469(i)(5)(A)(ii) (1988). With respect to a passive activity loss attributable
to a rehabilitation credit, the phase out begins when the separate filer's adjusted gross
income exceeds $100,000. I.R.C. § 469(i)(5)(A)(iii) (1988).
405. See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
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and the $25,000 ceiling would not be reduced until adjusted gross income
of the spouse claiming the deduction or credit exceeded $100,000.
ii. Expenses of a Qualified Performing Artist
The rules concerning the deduction of business expenses incurred by
performing artists can result in a marriage penalty. Unreimbursed em-
ployee business expenses of a qualified performing artist are deductible
above the line.4 The unreimbursed employee business expenses of other
taxpayers are miscellaneous itemized deductions, not only deductible
below the line, but also deductible only to the extent that they exceed
two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.4 7 The limitation
on miscellaneous itemized deductions often prevents the deduction of
unreimbursed employee business expenses incurred by a taxpayer other
than a qualified performing artist.
To be able to deduct the unreimbursed expenses above the line, a
performing artist must satisfy several requirements, including a require-
ment that the artist's adjusted gross income for the taxable year not
exceed $16,000.4 A married performing artist who has not lived apart
from his or her spouse for the entire taxable year may not deduct the
unreimbursed expenses above the line unless the performing artist files
a joint return. 40 If the combined adjusted gross income on the joint
return exceeds $16,000, the unreimbursed employee business expenses
406. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B) (1988).
407. I.R.C. § 67 (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-lT(e)(3) (as amended in 1990). Congress
enacted the provision limiting the deductibility of unreimbursed employee business expenses
as a tax simplification measure. H. Rep. No. 26, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-110 (1985); S.
Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-80 (1985). Because the availability of the deduction
is so limited, taxpayers no longer need to save their receipts and keep records to substantiate
the deduction, and the Service no longer needs to incur administrative expenses auditing
taxpayers whose miscellaneous itemized deductions are small. Id. Reimbursed employee
business expenses, on the other hand, are deductible in full above the line. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A)
(1988). To be entitled to deduct such reimbursed expenses above the line, the employee
must substantiate the expenses to his or her employer and may not retain any amount in
excess of the substantiated expenses. I.R.C. § 62(c) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
408. I.R.C. § 62(b)(l)(C) (1988). For this purpose, adjusted gross income is determined
without taking into account any deduction for the unreimbursed expenses. Id. The performing
artist will not qualify for the above-the-line deduction of unreimbursed employee business
expenses unless the following requirements are also met: (1) the individual performed services
in the performing arts as an employee during the taxable year for at least two employers,
and (2) the aggregate amount of the individual's unreimbursed employee business expenses
exceeds ten percent of the individual's gross income attributable to the performance of such
services. I.R.C. § 62(b)(1)(A), (B) (1988). An individual is not treated as performing services
in the performing arts as an employee for any employer unless the amount received for
the performing arts services exceeds $200. I.R.C. § 62(b)(2) (1988).
409. I.R.C. § 62(b)(3)(A) (1988).
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are not deductible above the line.4 10 For this purpose, the performing
artist is considered not married if the performing artist is legally separated
from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance
as of the close of the taxable year. 411
Under these rules a Louisiana performing artist whose adjusted gross
income is less than $16,000 and who is separated from his or her spouse
must file a joint return to qualify for an above-the-line deduction of
unreimbursed employee business expenses during the first year of sep-
aration. Even if the artist and the spouse cooperate well enough to file
a joint return, the combined adjusted gross income on the return could
easily exceed $16,000, eliminating the ability to deduct the expenses
above the line. If the community remains in existence, the community
income earned by the performing artist's spouse could cause the per-
forming artist's adjusted gross income to exceed the $16,000 threshold
on a separate return.4 12 A legal separation would not only eliminate the
joint return requirement but would also terminate the community, mak-
ing it easier for the performing artist to deduct unreimbursed employee
business expenses above the line.
iii. Losses From the Sale or Exchange of Property
(a) Capital Losses
A taxpayer also may deduct above the line allowable losses from
the sale or exchange of property. 43 There is a limitation, however, on
the amount that can be deducted if a loss is attributable to the sale or
exchange of a capital asset. 414 The maximum amount of such capital
losses that an individual taxpayer may deduct in any year is the amount
410. I.R.C. § 62(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
411. I.R.C. §§ 62(b)(3)(C), 7703(a) (1988).
412. In years after the first year of separation the performing artist could be relieved
of income attribution under the Seaborn rule if I.R.C. § 66 applies. Under I.R.C. § 66(a)
(1988), performing artist who lives apart from his or her spouse for the entire calendar
year will qualify for relief from the Seaborn rule with respect to all community income
except income derived from community property unless earned community income is trans-
ferred between the spouses. I.R.C. § 66(a) (1988). A performing artist receiving spousal
support, (which could be necessary for a person earning less than $16,000 a year) must
satisfy the stringent requirements of I.R.C. § 66(c) to avoid application of the Seaborn rule.
For a discussion of the difficulty of qualifying for relief under I.R.C. § 66(c), see supra
notes 89-97 and accompanying text. If there is significant income earned from community
property, the performing artist could have adjusted gross income in excess of $16,000,
regardless of whether the performing artist has any access to the income from the property.
413. I.R.C. § 62(a)(3) (1988).
414. I.R.C. §§ 165(0, 1211, 1212 (1988). In general, a capital asset is an asset held for
investment. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1988) (defining the term "capital asset" to include all property
except the property listed in subsections (1) through (5) of IR.C. § 1221). Congress causes
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of gains recognized from the sale or exchange of capital assets plus
$3,000.41s A taxpayer who is married and files a separate return may
deduct capital losses to the extent of capital gains plus a maximum of
$1 ,500 . 4 16
The limitation on the deductibility of capital losses results in a
marriage bonus when a spouse who has capital losses in excess of $3,000
can use the other spouse's capital gains to offset the losses by filing a
joint return. When each of the spouses has net capital losses in excess
of $1,500, however, a marriage penalty results. A separated spouse who
files a separate return can neither use the other spouse's capital gains
to offset capital losses 417 nor deduct more than $1,500 of net capital
losses for the year. While an individual taxpayer carries forward dis-
allowed capital losses indefinitely, 4 8 the time value of money makes a
current deduction worth more than a deferred deduction. The Louisiana
Legislature could help some separated spouses obtain larger current
capital loss deduction by permitting them to obtain a legal separation,
thereby qualifying as unmarried for federal income tax purposes.4 1 9 Those
spouses who would like to pool their capital gains and losses on a joint
some transactions to result in capital gain or loss by specifying that the transaction will be
treated as the sale or exchange of a capital asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165(g)(1) (worthlessness
of a security); 166(d) (worthlessness of a nonbusiness debt); 301(c)(3) (distribution from a
corporation in excess of earnings and profits and stock basis); 302(a) (redemption of stock);
303 (redemption of stock to pay death taxes); 331(a) (distribution in complete liquidation
of a corporation); 357(c)(1) (assumption of liabilities in excess of basis of property transferred
to a corporation); 731 (distribution by a partnership); 1233(a) (short sale of property); 1234(a)
(dealings in options); 1235(a) (transfer of patent rights); 1241 (cancellation of a lease or
distributorship); 1271(a) (retirement of a debt instrument). For a discussion of the definition
of the term "capital asset," see 2 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 11 51.1-51.10.6.
415. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988). Any capital losses that cannot be deducted because of the
$3,000 limit are carried forward indefinitely, subject to the same limitations in future years.
I.R.C. § 1212(b) (1988).
416. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988).
417. Of course, if the community is still in existence, the separated spouse will include
in income one-half of the community capital gains and will be entitled to deduct one-half
of the community capital losses, subject to the $1,500 limit that applies to net capital losses.
Johnson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 340, 347 (1979); Stewart v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A.
406, 411 (1937), aff'd 95 F.2d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1938); I.R.S. Pub. no. 555, supra note
31, at 2.
418. I.R.C. § 1212(b) (1988).
419. I.R.C. § 1211(b), limiting the amount of capital losses that an individual taxpayer
may deduct in a taxable year, provides no definition of marital status. Nor do the Regulations
promulgated under I.R.C. § 1211 define marital status. This article assumes that Congress's
reference in I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) to "a married individual filing a separate return" incorporates
the definition of marital status that applies for purposes of determining a taxpayer's filing
status. For such purposes, an individual taxpayer is considered unmarried if the taxpayer
is legally separated from his or her spouse or if the abandoned spouse rule applies. I.R.C.
§§ l(a), (c), (d); 2(c); 7703 (1988).
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return could do so by failing to file a petition for separation from bed
and board.
(b) Section 1244 Stock
Section 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code offers a marriage bonus
to taxpayers. Section 1244 permits a taxpayer to deduct, as ordinary
losses, losses on the sale, exchange, or worthlessness of the stock of
certain small business corporations that would otherwise be treated as
capital losses. 420 The maximum amount that can be deducted as an
ordinary loss under section 1244 is $50,000, or $100,000 in the case of
a joint return. 42' Thus, in a case where one spouse has qualified losses
in excess of $50,000, the couple may achieve aggregate tax savings by
filing a joint return. If the spouses are legally separated under a decree
of divorce or separation, however, they will not be able to take advantage
of the more generous deduction because joint filing will be unavailable
to them.42 The availability of legal separation in Louisiana would not
prevent separated spouses who cooperate well enough to file a joint
return from taking advantage of the marriage bonus under section 1244.
To be eligible to file a joint return, the spouses merely should not seek
a judgment of separation from bed and board.
iv. Contributions to an IRA
Contributions to an individual retirement account ("IRA") are de-
ductible above the line.423 The maximum amount that can be contributed
to an IRA in any taxable year is $2,000.424 Section 219 of the Internal
Revenue Code limits the amount of such contributions that an individual
may deduct to the lesser of $2,000 or the amount of compensation
420. I.R.C. § 1244(a) (1988). The loss will qualify as ordinary if: (1) at the time the
stock was issued, the aggregate amount of money and adjusted basis of property received
by the corporation as a contribution to capital and paid-in surplus did not exceed $1,000,000,
(2) the stock was issued for money or property other than stock or securities, and (3) during
the five most recent years before the loss was sustained (or the period the corporation was
in existence if less than five years), more than one-half of the corporation's gross receipts
were from sources other than royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or
exchanges of stock. I.R.C. § 1244(c) (1988).
421. I.R.C. § 1244(b) (1988).
422. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(2) (1988).
423. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(7), 219(a) (1988).
424. I.R.C § 408(a)(1) (1988). An exception is made for rollover contributions, i.e.,
amounts distributed from other IRAs. Id. For a discussion of the rules concerning the
qualification of an IRA and the deductibility of contributions to an IRA, see David R.
Baker, 355-3rd Tax Mgmt., IRAs and SEPs (1991).
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includable in the taxpayer's gross income for the year. 42 The maximum
deduction is computed separately for each individual. 426 Thus, if a hus-
band and wife both have sufficient compensation, each can establish a
separate IRA, and together they can deduct a maximum of $4,000 on
a joint return. 427 Community income, however, will not qualify a non-
earning spouse for the deduction. 421
Section 219 provides a small marriage bonus to couples who file a
joint return if one of the spouses has no compensation for the year. 429
In that case, the spouse with compensation may establish a separate
IRA for the nonworking spouse, known as a spousal IRA.430 The max-
imum deduction a couple can claim for IRA contributions under the
spousal IRA provisions is $2,250.431
A marriage penalty may result under the IRA provisions if one of
the spouses is an active participant in a pension plan.4 32 In that case,
425. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (1988). For this purpose, the term "compensation" is defined as
wages, salaries, professional fees, or -other amounts derived from or received for personal
services actually rendered but does not include amounts not includible in gross income such
as amounts excluded under I.R.C. § 911. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219(a)-l(b)(3), 49 Fed. Reg.
2795 (1984).
426. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219(a)-2(c)(1), 49 Fed. Reg. 2796 (1984).
427. Id.
428. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219(a)-2(c)(2), 49 Fed. Reg. 2796 (1984).
429. I.R.C. § 219(c) (1988). For this purpose, a spouse will be considered to have
compensation even if such compensation is excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 911.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219(a)-3(d)(2), 49 Fed. Reg. 2796 (1984). The compensation earned
by one spouse in a community property state is not attributed to the other spouse for
purposes of determining whether a spouse has compensation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219(a)-
2(c)(2), 49 Fed. Reg. 2796 (1984). A spouse who has compensation during the taxable year
may elect to be treated as having no compensation for purposes of qualifying for the
additional deduction. I.R.C. § 219(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1988). Because the additional IRA deduction
under I.R.C. § 219 is $250, the election benefits taxpayers in cases where one spouse has
less than $250 in compensation. A spouse who has compensation may deduct the lesser of
the amount of the spouse's compensation included in income for the year or $2,000. I.R.C.
§ 219(b)(1) (1988). Thus, a spouse with compensation over $250 should forego the election
to obtain a larger deduction.
430. I.R.C. § 219(c) (1988).
431. I.R.C. § 219(c)(2)(A)(i) (1988). In no event, however, may a taxpayer deduct more
than $2,000 for contributions to any one I.R.A. I.R.C. § 219(c)(2)(A) (1988).
432. I.R.C. § 219(g) (1988). An "active participant" is an individual:
(A) who is an active participant in-
(i) a plan described in section 401(a) which includes a trust exempt from
tax under section 501(a),
(ii) an annuity plan described in section 403 (a),
(iii) a plan established for its employees by the United States, by a state or
political subdivision thereof, or by an agency or instrumentality of any of
the foregoing,
(iv) any annuity contract described in section 403(b), or
(v) a simplified employee pension (within the meaning of section 408(K), or
(B) who makes deductible contributions to a trust described in section 501(c)(18).
I.R.C. § 219(g)(5) (1988).
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the $2,250 limit for aggregate contributions to an individual's IRA and
a spousal IRA or the $2,000 limit for each spouse is reduced. The
otherwise deductible amounts under the spousal IRA provisions are
reduced by twenty-two and one-half cents on the dollar for each dollar
of the couple's adjusted gross income in excess of $40,000. 433 The
reduction is twenty cents on the dollar for each dollar of adjusted gross
income in excess of $40,000 in cases where one or both of the spouses
otherwise qualify for a $2,000 IRA deduction. 43 4
Thus, when one of the spouses is an active participant in a retirement
plan, and the couple's combined adjusted gross income is $45,000, each
spouse is entitled to deduct only $1,000, or a total of $2,000 on the
joint return, for IRA contributions. If the couple has $50,000 or more
of adjusted gross income, no deduction is allowable to either spouse
for contributions made to an IRA.
In the case of an unmarried individual who is an active participant
in a pension plan, the $2,000 maximum allowable deduction is reduced
by twenty cents per dollar for each dollar of adjusted gross income in
excess of $2 5, 0 0 0 .43S Thus, an unmarried individual with adjusted gross
income of $35,000 or more who actively participates in a pension plan
will not be entitled to deduct any amount contributed to an IRA. The
different dollar limitations of adjusted gross income that apply depending
on a taxpayer's marital status and the availability of a spousal IRA
deduction cause a marriage bonus for one-worker couples. The different
dollar limitations and the attribution of one spouse's participation in a
pension plan to the other spouse result in a marriage penalty to two-
worker couples.
In the case of a married individual filing a separate return, no
matter which spouse is an active participant in a pension plan, the
twenty-cent-per-dollar reduction applies to adjusted gross income in ex-
cess of zero.4 36 Under these rules, the maximum $2,000 deduction for
IRA contributions is eliminated when adjusted gross income on the
separate return exceeds $10,000.
433. I.R.C. § 219(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(B)(i) (1988). In no event is the deduction reduced below
zero. I.R.C. § 219(g)(1) (1988). The dollar limitation will not be reduced below $200 as
long as the couple's adjusted gross income is less than the amount at which the maximum
dollar limit is reduced to zero. I.R.C. § 219(g)(2)(b) (1988). For purposes of determining
the amount of the reduction, adjusted gross income is determined by including social security
benefits as required under I.R.C. § 86, allowing a deduction for passive activity losses as
permitted under I.R.C. § 469, adding interest excludable under I.R.C. § 135 when Series
EE bonds are redeemed to pay qualified higher, education expenses, and including income
earned abroad that is excludable under I.R.C. § 911. I.R.C. § 219(g)(3)(A) (1988 & Supp.
1991).
434. I.R.C. § 219(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(B)(i) (1988).
435. I.R.C. § 219(g)(2), (g)(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
436. I.R.C. § 219(g)(2), (g)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
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If the spouses live apart at all times during the taxable year, they
will be considered unmarried for purposes of applying the rules reducing
the deduction for active participants in pension plans.4 3 7 Thus, a spouse's
participation in a pension plan and the stricter rules for separate returns
apply to separated spouses only during the first year of separation. If
the spouses could obtain a legal separation, thereby qualifying as un-
married tduring the first year of separation, they might be entitled to
deduct larger amounts of their IRA contributions.4 38
c. Section 1041: Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss With
Respect to Interspousal Transfers
Under section 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code, a spouse rec-
ognizes neither gain nor loss on the transfer of property to another
spouse, regardless of whether or not the transferor spouse receives any
consideration.4 3 9 As a consequence of the nonrecognition of gain or loss
by the transferor, the transferee spouse takes the property with the same
basis as it had in the hands of the transferor, regardless of whether
the transferee paid for the property.440 These rules also apply to former
437. I.R.C. § 219(g)(4) (1988).
438. For purposes of determining whether a taxpayer is considered an active participant
in a pension plan merely because a spouse is an active participant, marital status is determined
as of the end of the year. Notice 87-16, 1987-1 C.B. 446, 447 (A4). Thus, if an individual
is not married at the end of the year, the fact that the individual's former spouse is an
active participant will not be considered in determining whether the individual is an active
participant. Id. There is no provision in I.R.C. § 219(g) or the regulations, however, indicating
whether individuals who are legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate main-
tenance are considered unmarried for purposes of the limitations that apply to active
participants in pension plans and to their spouses. The only statement concerning marital
status with respect to the limitations is that a husband and wife who file separate returns
and live apart at all times during the taxable year are considered unmarried. I.R.C. § 219(g)(4)
(1988). Arguably, unless the spouses live apart at all times during the taxable year, legally
separated spouses are considered married under these rules.
Spouses who are legally separated or divorced, however, are generally considered
unmarried for federal income tax purposes. Considering legally separated spouses as unmarried
does no violence to the policy behind the separate return provision. Congress's purpose in
enacting the limitation was to eliminate the incentive for married spouses living together to
file separate returns, thereby avoiding the limitations that applied to joint returns under
prior law. S. Rep. No. 100-445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1988), reprinted in 6
U.S.C.C.A.N. 46 49-50 (1988). If a couple is legally separated under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance, the couple is not entitled to file a joint return. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(2)
(1988). Thus, the potential abuse under prior law was not available to legally separated
spouses.
439. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988).
440. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988). "Basis" is a term of art used in the Internal Revenue
Code. The basis of property generally is its cost. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988). A taxpayer's cost
basis in property is adjusted, however, to take into account certain expenditures made by
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spouses if the transfer of property is incident to the divorce."' A transfer
is incident to the divorce if it occurs within one year of the cessation
of the marriage or if the transfer is "related to the cessation of the
marriage.'"'2 Regulations promulgated under section 1041 provide that
a transfer of property is related to the cessation of the marriage if it
is pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument and occurs not more
than six years after the date on which the marriage ceases." 3
Section 1041 is a double-edged sword, often benefitting one spouse
or former spouse to the detriment of the other. For example, a taxpayer
who purchases stock that is separate property for $1,000 has a $1,000
"cost" basis in the stock. 4" If the stock appreciates in value and the
taxpayer sells the stock to his or her spouse for $2,000, section 1041
relieves the taxpayer of any tax liability for the gain." 5 The spouse who
paid $2,000 for the stock, however, must take the stock with a basis
of $1,000."6 On a later sale of the stock for $2,000, the transferee
spouse must pay tax on the $1,000 gain." 7 Similarly, a spouse who
purchases stock with separate funds for $2,000 that declines in value
may not deduct the loss on its sale to a spouse for $1,000.4" The
transferee spouse takes a $2,000 basis in the stock," 9 and may recognize
a $1,000 loss on its later sale. 4 0
Whether the application of section 1041 will result in a tax savings
or an increased tax liability to the spouses depends on the circumstances
surrounding the transfer. For example, if the property has appreciated
the taxpayer and certain deductions taken by the taxpayer with respect to the property. For
example, the cost basis of property is increased by capital expenditures and decreased by
allowable depreciation deductions. For a list of the adjustments made to basis, see I.R.C.
§ 1016 (1988).
441. I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2) (1988). The rules do not apply, however, if the transferee is a
nonresident alien. I.R.C. § 1041(d) (1988).
442. I.R.C. § 1041(c) (1988).
443. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(b)(A-7), 49 Fed. Reg. 34453 (1984). For this purpose
a "divorce or separation instrument" means: (1) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance
or a written instrument incident to such a decree, (2) a separation agreement, (3) a decree
requiring a spouse to make support payments to the other spouse, or (4) any modification
thereof. Id. I.R.C. § 71(b)(2) (1988). The Regulations provide a rebuttable presumption that
any transfer not pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument or that occurs more than
six years after the cessation of the marriage is not related to the cessation of the marriage
and therefore does not qualify for nonrecognition treatment. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-
IT(b) (A-7), 49 Fed. Reg. 34453 (1984).
444. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988).
445. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988).
446. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988).
447. I.R.C. § 1001 (1988).
448. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988).
449. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988).
450. I.R.C. § 1001 (1988).
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in value and the transferee does not intend to sell1 1 the property or
take depreciation deductions 45 2 with respect to the property, application
of section 1041 benefits both of the spouses. The nonrecognition of loss
under section 1041 with respect to a transfer of property that has declined
in value results in an aggregate increase in tax liability when the transferee
spouse does not sell or depreciate the property.
Spouses can do nothing to avoid application of section 1041 to
transfers of property between them. 453 Former spouses, however, can
use section 1041 as a planning device with respect to transfers of property
that occur more than one year after the cessation of the marriage. By
providing for the transfer of the property in a divorce or separation
instrument, former spouses can assure that section 1041 will apply to
a transfer that occurs within six years of the cessation of the marriage.
Similarly, the former spouses can avoid application of section 1041 by
omitting a provision for the transfer in the divorce or separation in-
strument. The availability of a judgment of separation from bed and
board might help separated spouses in Louisiana take better advantage
of the rules in section 1041. 414
451. If the transferee holds the property until he or she dies, the basis of the property
in the hands of the transferee's heirs will be the fair market value of the property at the
time of the transferee's death. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1988). In that case, the appreciation in the
7 property will escape federal income taxation forever.
452. The transferee will desire to have a higher basis in depreciable property because
depreciation deductions are computed by reference to the taxpayer's basis in the property.
I.R.C. § 167(c) (1988).
453. I.R.C. § 1041 offers limited planning opportunities to married taxpayers. Spouses
who live under a separate property regime can use I.R.C. § 1041 to assign the gain or loss
on the sale of an asset to the spouse who would receive an advantage from the assignment.
For example, a spouse who incurs medical expenses can only deduct the expenses to the
extent that they exceed seven and one-half percent of the spouse's adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. § 213(a) (1988). To increase the amount of deductible medical expenses, a spouse
living under a separate property regime could reduce his or her adjusted gross income by
selling at a loss stock received from his or her spouse and reporting both the medical
expenses and the loss on a separate return. Of course, the amount of deductible loss on
the sale of the stock would be limited to that amount of the spouse's capital gains for the
year plus $1,500. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988).
454. Application of I.R.C. § 1041 to separated spouses, however, is not certain. There
is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code or in the Regulations defining the term
"spouse", "former spouse", or "cessation of the marriage" for purposes of section 1041.
In cases where there is no statutory or regulatory definition of marital status, courts have
relied on state law definitions. See, e.g., Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904, 913-14 (1976)
(interpreting California law to determine whether the parties were "husband and wife" for
purposes of former I.R.C. § 1239); Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 540
(1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining the term "surviving spouse" for purposes
of I.R.C. § 2056). But see Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir.
1976) (defining the term "surviving spouse" for purposes of I.R.C. § 2056 and explaining
that "[t]he meaning of the words or the legal status of circumstances for federal tax purposes
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d. Spousal Attribution
The Internal Revenue Code contains a number of provisions that
attribute one spouse's ownership interest in an entity to the other spouse.
need not be identical to their meaning or their legal effect under state law"). While it seems
that spouses who are legally separated are still married under state law, the Tax Court has
interpreted the former provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code authorizing a judgment of
separation from bed and board to effect a limited divorce that qualified as a "divorce"
for tax purposes. Garsaud v. Commisioner, 28 T.C. 1086 (1957). The application of this
interpretation, however, is uncertain with respect to transfers under I.R.C. § 1041. The
decision in Garsaud concerned the meaning of the statutory phrase, "legally separated under
a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance" that causes taxpayers to be considered
unmarried. I.R.C. § 1041 does not designate whether an individual who is legally separated
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance is considered unmarried.
The operative terms under I.R.C. § 1041 are "spouse," "former spouse," and "cessation
of the marriage". In Estate of Goldwater, 64 T.C. 540 (1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 878 (2d
Cir. 1976), both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit held that a New York spouse who
had obtained a final decree of separation was a "surviving spouse" within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 2056. The decisions in Goldwater, however, do not require a similar interpretation
with respect to the meaning of the term "spouse" for purposes of I.R.C. § 1041. Neither
court in Goldwater addressed the issue of whether a legally separated spouse is considered
a "spouse" under federal income tax law.
The issue in Goldwater concerned the effect of an ex parte Mexican decree of divorce
later declared null by a state court with jurisdiction over all of the parties. In Goldwater,
Gertrude Goldwater obtained a final decree of separation from Leo Goldwater. Leo then
obtained an ex parte decree of divorce in Mexico and married Lee Jablow. When Leo died,
he bequeathed to Lee an interest in property equal to or greater than 50 percent of his
gross estate. Gertrude sued as a widow for her elective share of Leo's estate and was
awarded approximately $206,000. The question in Goldwater was whether the estate could
deduct the $395,000 bequeathed to Lee or the $206,000 inherited by Gertrude as an amount
left to a "surviving spouse" under I.R.C. § 2056. Both the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit deferred to a judgment issued by the New York Supreme Court declaring that
Gertrude was the lawful wife of the decedent for purposes of the New York estate tax law.
Estate of Goldwater, 64 T.C. at 550; 539 F.2d at 880.
Goldwater involved the construction of a federal estate tax provision. Section 1041
concerns matters of federal income taxation. Income tax provisions are not always construed
as though they are in pari materia with the estate tax law. See, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1947). In Goldwater, both the Tax Court and
the Second Circuit distinguished their holding from caselaw defining marital status for
purposes of the income tax provisions. Goldwater, 64 T.C. at 548-51; 539 F.2d at 881-82.
Thus, the determination in Goldwater that a legally separated spouse qualified as a surviving
spouse under the estate tax provisions should not constitute binding precedent with respect
to the definition of the term "spouse" for purposes of I.R.C. § 1041.
Regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 1041 seem to equate legal separation with
divorce and the cessation of the marriage. Question 2 in the Regulations asks, "Does section
1041 apply only to transfers of property incident to divorce?" Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-
IT(a)(Q-2) (1984). The response is: "No. Section 1041 is not limited to transfers of property
incident to divorce .... A divorce or legal separation need not be contemplated between
the spouses at the time of the transfer nor must a divorce or legal separation ever occur."
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The spousal attribution rules sometimes reduce taxable income. More
often, however, spousal attribution increases the couple's taxable income.
Section 318 treats a taxpayer as the constructive owner of any shares
of stock owned by the taxpayer's spouse, whether the stock is community
property or separate property .4  If a taxpayer's spouse is the constructive
owner of stock because of the spouse's interest in a partnership 5 6 trust,4 "
estate45s or corporation 5 9 that owns the stock, or because the spouse
Id. at (A-2).
The Regulations also provide that transfers of property between former spouses that
occur within six years of the cessation of the marriage pursuant to a divorce or separation
instrument are governed by section 1041. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(b)(A-7) (1984). The
reference to a "separation instrument" in conjunction with the term "cessation of the
marriage" could indicate that for purposes of section 1041 the marriage ceases upon the
entry of a judgment of separation from bed and board. This construction, however, is not
dictated by the Regulations. The Regulations could be contemplating a case in which a
spouse enters into a separation agreement, then obtains a decree of divorce, and then
transfers property to the other spouse pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement.
Until there is a more definite statement by Congress, by the Treasury Department, or by
a court, however, the status of legally separated taxpayers under section 1041 remains
doubtful. Consequently, the value of reenactment of the provisions authorizing a judgment
of separation from bed and board in Louisiana is uncertain in cases involving I.R.C. § 1041
transfers.
455. I.R.C. § 318(a)(l)(A)(i) (1988). I.R.C. § 318 is not limited to requiring spousal
attribution. The section attributes stock among related parties, including trusts, estates,
partnerships, corporations, and family members. For an explanation of~the intricate stock
attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318, see Borris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 1 9.03 (5th ed. 1987).
456. Stock owned directly or indirectly by a partnership is considered as owned pro-
portionately by its partners. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (1988). A partnership is considered the
constructive owner of all of the stock owned by its partners. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A) (1988).
Stock constructively owned by a partnership by virtue of its ownership by a partner, however,
is not reattributed to the other partners. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C) (1988).
457. Stock owned directly or indirectly by a trust (other than certain employees' trusts)
generally is considered as owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to the actuarial interest
of the beneficiaries in the trust. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988). If the trust is a grantor
trust, stock owned by the trust is considered owned by the grantor. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(1988). A trust generally is considered the owner of stock owned, directly or indirectly, by
its beneficiaries except for a beneficiary whose interest in the trust is a remote contingent
interest. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B)(i) (1988). Stock owned by the grantor of a grantor trust is
considered as owned by the trust. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1988). Stock that is constructively
owned by a trust because of its ownership by a beneficiary or a grantor is not reattributed
to the other beneficiaries or to the grantor of the trust. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C) (1988).
458. Stock owned directly or indirectly by art estate is attributed proportionately to its
beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (1988). Stock constructively owned by an estate because
the stock is owned by a beneficiary is not reattributed to other beneficiaries. I.R.C.
§ 318(a)(3)(A), (a)(5)(C) (1988).
459. If fifty percent or more of the stock of a corporation is owned directly or indirectly
by or for any person, the person is considered the owner of stock owned by the corporation
in proportion to the person's interest in the value of the stock of a corporation. I.R.C.
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has an option to purchase the stock,"0 the taxpayer is also considered
to be an owner of the stock.4' Spousal attribution does not apply under
section 318, however, if the spouses are legally separated under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance. 4" 2 Thus, the availability of legal
separation in Louisiana could help separated spouses avoid attribution
under section 318.
The attribution rules of section 318 apply to determine the tax
consequences of transactions governed by other sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.463 For example, spousal attribution can cause a redemp-
tion of a shareholder's stock to be taxed as a dividend. A distribution
by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock generally is
taxed as a dividend resulting in ordinary income to the shareholder to
the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. 4 6 A distribution in
redemption of a shareholder's stock, however, is treated as a sale or
exchange of the stock,461 resulting in capital gain or loss 46 to the share-
holder, computed by subtracting the shareholder's basis in the redeemed
stock from the amount of the distribution."67 A distribution to a share-
holder that qualifies as a redemption generally results in a smaller tax
§ 318(a)(2)(C) (1988). A corporation is considered the owner of all stock owned by persons
who own fifty percent or more of the value of its stock. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C) (1988). Stock
constructively owned by a corporation because of its ownership by a fifty percent shareholder
is not reattributed to another fifty percent shareholder. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C) (1988).
460. A person who has an option to purchase stock is considered the owner of the
stock. I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) (1988).
461. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988). A spouse is not considered the owner of stock
constructively owned by a spouse by virtue of its ownership by one of the spouse's family
members. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(B) (1988).
462. I.R.C. § 318(a)(l)(A)(i) (1988).
463. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 302 (redemption of stock); 304 (redemption of stock by related
corporations); 306 (dispositions of section 306 stock); 338(h)(3) (definition of "purchase");
382(l)(3) (limitations on net operating loss carryovers); 856(d) (definition of rents from real
property in the case of real estate investment trusts); 958(b) (controlled foreign corporations);
6038(d) (information with respect to certain foreign corporations).
464. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1988). For a discussion of the taxation of such corporate
distributions, see Bittker & Eustice, supra note 455, at 11 7.01-7.44. Different rules apply
if the distribution is made by an S corporation. A discussion of the rules concerning
distributions from an S corporation is beyond the scope of this article. For such a discussion,
see James S. Eustice & Joel D. Kuntz, Federal Income Taxation of S Corporations 11 9.01-
9.08 (2d ed. 1985); Irving M. Grant & William R. Christian, Subchapter S Taxation §§ 22-
27 (3d ed. 1991).
465. I.R.C. § 302(a) (1988).
466. Stock generally falls under the definition of a capital asset. I.R.C. § 1221 (1988).
The gain or loss on the sale or exchange of a capital asset is capital gain or loss. I.R.C.
§ 1222 (1988).
467. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
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liability than if the distribution is considered a dividend. 46 Any capital
gain that results from the redemption could be used to offset the
shareholder's capital losses from other transactions, thereby reducing the
amount of capital losses subject to the $3,000 or $1,500 limitation.469
If the shareholder held the redeemed stock for more than one year, any
capital gain in excess of the taxpayer's capital losses could qualify for
the lower tax rate that applies to net capital gain.4 70 The most significant
tax savings achieved by characterization of the distribution as a re-
demption, however, generally result because the shareholder is able to
use the basis of the redeemed stock to offset the amount of the re-
demption, reducing the gain to be included in income or increasing the
taxpayer's recognizable loss.47k
A redemption does not always qualify for taxation as a sale or
exchange of the stock. A redemption that is not made in partial liqui-
dation of the corporation is taxed as a dividend to the extent of the
corporation's earnings and profits unless the redemption (1) is not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend, (2) is substantially disproportionate,
or (3) results in a complete termination of the shareholder's entire stock
interest in the corporation. 472 The redemption generally satisfies these
tests if the shareholder's proportionate ownership interest in the cor-
poration after the redemption is sufficiently reduced as compared to the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation before the re-
demption.473
The redemption rules draw a distinction between a redemption that
should be taxed as a dividend because it enables a shareholder to
withdraw cash or property from the corporation while leaving the share-
holder's proportionate interest intact, and a redemption that resembles
a sale of the shareholder's stock because it results in a meaningful
reduction in the shareholder's interest in the corporation. 474 The attri-
bution rules of section 318 apply to determine whether the redemption
in fact has meaningfully reduced the shareholder's interest in the cor-
468. A corporate shareholder, however, can achieve greater tax savings on the receipt
of a dividend if the corporate shareholder qualifies for a dividend received deduction under
I.R.C. §§ 243-245 (1988).
469. For a discussion of the rules limiting the deductibility of an individual taxpayer's
capital losses, see supra notes 413-419 and accompanying text.
470. The maximum tax rate that applies to an individual's net capital gain is twenty-
eight percent. I.R.C. § 1(h) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The maximum tax rate that applies to
an individual's ordinary income is thirty-one percent. I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
471. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
472. I.R.C. § 302(b), (d) (1988).
473. For a discussion of the various tests and the amount of reduction in proportionate
ownership required under each of the tests, see Bittker & Eustice, supra note 455, at 9.04-
9.06.
474. Stephen A. Lind et al, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation 195 (3d ed. 1991).
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poration. 471 A shareholder can avoid spousal attribution only if (1) the
redemption is a complete redemption of all of the shareholder's stock
in the corporation, (2) immediately after the redemption, the former
shareholder has no interest in the corporation (including an interest as
officer, director or employee), other than an interest as a creditor, and
(3) the former shareholder does not acquire any interest in the corpo-
ration (other than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) for ten
years after the redemption.476
When a redemption does not completely terminate a shareholder's
interest in the corporation or the shareholder retains a tainted interest
in the corporation, spousal attribution can increase the shareholder's tax
burden. For example, to qualify for sale or exchange treatment under
the substantially disproportionate rule, (1) the shareholder must own,
immediately after the redemption, less than 50 percent of the voting
stock of the corporation, and (2) the shareholder's proportionate share
of the voting stock of the corporation after the redemption must be
less than 80 percent of the shareholder's proportionate share of voting
stock before the redemption.477 If the shareholder owns 50 shares of a
corporation's voting stock, the shareholder's spouse owns 25 shares, and
an unrelated party owns the remaining 25 shares, a redemption of 20
shares of the shareholder's stock will fail the substantially dispropor-
tionate test and therefore be taxed as a dividend. Because of spousal
attribution, the shareholder is considered as owning 75 of the outstanding
100 shares, or 75 percent of the voting stock, before the redemption
and 55 of the outstanding 80 shares, or 68.75 percent of the voting
stock, after the redemption, thereby failing the requirement that the
shareholder own less than 50 percent of the voting stock after the
redemption. 47
475. I.R.C. § 302 (c)(1) (1988).
476. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), (c)(2) (1988). The redeemed shareholder must also file an agree-
ment with the Service to notify the Service of any prohibited acquisition and to retain
proper records. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1988). If the redeemed shareholder acquires a
prohibited interest in the corporation, the statute of limitations for assessment and collection
of any deficiency in tax resulting from the prohibited acquisition is extended to include one
year following the date that the redeemed shareholder notifies the Service. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)
(1988). The redeemed shareholder may not disregard spousal attribution if any of the redeemed
stock was acquired (directly or indirectly) from the spouse within the ten-year period preceding
the distribution or if the spouse of the former shareholder acquired any stock in the redeeming
corporation from the former shareholder within the same prior ten-year period. I.R.C.
§ 302(c)(2)(B) (1988). The same rules apply for purposes of disregarding attribution of stock
from any family member. I.R.C. §§ 302(c), 318(a) (1988).
477. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1988).
478. The retention of more than fifty percent of the voting stock will cause the shareholder
to fail the essentially-equivalent-to-a-dividend and the complete-termination-of-interest tests
as well. For a discussion of these tests, see Bittker & Eustice, supra note 455, at 11 9.05-
9.06.
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Spousal attribution applies to separated spouses, no matter how long
they have been separated, unless the spouses are legally separated under
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. 479 If the shareholder in the
example were able to obtain a judgment of separation from bed and
board, the redemption would qualify for sale or exchange treatment.
Without spousal attribution, the shareholder owns 50 of the 100 out-
standing shares, or 50 percent of the voting stock before the redemption.
After the redemption, the .shareholder owns 30 of the 80 outstanding
shares, or 37.5 percent of the voting stock. The reduction in propor-
tionate stock ownership satisfies both prongs of the substantially dis-
proportionate test. After the redemption the shareholder's ownership
interest is less than 50 percent of the voting stock of the corporation,
and the shareholder's interest, 37.5 percent, is less than 80 percent of
the shareholder's prior 50 percent interest.
Spousal attribution under section 318 can also trigger rules requiring
a sale of stock to a related corporation to be taxed as a dividend
4
1
0
and causing a sale of section 306 stock to be taxed as a dividend even
if the sale terminates the shareholder's entire interest in the corporation .4 8
479. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.318-1(a) (as amended in 1968).
480. I.R.C. § 304 (1988). The rules of I.R.C. § 304 prevent a shareholder from circum-
venting the tests in I.R.C. § 302 which determine whether a redemption is taxed as a sale
or exchange or as a dividend. Absent some provision, a shareholder could sell stock in one
corporation that the shareholder controls to another controlled corporation, thereby bailing
out corporate earnings at capital gains rates while effectively retaining control of both
corporations. After the sale the shareholder would continue to control the corporation whose
stock was sold by virtue of the shareholder's control of the purchasing corporation. I.R.C.
§ 304 provides that the tests for dividend equivalency under the redemption rules apply to
determine whether the sale of stock in one controlled corporation to another controlled
corporation qualifies for taxation as a sale or exchange. I.R.C. § 304(a) (1988). The attribution
rules of I.R.C. § 318 apply to determine whether a shareholder has "control", i.e., owns
fifty percent or more of the stock by vote or by value, of each corporation before the
sale, and if so, whether the sale results in a significant reduction in the shareholder's
proportional interest in the corporation whose stock was sold. I.R.C. § 304(b), (c) (1988).
481. I.R.C. § 306(b) (1988). "Section 306 stock" generally is preferred stock that was
received by a shareholder tax-free. I.R.C. § 306(c) (1988). The proceeds of a sale or
redemption of section 306 stock often are taxed as a dividend. I.R.C. § 306(a) (1988). In
enacting I.R.C. § 306, Congress intended to prevent shareholders from avoiding dividend
treatment on distributions of corporate earnings by selling or redeeming preferred stock that
was received in a tax-free stock dividend or in a tax-free reorganization. Before Congress
enacted I.R.C. § 306, ,a shareholder could bail out corporate earnings at capital gains rates
and reduce the amount includible in income by causing the corporation to make a tax-free
stock dividend of preferred stock. The shareholder then could sell the preferred stock,
subtract the basis of the stock from the amount realized, and receive the preferential tax
treatment for capital gains realized on the sale. In selling the preferred stock, the shareholder
retained control of the corporation by continuing to hold the common stock. Later the
corporation could redeem the preferred stock from the purchaser. The purchaser would
recognize .little or no, gain on the redemption because the purchaser's basis in the stock is
its cost. The result of such a transaction is economically equivalent to a dividend. The
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Stock attributed to a spouse under section 318 can cause the spouse to
be a United States shareholder and therefore unable to defer taxation
on certain income earned by a controlled foreign corporation.4 2 A
taxpayer who is separated from his or her spouse may avoid the adverse
effects caused by spousal attribution only by obtaining a legal separation
from the spouse. 4s3 The enactment of provisions authorizing a judgment
of separation from bed and board could help separated spouses in
Louisiana avoid the burdens resulting from spousal attribution under
section 318.
Section 267 of the Internal Revenue Code provides attribution rules
similar to the attribution rules of section 318. Among the related parties
shareholder indirectly received corporate earnings while retaining the same proportional control
of the corporation. In Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 918, 74 S. Ct. 516 (1954), the Sixth Circuit held that the sale of such
preferred stock was to be treated as a sale for tax purposes, entitling the shareholder to
capital gains treatment. Congress overruled Chamberlin by enacting I.R.C. § 306. Under
I.R.C. § 306, the proceeds of a sale of section 306 stock are ordinary income to the extent
that they would have been taxed as a dividend at the time the stock was issued. I.R.C.
§ 306(a)(1) (1988). A redemption of section 306 stock results in ordinary income to the
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits at the time of the redemption. I.R.C.
§ 306(a)(2) (1988). The potential for abuse does not exist, however, if a sale of the preferred
stock terminates the shareholder's entire interest in the corporation; in such a case the
shareholder loses control of the corporation. Therefore, when a shareholder's sale of section
306 stock terminates the shareholder's entire interest in the corporation, the transaction
generally is respected as a sale. I.R.C. § 306(b)(l)(A) (1988). If the sale is to a related
person, however, the shareholder effectively could retain control of the corporation through
the related party while bailing out corporate earnings at capital gains rates. Therefore, a
sale of section 306 stock to a related entity generally is taxed as a dividend. I.R.C.
§ 306(b)(l)(A)(ii) (1988). Spousal attribution under I.R.C. § 318 applies in determining whether
a shareholder owns an interest in the purchasing entity. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1988). For a
discussion of I.R.C. § 306, see Bittker & Eustice, supra note 455, at 1110.01-10.07.
482. I.R.C. §§ 951, 958(b) (1988). A "United States shareholder" is a United States
person who owns directly or indirectly ten percent or more of the voting stock of a foreign
corporation. I.R.C. § 9f1(b) (1988). The attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 apply in determining
how much stock is owned. I.R.C. § 958(b) (1988). A controlled foreign corporation is any
foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of its stock by vote or by value is owned
by United States shareholders on any day of its taxable year. I.R.C. § 957(a) (1988). A
United States shareholder must include in income the shareholder's pro rata share of the
controlled foreign corporation's subpart F income as it is earned, rather than deferring
taxation until the income is distributed. I.R.C. § 951 (1988). A United States shareholder
also must include in income a pro rata share of the controlled foreign corporation's previously
untaxed earnings that are invested in United States property. Id. Subpart F income generally
consists of the type of income on which United States taxpayers could, absent some provision,
defer taxation by using tax haven operations. A discussion of subpart F income is beyond
the scope of this article. For such a discussion, see I Joel D. Kuntz & Robert J. Peroni,
U.S. International Taxation B3.04 (1992). Spousal attribution under I.R.C. § 318 also can
subject a taxpayer to the information reporting requirements of I.R.C. § 6038 that apply
to a United States person who owns more than fifty percent of the voting stock or more
than fifty percent of the value of the stock of a foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 6038(e)(1)
(1988).
483. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1988).
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listed in section 267(b) whose interests in an entity are attributed to a
taxpayer are family memberss4 4 which, of course, include the taxpayer's
spouse. 485 Spousal attribution under section 267 may cause the disallow-
ance of loss on a sale of property to a corporation 486 or to a partnership48 7
if the taxpayer is considered as owning more than fifty percent of the
equity interest in the corporation 48 or the partnership.4 9 When a spouse's
ownership interest is attributed to a taxpayer under section 267, the
taxpayer may have to recognize ordinary income, rather than capital
gain, on the sale of property to a related corporation, partnership, or
trust if the property is depreciable in the hands of the transferee. 49 In
the case of a sale to a partnership, spousal attribution may cause the
gain to be ordinary if the asset is not a capital asset in the hands of
the partnership.4 91 Attribution under section 267 also may require a seller
of all the substantial rights to a patent to recognize ordinary income
rather than capital gain 492 and may prevent a taxpayer from claiming a
current deduction of reasonably estimated losses on deposits in bankrupt
or insolvent financial institutions'. 493 Section 267 attribution may impose
an indirect tax burden on a taxpayer by disallowing losses on the sale
of property from a related entity to the taxpayer, 49 deferring deductions
for expenses otherwise accrued by a related entity,495 and requiring a
related entity to recognize ordinary income, rather than capital gain, on
484. I.R.C. § 267(b)(1) (1988).
485. I.R.C. § 267(c)(4) (1988).
486. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) (1988).
487. I.R.C. § 707 (1988).
488. The loss is disallowed if the taxpayer owns, directly or through attribution, more
than fifty percent of the value of the stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2) (1988).
489. The loss is disallowed if the seller owns, directly or through attribution, more than
fifty percent of the capital interest or profits interest in the partnership. I.R.C. § 707(b)(l)(A)
(1988).
490. I.R.C. § 1239 (1988). The gain on the sale is ordinary income if the sale is to a
trust in which the taxpayer or his spouse is a beneficiary or if the sale is to a corporation
or partnership in which the taxpayer owns, directly or through attribution, a greater than
fifty percent interest. I.R.C. § 1239(b)(2), (c)(1)(A), (B) (1988).
491. I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) (1988).
492. I.R.C. § 1235 (1988).
493. I.R.C. § 165(l)(2)(D) (1988). A taxpayer is not entitled to a current deduction of
such estimated losses unless the taxpayer is a "qualified individual". I.R.C. § 165(l)(1)(A)
(1988). The term "qualified individual" is defined to include any individual except one who
owns at least one percent of the value of the outstanding stock of the bankrupt or insolvent
financial institution, who is an officer of the institution, or who is related to a person who
owns at least one percent of the stock or is an officer of the financial institution. I.R.C.
§ 165(l)(2) (1988). The rules of I.R.C. § 267 apply for purposes of determining whether a
person owning a prohibited interest in or participating as an officer of the financial institution
is related to the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 165(l)(2)(D) (1988). For a discussion of I.R.C. § 165(1),
see supra, notes 275-284 and accompanying text.
494. I.R.C. §§ 267(a)(1), 707(b)(1) (1988).
495. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (1988).
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the sale of an asset to the taxpayer. 496 Several other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code provide spousal attribution rules that can increase
the tax burden of the attributee. 497 In such cases, a provision authorizing
legal separation in Louisiana could help separated spouses avoid adverse
tax consequences that result from spousal attribution.49s
496. I.R.C. §§ 707(b)(2), 1239(a) (1988).
497. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 341 (taxing as ordinary income gain recognized on the sale or
exchange of stock or the liquidation or partial liquidation of a collapsible corporation);
§§ 542-544 (imposing an additional twenty-eight percent tax on undistributed income of a
personal holding company); §§ 671-679 (attributing income of a trust to the grantor rather
than to the beneficiaries of the trust); § 1014(e) (denying a step-up in basis of property
acquired from a decedent by an individual or the individual's spouse if the individual gave
the property to the decedent within one year of the decedent's death); § 1092 (disallowing
losses in certain straddle transactions); § 1233 (providing for short-term rather than long-
term capital gain on short sales of property); § 1272 (imputing original issue discount income
with respect to certain loans); §§ 1561-1563 (limiting a taxpayer's ability to avoid taxation
by incorporating multiple corporations); § 7872 (imputing interest on certain loans).
498. It is not certain whether a legal separation will cause a taxpayer to be considered
unmarried for purposes of attribution under I.R.C. § 267. Nothing in the Internal Revenue
Code or the Regulations defines the term "spouse" or determines marital status for purposes
of I.R.C. § 267. For a discussion of the uncertainty that results when there is no statutory
or administrative definition of marital status for purposes of a federal income tax provision,
see supra note 454. Unless and until a court determines whether an individual who is legally
separated retains his or her status as a "spouse" for purposes of I.R.C. § 267, the individual's
status for that purpose remains in doubt. Some of the other sections of the Internal Revenue
Code provide that spousal attribution will not apply to legally separated spouses. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(l)(A)(i) (no spousal attribution if the taxpayer is legally separated from his
or her spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance); 672(e)(2) (individual
who is legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance is not married
for purposes of the grantor trust rules); 1233(e)(2)(C) (individual who is legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance is not considered a spouse for purposes
of the short sale rules). Regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 1239 contain a rule providing
for the retroactive nonapplication of I.R.C. § 1239 when property is transferred between a
husband and wife pursuant to an interlocutory decree of divorce which subsequently becomes
final. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1986). The rule in the regulation is curious
because I.R.C. § 1041, which governs transfers between spouses provides that a taxpayer
will not recognize gain at all when property is transferred to a spouse or a former spouse
if the transfer is incident to the divorce. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988). The rule could be a vestige
from regulations promulgated under former I.R.C. § 1239 which did apply to transfers
between spouses. I.R.C. § 1239(b)(1) (repealed 1984). The regulations also provide that in
general the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318(a) apply in determining whether a transferor
or transferee is a related party for purposes of I.R.C. § 1239. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1(c)(5)
(as amended in 1986). Under I.R.C. § 318 stock owned by one spouse is not attributed to
the other spouse if the spouses are legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988). I.R.C. § 1239, however, states that constructive
ownership for purposes of section 1239 "shall be determined in accordance with rules similar
to the rules under section 267(c) (other than paragraph (3) thereof)." I.R.C. § 1239(c)(2)
(1988). I.R.C. § 267 is silent with respect to any definition of marital status. The application
of I.R.C. § 318 attribution could be a reference to former I.R.C. § 1239 which did apply
such rules to determine constructive ownership. I.R.C. § 1239(c)(2) (repealed 1986).
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Occasionally, spousal attribution can result in tax savings. For ex-
ample, section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code treats a husband and
a wife as one person for purposes of counting the number of shareholders
who own stock in an S corporation.4 9 A corporation cannot elect to
be an S corporation if it has more than thirty-five shareholders.5°° If
the number of an S corporation's shareholders increases to more than
thirty-five, the corporation's subchapter S election terminates. °50  Thus,
a divorce could trigger the termination of a subchapter S election where
a husband and wife each own stock in a corporation with thirty-four
other shareholders.
Ineligibility to make a subchapter S election or termination of an
existing subchapter S election can be expensive to the shareholders. The
income of most nonelecting corporations is taxed twice: once as it is
earned by the corporation, 50 2 and a second time when it is distributed
to the shareholders. a0 Even if corporate earnings are not distributed,
the tax burden on the earnings can be heavier if the corporation does
not have a subchapter S election in effect because a nonelecting cor-
poration generally pays tax at a higher rate than the tax rates that apply
to the income of individuals . 4 When the corporation has a subchapter
S election in effect, the corporation's income generally is taxed once at
the rate that applies to the individual shareholders. 50 1
Regulations promulgated under subchapter S provide that a husband
and wife will not be treated as one person upon the dissolution of the
marriage for any reason other than death. 5°6 Neither the Internal Revenue
Code nor the Regulations define the terms "husband," "wife," or
"dissolution of the marriage" for purposes of counting the number of
shareholders in an S corporation. If a legal separation constitutes a
dissolution of the marriage under subchapter S, separated spouses may
wish to avoid a legal separation to prevent a termination of a subchapter
S election.1°7 The availability of a legal separation in Louisiana will not
499. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1) (1988).
500. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (1988).
501. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2), (b)(1)(A) (1988).
502. I.R.C. § 11 (1988).
503. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1988).
504. The highest tax rate on corporate income is thirty-four percent. I.R.C. § 11(b)
(1988). The highest rate on an individual's income is thirty-one percent. I.R.C. § l(a)-(e)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
505. I.R.C. § 1366 (1988).
.506. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1A(e)(2), 51 -Fed. Reg. 35662 (1986).
507. Spousal attribution under I.R.C. § 1034 also may result in tax savings to spouses.
I.R.C. § 1034 generally provides for nonrecognition of gain on the sale of a taxpayer's
principal residence if the taxpayer invests the proceeds of the sale in a new principal residence
within a period beginning two years before the date of the sale and ending two years after
the sale date. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (1988). As a consequence of the nonrecognition of gain, the
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necessarily terminate a subchapter S election. Separated spouses can
prevent termination by not filing a petition for a judgment of separation
from bed and board.
D. Marital Status as a Determining Factor With Respect to Tax
Credits
A number of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code authorize
credits against tax. 08 To the extent that a taxpayer can take advantage
of a tax credit, the amount of tax that must be paid will be less than
the computed tax liability. A tax credit generally is more advantageous
to a taxpayer than a deduction because a credit reduces the tax liability
dollar-for-dollar, whereas a deduction reduces taxable income, resulting
in a smaller reduction in tax liability.1s 9 The fact of marriage can reduce
the amount of, or even eliminate the availability of, a tax credit that
the taxpayer otherwise would be entitled to claim.
1. The Child Care Credit
The limitations on the child care credit impose significant marriage
penalties. Section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code permits an individual
taxpayer to claim a tax credit for household and dependent care services
incurred to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed. To be eligible
to claim the credit, the taxpayer must have a dependent who is under
the age of thirteen or who is physically or mentally incapable of caring
for himself or herself.510
The maximum amount that a taxpayer may claim as a child care
credit for the taxable year is thirty percent of $2,400, (i.e., a maximum
credit of $720) of dependent care expenses if the taxpayer has one
qualifying dependent."' A taxpayer with two or more qualifying de-
pendents may credit up to thirty percent of $4,800, or $1,440, of
taxpayer's adjusted basis in the new principal residence is reduced by the gain not recognized.
I.R.C. § 1034(e) (1988). If a husband and wife agree to share equally in the reduced basis
of the new residence, a sale of a residence owned by one or both spouses will qualify for
nonrecognition whether the new residence is purchased by the other or both of the spouses.
I.R.C. § 1034(g) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(f) (as amended in 1979). This rule is of no
use to separated spouses, however. To qualify for nonrecognition, the spouses must both
use the new residence as their principal residence. I.R.C. § 1034(g) (1988); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1034-1(f)(1) (1988).
508. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21-44 (1988).
509. James J. Freeland et al, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 982 (7th ed.
1991).
510. I.R.C. § 21(b)(1)(A), (B) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The taxpayer's spouse will satisfy
the requirement that the taxpayer have a dependent if the spouse is physically or mentally
incapable of taking care of himself or herself. I.R.C. § 21(b)(1)(C) (1988).
511. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2), (c)(l) (1988).
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dependent care expenses incurred during the taxable year." 2 The per-
centage of expenses that a taxpayer may claim as a child care credit is
reduced (but not below twenty percent) by one percentage point for
each $2,000 (or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income for the year exceeds $10,000.'1 Thus, a taxpayer with adjusted
gross income in excess of $30,000 is entitled to claim a maximum credit
of $480 if the taxpayer has one qualifying dependent and $960 if the
taxpayer has two or more such dependents. 1 4
The maximum amount of dependent care expenses that can be taken
into account also cannot exceed the individual's earned income for the
year.5"5 For a married individual, the limitation is the lesser of the
individual's earned income or the earned income of the individual's
spouse.1 6 A married taxpayer is not eligible to claim the credit unless
the taxpayer and his or her spouse file a joint return . 7 For purposes
of section 21, an individual is considered not married if the individual
is legally separated from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance5"' or if the abandoned spouse rule applies.53 9
Under these rules a separated spouse in Louisiana must file a joint
return to be eligible to claim the child care credit unless the abandoned
512. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2), (c)(2) (1988).
513. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (1988).
514. The $2,400 and $4,800 limitations are reduced, no matter how much adjusted gross
income the taxpayer has, by amounts that are excludable from income under I.R.C. § 129
because they are employer-provided dependent care expenses. I.R.C. § 21(c) (1988). For a
discussion of the exclusion under I.R.C. § 129, see supra notes 319-25 and accompanying
text.
515. I.R.C. § 21(d)(l)(A) (1988).
516. I.R.C. § 21(d)(l)(B) (1988). There is an exception to this rule if the individual's
spouse is a full-time student or is incapable of taking care of himself or herself. In that
case, the spouse will be deemed to have income each month that the spouse is a full-time
student or unable to care for himself or herself of $200 per month if the taxpayer has one
qualifying dependent and $400 per month if the taxpayer has two or more qualifying
dependents. I.R.C. § 21(d)(2) (1988).
517. I.R.C. § 21(e)(2) (1988).
518. I.R.C. § 21(e)(3) (1988).
519. I.R.C. § 21(e)(4) (1988). The abandoned spouse rule under I.R.C. § 21 differs in
one respect from the abandoned spouse rule under I.R.C. § 7703(b). To be considered
unmarried under the I.R.C. § 7703(b) abandoned spouse rule, the taxpayer, inter alia, must
maintain as his home a household which constitutes the principal place of abode of a
dependent child (or a child who would be a dependent except for an agreement to permit
the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption deduction for the child). Under I.R.C.
§ 21(e)(4)(A)(i), the child for whom the taxpayer provides an abode must be a "qualifying
individual," i.e., a dependent child who is under the age of thirteen or physically or mentally
incapable of taking care of himself or herself. The noncustodial parent is not entitled to
claim the child care credit. I.R.C. § 21(e)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The custodial parent,
however, may claim the credit even if the custodial parent has signed an agreement permitting
the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption deduction with respect to the qualifying
child. Id.
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spouse rule applies. If the community is still in existence, the abandoned
spouse rule will not apply because the taxpayer will not be able to meet
the requirement that the taxpayer furnish over one-half of the household
expenses for the year. 20 Even spouses who have partitioned the com-
munity must file a joint return to claim the credit for the first year of
their separation unless they were separated during the last six months
of the taxable year. 2' If the spouses could obtain a judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board, they could avoid the joint return require-
ment. 5
22
The joint return requirement is problematic. Separated spouses may
not be able to cooperate well enough to file a joint return. Spouses
who file a joint return could lose part of the credit if combined adjusted
gross income on the return exceeds $10,000. If the noncustodial spouse
does not work, the child care credit will not be available to the joint
filers because of the earned income limitation. 23 The enactment of
provisions authorizing legal separation in Louisiana could help separated
spouses obtain greater tax savings with respect to the child care credit.
2. The Credit for the Elderly and Totally Disabled
Section 22 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a tax credit to a
low-income individual taxpayer who is over the age of sixty-five or who
is retired because of a permanent and total disability5 u' (the "credit for
the elderly and totally disabled"). The amount of the credit often is
reduced for a married taxpayer. The maximum amount of the credit is
fifteen percent of the taxpayer's "section 22 amount," which consists
of an initial amount, reduced by certain factors. 25
The initial amount is $5,000 in the case of a single individual or
a joint return where only one spouse qualifies for the credit.526 In the
case of a joint return, the initial amount is $7,500 if both spouses
qualify for the credit. 27 A qualifying spouse who files a separate return
has an initial amount of $3,750.28 Thus, the maximum credit for an
520. I.R.C. § 21(e)(4)(A)(ii) (1988). For a discussion of the impossibility of meeting the
requirement that the taxpayer furnish over one-half of household costs during the existence
of the community, see supra notes 192, 248 and accompanying text.
521. I.R.C. § 21(e)(4)(B) (1988).
522. Under I.R.C. § 21(e)(3) (1988), the spouses who are legally separated under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance are considered unmarried for purposes of claiming
the child care credit.
523. I.R.C. § 21(d) (1988).
524. For a discussion of the credit for the elderly and the permanently and totally
disabled, see 2 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 37.2.
525. I.R.C. § 22(a), (c) (1988).
526. I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
527. I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
528. I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1988).
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unmarried taxpayer or a joint return where only one spouse qualifies
is $750. On a joint return, spouses may claim a maximum credit of
$1,125 if they both qualify. A married taxpayer who files a separate
return may claim a maximum credit of $562.50 The marriage penalty
resulting from the statutory limitations is obvious. Separated spouses
who are 'considered unmarried and qualify for the credit may claim a
maximum of $1,500 in the aggregate; if they are considered married,
the maximum credit is $1,125.
The maximum credit often is unavailable to taxpayers because of
factors that reduce the initial amount. The initial amount for a disabled
taxpayer who is under the age of sixty-five may not exceed the taxpayer's
disability income529 For both elderly and disabled taxpayers, the initial
amount is further reduced by certain retirement or disability income that
is exenmpt from tax. 53 0 On a joint return, the exempt income of both
spouses is combined to reduce the initial amount. 5 1 Thus, in the case
of a joint return, even if the spouses are living under a separate property
regime, the exempt income of one of the spouses could eliminate a
credit that otherwise would be available to the other spouse. A married
taxpayer cannot avoid this problem by filing a separate return unless
the taxpayer lives apart from his or her spouse for the entire taxable
year. 532
The initial amount is finally reduced by one-half of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income in excess of $7,500 in the case of an unmarried
taxpayer, $10,000 in the case of a joint return, and $5,000 in the case
of a married taxpayer filing a separate return. 3 The reduction for
529. I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(B) (1988). Disability income is the aggregate amount includable in
the individual's gross income for the taxable year under I.R.C. § 72 or 105(a) to the extent
that the amount constitutes wages (or payment in lieu of wages) for the period during which
the individual is absent from work on account of permanent and total disability. I.R.C.
§ 22(c)(2)(B)(iii) (1988). If both spouses qualify for the credit and only one of the spouses
is over the age of sixty-five, the initial amount on their joint return is the sum of $5,000
plus the disability income of the spouse who is under age sixty-five. I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(B)(ii)(II)
(1988). Because I.R.C. § 22 does not contain a special provision for community income, it
seems that the existence of the community could reduce the amount of the credit significantly
by cutting the under sixty-five-year-old spouse's disability income in half.
530. There are four categories of exempt income that reduce the initial amount: (1)
benefits under title II of the Social Security Act; (2) retirement benefits under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974; (3) disability benefits payable on account of personal injuries or
sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces; and (4) pensions, annuities, and
disability benefits excluded from income by any provision of law not contained in the
Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 22(c)(3)(A) (1988).
531. I.R.C. § 22(c)(3)(A) (1988).
532. Except in the case of a taxpayer who lives apart from his or her spouse for the
entire taxable year, the taxpayer may not claim the credit unless a joint return is filed.
I.R.C. § 22(e)(1) (1988).
533. I.R.C. § 22(d) (1988).
[Vol. 53
TAX, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE
adjusted gross income may result in a marriage penalty when two spouses
have adjusted gross income, and a marriage bonus when only one spouse
has adjusted gross income.
For purposes of section 22, a taxpayer is considered unmarried if
the taxpayer is legally separated from his or her spouse under a decree
of divorce or separate maintenance or if the abandoned spouse rule
applies . 3 4 Under these rules, a separated spouse in Louisiana who does
not satisfy the requirements of the abandoned spouse rule cannot avoid
the joint return requirement unless the spouse has been separated for
the entire taxable year. Not only will the other spouse's exempt income
reduce or eliminate the otherwise available credit, but the other spouse's
adjusted gross income that must be reported on the joint return could
also reduce or eliminate the taxpayer's ability to claim a credit under
section 22. If the community remains in existence in post-separation
years, the one-half of the other spouse's exempt income and adjusted
gross income that must be reported on the taxpayer's separate return
could reduce or eliminate an otherwise available credit. The availability
pf a judgment of separation from bed and board in Louisiana would
help such spouses both to avoid the joint return requirement during the
first year of separation and to terminate the community.
Even Louisiana spouses who have been separated for the entire
taxable year and who are living under a separate property regime could
benefit from the availability of a judgment of separation from bed and
board. A separated spouse who does not meet the requirements of the
abandoned spouse rule and who is not legally separated must compute
the section 22 credit for the elderly or totally disabled by using the
smallest initial amount and the smallest adjusted gross income threshold
that applies if the spouse files a separate return. A judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board would entitle the spouse to the larger credit
that is available to unmarried taxpayers.
3. The Earned Income Credit
The earned income credit is one of the most important credits
available to low income taxpayers. Section 32 of the Internal Revenue
Code allows a taxpayer to claim the earned income credit which consists
of a basic earned income credit and a health insurance credit. 35 The
fact of marriage may reduce the amount of the credits if both spouses
'have income. The maximum amount that a taxpayer can claim under
the earned income credit provisions in 1992 is $2,211. a1 The earned
income credit often serves as a subsidy to low income taxpayers because
534. I.R.C. §§ 22(e)(2), 7703 (1988).
535. I.R.C. § 32(a) (1988).
536. Rev. Proc. 91-65, § 5 1991-2 C.B. 869.
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it is refundable, to the extent that it exceeds the taxpayer's pre-credit
tax liability. 5"
The credit is available only if the taxpayer has at least one "qual-
ifying child" during the taxable year. 38 A qualifying child is a son,
daughter, grandchild, stepson, stepdaughter, or foster child of the
taxpayer s39 who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer, 40
and (1) is under the age of nineteen, (2) is a student under the age of
twenty-four, or (3) is permanently and totally disabled.5 4'
The basic earned income credit for 1992 is computed as a percentage
of the first $7,520 of the taxpayer's earned income.5 42 "Earned income"
includes wages, salaries, tips, other employee compensation, and net
earnings from self-employment. 43 Earned income is computed without
537. A taxpayer who qualifies for the earned income credit may receive the refund as
income is earned, thereby increasing his or her wages. I.R.C. § 3507 (1988). For a discussion
of the mechanics for receiving advance payments of the refundable portion of the earned
income credit, see 2 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 37.3 (Supp. 1992). Any refund
available under the earned income credit provisions is subject to I.R.C. § 6402(c) which
requires the Service to apply tax refunds for overpayments to past-due child support obli-
gations. Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 106 S. Ct. 1600 (1986). A
refund created by the earned income credit, however, is not an asset that passes to the
taxpayer's trustee in bankruptcy. In re Searles, 445 F. Supp. 749, 753 (D. Conn. 1978).
538. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A) (1988).
539. I.R.C; § 32(c)(3)(A)(i), (B) (1988 & Supp. 1991). A foster child qualifies only if
the taxpayer cares for the foster child as the taxpayer's own child and the foster child has
the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for the entire taxable year. I.R.C.
§ 32(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1988 & Supp. 1991). A child who is legally adopted or who is placed with
the taxpayer by an authorized adoption agency is treated as a child by blood for these
purposes. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(B)(iv) (1988 & Supp. 1991). A married child does not qualify
unless taxpayer is entitled to claim the married child as a dependent, or would be so entitled
except that the taxpayer has signed an agreement allowing the noncustodial parent to claim
the married child as a dependent. I.R.C. §32(c)(3)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
540. If the child is a son, daughter, grandchild, stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer,
the child must have the same principal place of abode for more than one-half of the taxable
year. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991). In the case of a foster child, the child's
principal place of abode must be the same as the taxpayer's for the entire taxable year.
I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1988 & Supp. 1991). In either case, the "abode" must be in the
United States. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(E) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
541. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(iii), (c) (1988 & Supp. 1991). A child who meets all of the
tests in the text will not be a "qualifying child", however, unless the taxpayer includes on
his or her income, tax return the child's name, age, and for a child over the age of one,
the child's taxpayer identification number. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(iv), (D)(i) (1988 & Supp.
1991). If the taxpayer also claims a health insurance credit under I.R.C. § 32(a)(2), the
Service can also require the taxpayer to include the insurance policy number or other evidence
of insurance on the return. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
542. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 5.02, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
543. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A) (1988). Earned income also includes compensation that is ex-
cluded from gross income, such as fringe benefits. Treas. Reg. 1.43-1(c)(3) (1980). Earned
income is reduced by any net loss from self-employment. Id. Earned income does not
include pensions, annuities, unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation or a
nonresident alien's income not connected with a United States business. Id.
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regard to community property laws.3" Thus, the earned income of a
Louisiana couple living under a community property regime is attributed
to the spouse who performs the services.
The maximum amount of the credit in 1992 is 17.6 percent of
$7,520, or $1,323.52, if the taxpayer has one qualifying child and 18.4
percent of $7,520, or $1,383.68, for a taxpayer with two or more
qualifying children . 4 In the case of a taxpayer with a qualifying child
who has not attained the age of one by the end of the taxable year,
a supplemental young child credit is allowed, increasing the credit per-
centage by five percentage points, to 22.6 percent for a taxpayer with
one child and 23.4 percent for a taxpayer with two or more qualifying
children.'"
The credit is phased out for a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income
(or, if greater, earned income) for 1992 exceeds $11,840 .4 For 1992
the credit for a taxpayer with one qualifying child is reduced by 12.57
percent of the amount by which adjusted gross income or earned income
(whichever is greater) exceeds $11,840.48 The phaseout percentage for
a taxpayer with two qualifying children in 1992 is 13.14 . 54 The phaseout
percentage for a taxpayer who claims the supplemental young child
credit is 3.57.1o Thus, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income or earned
income is greater than $22,370 in 1992 is not entitled to claim the basic
earned income credit.
The health insurance credit is allowed for premiums paid by the
taxpayer for medical insurance which covers at least one qualifying
child. 5 ' The maximum amount of insurance premiums that the taxpayer
544. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
545. I.R.C. § 32(b)(l)(C)(ii)(11) (1988 & Supp. 1991). In 1991 when Congress revised the
rules for calculating the earned income credit, it decided to phase in the amount allowed
as a credit, gradually increasing that amount. When the rules are fully phased in, for 1994
and subsequent years the percentages will be twenty-three percent for a taxpayer with one
qualifying child and twenty-five percent for a taxpayer with two or more qualifying children.
I.R.C. § 32(b)(l)(C)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The amounts of earned income to which the
percentages apply are adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 32(i) (1988).
546. I.R.C. § 32(b)(l)(D)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1991). If the taxpayer elects to claim this
supplemental young child credit, the taxpayer may not claim a child care credit with respect
to the child. Id.
547. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 5.02, 1991-2 C.B. 867, 869.
548. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(C)(ii)(Il) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The phase out percentages are
transitional. For 1994 and subsequent years, the phase out percentage for taxpayers with
one qualifying child is 16.43.
549. I.R.C. § 32(b)(l)(C)(ii)(lI) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
550. I.R.C. § 32(b)(l)(D)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
551. 1.R.C. § 32(a)(2), (b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1991). If the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
spouse is also covered by the insurance policy, the credit is not limited to the portions of
the premium allocable to the qualifying child. A taxpayer may not take into account,
however, any amount that is paid, reimbursed, or subsidized by the federal government, a
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can claim as a health insurance credit in 1992 is limited to six percent
of the taxpayer's first $7,520 of earned income, or $451.511 This amount
is, phased out by 4.285 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income or earned income (whichever is greater) exceeds
$11,840. 53 The health insurance credit, like the basic earned income
credit, is completely phased out for a taxpayer whose 1992 adjusted
gross income or earned income exceeds $22,370.
A taxpayer who is married is ineligible to claim either the basic
earned income credit or the health insurance credit unless the taxpayer
files a joint return.514 For purposes of the joint return requirement, a
taxpayer is considered unmarried if the taxpayer is legally separated
from his or her spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance
or if the abandoned spouse rule applies.155 Thus, in Louisiana a separated
spouse who does not meet the requirements of the abandoned spouse
rule, either because the spouse has not been separated during the last
six months of the taxable year5 6 or because the community is still in
existence,5 7 cannot claim the earned income credit unless the spouse
files a joint return. The combined adjusted gross income on a joint
return could reduce the amount of the credit or eliminate it completely.
There would be no need to file a joint return if the spouse could obtain
a judgment of separation from bed and board before the end of the
taxable year.
4. The General Business Credit
The limitations on the allowance of the general business credit can
result in a marriage penalty, especially for spouses who file separate
returns. The general business credit includes seven business-related cred-
its: (1) the investment credit, (2) the targeted jobs credit, (3) the alcohol
fuels credit, (4) the research credit, (5) the low-income housing credit,
(6) the enhanced oil recovery credit, and (7) in the case of an eligible
small business, the disabled access credit.15 Section 38 of the Internal
Revenue Code places a ceiling on the aggregate amount of the seven
credits that a taxpayer can use as a credit against tax in any taxable
state or local government, or any government agency or instrumentality and not includible
in the recipient's gross income. I.R.C. § 32(b)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
552. Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 5.05, 1991-92 C.B. 867, 869.
553. I.R.C. § 32(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 1991); Rev. Proc. 91-65 § 5.05, 1991-2 C.B.
867, 869.
554. I.R.C. § 32(d) (1988).
555. I.R.C. §§ 32(d), 7703 (1988).
556. I.R.C. § 7703(b)(3) (1988).
557. If the community is still in existence, the spouse will fail the requirement of I.R.C.
§ 7703(b)(2) (1988) that the spouse furnish over one-half of the costs of maintaining the
household. See supra notes 192, 248 and accompanying text.
558. I.R.C. § 38(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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year.55 9 Amounts that are disallowed under section 38 are carried back
three years and forward fifteen years, subject to the section 38 limitations
in the carry-back and carry-forward years.6° The limitations can be
detrimental to the taxpayer because the time value of money makes a
current tax credit worth more than a credit that is applied in a future
year. Because the limitations of section 38 apply to amounts carried
back or forward, a taxpayer could lose the advantage of a suspended
credit altogether.
The limitation under section 38 is based on the taxpayer's "net
income tax," defined as the sum of the regular tax liability and the
alternative minimum tax liability, reduced by the foreign tax credit and
the nonrefundable personal credits (including the child care credit and
the credit for the elderly and disabled).5 6' The maximum amount of the
otherwise allowable general business credit that the taxpayer may claim
for the year is the lesser of two amounts. The first is the excess of the
taxpayer's net income tax over the tentative minimum tax for the taxable
year. 6 2 The second is the excess of the taxpayer's net income tax over
twenty-five percent of so much of the taxpayer's net regular tax liability
as exceeds $25,000.163 The term "net regular tax liability" means regular
tax liability reduced by the foreign tax credit and the nonrefundable
personal credits. 56"
The first of these measures, based on tentative minimum tax, can
result in a marriage penalty, especially for separate filers. The tentative
minimum tax is an element of the alternative minimum tax, discussed
later in this article.5 65 To the extent that the fact of marriage increases
the tentative minimum tax, it also reduces the taxpayer's ability to use
the general business credit unless the second measure results in a smaller
allowable credit. 66
The second measure reduces the otherwise creditable amount for
taxpayers with a high income tax liability. The combined income on a
joint return often increases the amount of net tax liability as compared
with the tax liability incurred with respect to a separate return. Of
course, any increase in the taxpayer's net tax liability will also result
1
559. I.R.C. § 38(c) (1988). For an explanation of the limitation on the general business
credit, see I Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 1 27.1 (Supp. 1992).
560. I.R.C. § 39 (1988).
561. I.R.C. § 38 (c)(1) (1988).
562. I.R.C. § 38(c)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
563. I.R.C. § 38(c)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
564. I.R.C. § 38(c) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
565. See infra notes 569-586 and accompanying text.
566. Of course, to the extent that the fact of marriage reduces the tentative minimum
tax, it also increases the taxpayer's ability to use the general business credit unless the second
measure results in a smaller allowable credit.
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in an increase in the taxpayer's net income tax, which is the amount
from which twenty-five percent of the excess of the taxpayer's net tax
liability over $25,000 must be subtracted. The amount to be subtracted
from net income tax, however, can be greater for separated spouses
who are considered married for federal tax purposes than their coun-
terparts who are considered unmarried. The formula for computing that
amount requires a married couple to reduce the couple's joint net tax
liability by $25,000, whereas an unmarried taxpayer reduces the tax-
payer's single net tax liability by $25,000.
Separated spouses who are considered married cannot avoid this
problem by filing separate returns unless one of the spouses has no
current business credit or business credit carryforward or carryback to
the taxable year. In cases where both spouses have general business
credits, the second measure of the limit on the creditable amount is
computed by subtracting from the net income tax on the separate return,
twenty-five percent of so much of the taxpayer's net regular tax liability
as exceeds $12,500. 567 Separated spouses in Louisiana who do not satisfy
the requirements of the abandoned spouse rule cannot avoid any marriage
penalty resulting from the section 38 limitations on the general business
credit. The availability of a judgment of separation from bed and board
could increase the amount a separated spouse in Louisiana can claim
as a general business credit.5 61
E. The Alternative Minimum Tax
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code concerning the com-
putation of the alternative minimum tax5 69 ("AMT") create a marriage
bonus for some taxpayers and a marriage penalty for others. In general,
the AMT for an individual is a tax computed at a rate of twenty-four
percent that applies to an expanded income tax base called alternative
minimum taxable income ("AMTI").5 70 AMTI is taxable income in-
creased to eliminate the benefits of many tax preferences allowed in
computing a taxpayer's regular tax liability. 7I The amount of tax that
a taxpayer must pay for any year is essentially the greater of the regular
income tax or the AMT. Section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code refers
567. I.R.C. § 38(c)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
568. I.R.C. § 38 provides no definition of marital status. The reference in I.R.C.
§ 38(c)(2)(A) to "a husband or wife who files a separate return," however, seems to be a
reference to the taxpayer's filing status. For purposes of determining a taxpayer's filing
status, the taxpayer is considered unmarried if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or
her spouse or if the abandoned spouse rule applies. I.R.C. §§ l(a)-(d); 2(b), (c); 7703 (1988).
569. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1988).
570. For a discussion of the AMT, see 4 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 46, at 1111.4.
571. I.R.C. § 55(b)(2) (1988).
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to the AMT as the "tentative minimum tax" '' 52 because a taxpayer must
pay the AMT only if the AMT exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax liability
for the taxable year.
The purpose of the AMT is to ensure that a taxpayer with substantial
economic income cannot avoid significant tax liability by using tax
incentives and other special allowances authorized by the Internal Rev-
enue Code.7 To that end, Congress has assured that a taxpayer's AMTI
is greater than the taxpayer's taxable income to which the regular income
tax rates apply. For purposes of determining AMTI, (1) depreciation is
computed on a slower basis than is allowed for regular tax purposes,
5 74
(2) certain expenses that are deductible for regular tax purposes, such
as mining development and exploration costs, must be capitalized and
amortized, 57 (3) gain on certain installment sales must be reported in
full in the year of the sale 176 (4) certain itemized deductions are reduced
or disallowed 7 7 (5) the standard deduction and deduction for personal
exemptions are disallowed,5 7 (6) certain excess depletion deductions and
intangible drilling costs are disallowed5 79 (7) certain interest that is
exempt from the regular income tax is included, 80 and (8) numerous
other tax preferences and incentives that reduced the regular income tax
are added or adjusted to increase the tax base.5 11 Credits generally are
disallowed for AMT purposes except for a limited foreign income tax
credit. 182
The twenty-four percent individual AMT rate applies to the amount
of the taxpayer's AMTI that exceeds an exemption amount.5 8 a The
exemption amount is: (1) $40,000 in the case of a joint return, (2)
$30,000 for an unmarried individual, and (3) $20,000 for a married
taxpayer who files a separate return.58 4 The marriage bonus and penalty
that result from the variations in the exemption amount are obvious.
A separated spouse who is considered unmarried may reduce AMTI by
572. I.R.C. § 55(a) (1988).
573. H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 306 (1985); S. Rep. No. 313, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess., 518-19 (1985).
574. I.R.C. § 56(a)(1) (1988).
575. I.R.C. § 56(a)(2) (1988).
576. I.R.C. § 56(a)(6) (1988).
577. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A), (B), (C) (1988).
578. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(E) (1988).
579. I.R.C. § 57(a)(1), (2) (1988).
580. I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (1988).
581. For an explanation of all of the items that are adjusted or included in computing
an individual's AMT base, see Gaved A. Khokhar, 288-4th Tax Mgmt., Alternative Minimum
Tax A-8 to A-44 (1991).
582. I.R.C. § 59 (1988).
583. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
584. I.R.C. § 55(d)(1) (1988).
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$30,000. If the taxpayer is considered married and his or her spouse
has no AMTI, the taxpayer's AMTI is reduced by $40,000, resulting in
a marriage bonus of an additional $10,000 exemption amount. Separated
spouses with AMTI who are considered unmarried can each reduce their
AMTI by $30,000, resulting in an aggregate exemption of $60,000. If
they are considered married, the total exemption from the combined
AMTI is only $40,000 on a joint return. Each spouse may reduce AMTI
reported on a separate return by only $20,000.
The exemption amount is phased out for high income taxpayers. A
taxpayer must reduce the applicable exemption amount by twenty-five
percent of the taxpayer's AMTI in excess of (1) $150,000 in the case
of a joint return, (2) $112,500 in the case of aii unmarried taxpayer,
and (3) $75,000 in the case of a married taxpayer who files a separate
return.585 The threshold amounts of AMTI used in computing the re-
duction in the exemption amount produce a marriage bonus or penalty
similar to the bonus and penalty resulting from the exemption amounts.
. For purposes of computing an individual's AMT, a taxpayer is
considered unmarried if the taxpayer is legally separated from his or
her spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or if the
abandoned spouse rule applies.58 6 Thus, in Louisiana, a separated spouse
cannot avoid any marriage penalty resulting from the computation of
the AMT unless the spouse meets the requirements of the abandoned
spouse rule. The ability to obtain a decree of separation from bed and
board in Louisiana could help some separated spouses avoid some of
the adverse impact of the AMT provisions.
III. CONCLUSION
The federal rules concerning the taxation of community income and
the computation of an individual's income tax liability often impose a
burden on separated spouses. While application of the rules sometimes
results in a marriage bonus, a marriage penalty usually results in cases
where both spouses work. When spouses separate, it is not unusual for
both spouses to work to pay the costs of maintaining two households.
Thus, separated spouses who are considered married often are subject
to the marriage penalties that result from many different provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.
Commentators have criticized the Seaborn rule587 which requires each
spouse to report and pay tax on one-half of the community income,
the rules whose effect depends on marital status,5 88 and the rules requiring
585. I.R.C. § 55(d)(3) (1988).
586. I.R.C. §§ 55(d)(1), 7703 (1988).
587. See authorities cited supra note 177.
588. See authorities cited supra note 13.
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a legal separation to establish that a taxpayer is unmarried for federal
tax purposes. 8 9 While there is great need for reform at the federal level,
none seems to be forthcoming in the near future. In the meantime,
Louisiana could help some of its taxpayers to avoid the adverse impact
of the Seaborn rule and the marriage penalties by enacting provisions
authorizing legal separation. A judgment of separation from bed and
board would not only make it easier for separated spouses to terminate
the community, releasing such spouses from the burden of the Seaborn
rule, but it would also permit more separated spouses in Louisiana to
be considered unmarried for federal income tax purposes, removing the
burdens of the marriage penalty. The availability of a judgment of
separation from bed and board would not prevent Louisiana taxpayers
from taking advantage of the marriage bonus provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Separated spouses could take advantage of the marriage
bonus provisions by not filing a petition for a separation from bed and
board. Authorizing legal separations in Louisiana, therefore, would give
separated spouses a choice in selecting the federal income tax conse-
quences that would result in the greatest tax savings.
589. Hesch, supra note 183; Ulven, supra note 183.
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